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This study revises a dominant narrative of the eighteenth-century, in which a 
secular modernity emerges in opposition to religious belief.  It argues that a major 
challenge for writers such as Jonathan Swift and Daniel Defoe, and for English subjects 
generally, was to grasp the object world—including the modern technological object—in 
terms of its spiritual potential.  I identify disputes around the liturgy and common prayer 
as a source of a folk psychology concerning mental habits conditioned by everyday 
interactions with devotional and cultural objects.  Swift and Defoe therefore confront 
even paradigmatically modern forms (from trade items to scientific techniques) as a 
spiritual ecology, a network of new possibilities for practical piety and familiar forms of 
mental-spiritual illness. Texts like A Tale of a Tub (1704) and Robinson Crusoe (1719) 
renew Reformation ideals for the laity by evaluating technologies for governing a nation 
of souls.  
 vi 
Swift and Defoe‟s Protestantism thus appears as an active guide to understanding 
emotions and new experience rather than a static body of doctrine.  Current 
historiography neglects the early modern sense that sectarian objects and rituals not only 
discipline religious subjects, but also provoke ambivalence and anxiety: Swift‟s Tale 
diagnoses Catholic knavery and Puritan hypocrisy as neurotic attempts to extract pleasure 
from immiserating styles of material praxis. Crusoe, addressed to more radical believers 
in spaces of trade, sees competent spiritual, scientific and commercial practice on the 
same plane, as techniques for overcoming fetishistic desires.  Swift‟s orthodoxy of 
enforced moderation and Defoe‟s oddly worldly piety represent likeminded formulae for 
psychic reform, and not—as often alleged—conflicts between sincere belief and political 
or commercial interests.   
Gulliver’s Travels (1726) and A Journal of the Plague Year (1722) also link mind 
and governance through different visions of Protestant polity. Swift sees alienation from 
the national church—figured by a Crusoe or Gulliver—as refusal of common sense and 
problem solving. Defoe points to religious schism, exemplified by dissenters‟ exclusion 
from state church statistics, as a moral and medical failure: the city risks creating selfish 
citizens who also may overlook data needed to combat the plague. 
 vii 
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Introduction:  Belief and Its Vicissitudes 
But, the fourth Method of Religious Enthusiasm, or launching out of the Soul, as 
it is purely an Effect of Artifice and Mechanick Operation, has been sparingly handled, or 
not at all, by any Writer. 
 
Overview 
The long eighteenth century in England has often been represented as a seedbed 
of modernity, a period in which literature reflects, resists or aids a shift from a religious 
past to a secular future.  Increasingly, that future has been understood in terms of its 
material culture.  New structures of commerce, science and government were, after all, 
embodied in new cultural things: the spinning jenny, the power loom, navigational tools, 
carriage springs, city maps, clocks and a panoply of consumer goods.  Literary scholars 
have by now thoroughly embraced that artifactual world, turning especially to the 
commodity form and, by extension, the popular book itself, as avatars of a secular 
society.  Materialist approaches, including recent ―thing theory,‖ have examined cultural 
objects chiefly as new technologies or products presumed resistant to traditional or 
spiritual values. 
This study, in contrast, seeks to challenge dominant literary histories that 
understand the eighteenth century in terms of an epistemic shift between religious ways 
of knowing and the technical apparatuses of the modern, secular state.  It acknowledges 
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persisting spiritual thought by broadening our sense of what counts as early modern 
religion in literature.  In particular, I argue that by the eighteenth century English 
Protestantism‘s ceremonial fixations—parish-level disputes around the liturgy and 
common prayer—developed into what we might call an object-relations psychology, in 
which religious belief was construed in terms of mental habits conditioned by everyday 
interactions with devotional and cultural objects.  Authors therefore confronted even 
paradigmatically modern institutions as a kind of liturgy, a network of new possibilities 
for practical piety and familiar forms of mental-spiritual illness.   
This sense of a spiritual ecology led writers like Jonathan Swift and Daniel Defoe 
to use familiar sectarian thinking to assess cultural artifacts, institutions of governance 
and ethical habits in ways we do not easily recognize as religious.  Literary estimations of 
modern forms (from newspapers to trade items to scientific techniques) may be seen as 
efforts to distinguish between object practices that edify believers and idols that provoke 
neurotic illness. Texts like Gulliver’s Travels (1726) and A Journal of the Plague Year 
(1722) confront or reference new technologies not as avatars of modernity but as new 
possibilities for governing a nation of souls. 
Most broadly, I claim that a continuing English Reformation, rather than a break 
between religion and secular modernity, continued to guide thought about the material 
world.  I connect theories of mind in popular literature to post-Reformation debates about 
the laity‘s propensity to abuse devotional practice and fall into antisocial behaviors.  
Seemingly narrow sectarian controversies—stereotypes about Puritan character or 
conflict over Anglican liturgical moderation, for example—employ a common folk 
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psychology that sought to diagnose pathological modes of faith.  My account therefore 
questions the application of narratives about secularization or religious disenchantment to 
literature, since concepts from ecclesiology and theology more directly structure 
cognition about social change.  I seek, then, to provoke a sense of Protestantism in these 
works as an active guide to understanding emotions and new experience, rather than a 
static body of knowledge.  I will work with the premise that modernization should not be 
understood as a decay of religion but as a gradual reform of England‘s religious culture 
into its nineteenth-century Anglican form. 
The featured texts by Swift and Defoe—A Tale of a Tub (1704), Robinson Crusoe 
(1719), Gulliver’s Travels, and A Journal of the Plague Year—reflect influential 
eighteenth-century attitudes toward elements of modernization, and have been frequently 
appraised from that point of view.  Histories of the novel, for example, have typically 
looked to Swift and Defoe as exemplars of available political and artistic-mimetic 
responses to cultural change across the eighteenth century; both have been recruited as 
symbols for various modern reactions to secularity and capitalism.  Against such 
magisterial accounts charting modernity‘s rise through secular institutions, my treatment 
of these authors seeks to acknowledge the importance of the humble English parish to 
literary studies.  My comparison of these writers looks to their religious prejudices to 
discern a common spiritual hermeneutic about object culture and ethical disposition.  
This can alter our sense of the domain in which arguments about governance and 
modernity proceeded; at the same time, this model suggests a need to reassess common 
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This study seeks to make a novel claim by adopting an uncontroversial premise: 
that the eighteenth century remained significantly religious in its sensibility.  
Ecclesiastical historians recently have offered accounts of popular religion and a culture 
of practices that held sway even outside the Church of England well into the nineteenth 
century:  the intuition that spiritual forms are inherently averse to urbanization, 
industrialization, or technological innovation has been actively challenged.1  Evidence 
suggests the view of a fractured or complacent, unaccommodating Church of England 
under the late Stuarts and Hanoverians, administrated by an acquisitive (or destitute), 
pedantic or badly educated clergy must certainly be qualified.2  In cases where industrial 
workers and the poor were indeed alienated from the church, there seems to have been 
little concomitant decline in spiritual or supernatural belief, and a compensatory shift to 
dissent or Methodism.3  In addition, the analysis of religion as a discursive field or 
                                                 
1 Callum G. Brown, “The Mechanism of Religious Growth in Urban Societies: British Cities since the 
Eighteenth Century,” in European Religion in the Age of the Great Cities, 1830-1930, ed. Hugh McLeod 
(New York: Routledge, 1995), 239-62; Steve Bruce, ed. Religion and Modernization: Sociologists and 
Historians Debate the Secularization Thesis (New York: Oxford University Press,1992); Jeffrey Cox, The 
English Churches in a Secular Society: Lambeth, 1870-1930 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); 
Mark Smith, Religion in Industrial Society: Oldham and Saddleworth, 1740-1865, Oxford Historical 
Monographs (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994). 
2 William Gibson, The Church of England 1688-1832: Unity and Accord (New York: Routledge, 2001); 
John H. Pruett, The Parish Clergy under the Later Stuarts: The Leicestershire Experience (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1978); Smith, Religion, 32-62. 
3 Brown, “Religious Growth”; M. F. Snape, The Church of England in Industrialising Society: The 
Lancashire Parish of Whalley in the Eighteenth Century (Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 2003). 
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―protocols of behavior‖ not explicitly connected to institutions or quantifiable ritual 
behavior has revealed syncretic complexes of folk belief, magical thinking, and the 
affective communities that typify evangelicalism.4  The continued bestselling status of 
works like Lewis Bayly‘s The Practice of Piety (1611), Richard Allestree‘s The Whole 
Duty of Man (1658), and Gilbert Burnet‘s Discourse of Pastoral Care (1692) testifies to 
the continued importance in the eighteenth century of devotional modes involving 
personal transformation through discrete practices.5  Historians like J.C.D. Clark have 
insisted on the persistence of religious consensus.6  
Certainly the literary history of the eighteenth century has been written with an 
awareness of religious belief.  Influential studies of the early novel and its social matrix 
by Ian Watt and Michael McKeon make explicit use of Max Weber‘s The Protestant 
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.7  Theoretical texts with lasting impact in the field have 
                                                 
4Callum G. Brown, The Death of Christian Britain: Understanding Secularisation, 1800-2000 (New York: 
Routledge, 2001), 12.  See also David Hempton, The Religion of the People (London: Routledge, 1996); 
W.M. Jacob, Lay People and Religion in the Early Eighteenth Century (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996); Jim Obelkevich, Religion and Rural Society: South Lindsey, 1825-1875 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1976). 
5 Gibson, Church of England, 159-66. 
6 J.C.D. Clark, English Society 1660-1832: Religion, Ideology and Politics During the Ancien Regime, 2nd 
ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
7 Michael McKeon, The Origins of the English Novel 1600-1740 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1987), 190-95; Ian Watt, The Rise of the Novel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1957), 64, 90-1. 
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likewise acknowledged the Reformation‘s influence on modernity.8  Discourses of 
sentiment and ethics have been traced to a formative religious matrix.9   
But appreciations of religion‘s influence or vitality in the era sit, in literary 
history, perhaps too comfortably alongside grand narratives of technology and secularity.  
Most of these narratives have defined literary culture in terms of a shift from a numinous 
or enchanted world of religion to a scientistic and secular rationality. Weber‘s disciples 
see Protestantism as a vanishing mediator on the way to modernity; others point to 
Anglican moderation, tolerance or natural religion as self-destructive or unstable 
concessions on the way to science and secular liberalism10; other prominent critical works 
have tended to stress religion as part of a receding past, or as a didactic mode at odds 
with emergent social forms.11  
In this regard, my argument for the importance of spiritual discourse depends, in 
part, on a larger claim that literary history does not lack an appreciation of religion so 
much as an adequate concept of belief itself. Literary historiography has tended to 
characterize all religious faith similarly—as the subject‘s wholesale immersion in a world 
presumed shaped by supernatural forces, inner convictions regarding dogmatics, and 
                                                 
8 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Harbard University 
Press, 1989); Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (New York: Verso, 2006). 
9 R.S. Crane, “Suggestions toward  a Genealogy of the „Man of Feeling‟',” ELH 1, no. 3 (1934); Isabel 
Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment: A Study of the Language of Religion and Ethics in England, 1660-
1780. Vol. I: Whichcote to Wesley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
10 Again, see Rivers, Reason, Grace and Sentiment. 
11 See, for example Martin C. Battestin, The Moral Basis of Fielding's Art: A Study of Joseph Andrews, [1st 
ed. (Middletown, Conn.,: Wesleyan University Press, 1959); Nancy Armstrong, How Novels Think: The 
Limits of Individualism from 1719-1900 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); J. Paul Hunter, 
Before Novels: The Cultural Contexts of Eighteenth-Century English Fiction, 1st ed. (New York: Norton, 
1990); McKeon, Origins.  
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narrow ethical imperatives. Belief, that is, remains at once 1) a fragile inner state defined 
by supernatural perceptions that are undermined by naturalistic observation and 2) a 
stubborn set of ideological-epistemological constraints on the subject.  To the extent that 
Anglican subjects, for example, embraced religious tolerance, natural philosophy, or 
rational ethics they are perceived to participate in an erosion of real religious faith.  By 
the same token, a believer like Defoe can be tasked with betraying real Puritan 
providentialism with pragmatic capitalist motivations, individualism, or empiricism. 
But the Protestantism inherited by Swift and Defoe was not confined to static 
metaphysical prejudices; it also included an evolving practical piety organized around 
manipulating public behaviors and affects.  Rather than look to the more subjective 
components of what we usually take to be religion (doctrinal convictions or paranormal 
world-views), I propose to examine the broader spectrum of what we might call 
spirituality: acts of self-transformation.  The domain of investigation for this study—
discourses of spiritual technique or technology—has been suggested by scholarship 
regarding ―spiritual exercises,‖ described by Pierre Hadot as  
practices which could be physical, as in dietary regimes, or discursive, as in 
dialogue and meditation, or intuitive, as in contemplation, but which were all 
intended to effect a modification and a transformation in the subject who 
practiced them. 12  
Hadot offers the possibility of conceiving of religious practice in day-to-day living: that 
is, not as the expression of a world view but as a tool for cultivating dispositions and 
                                                 
12 Pierre Hadot, What Is Ancient Philosophy? (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2002), 6. 
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guiding relations between social actors and institutions. 13   Under Hadot‘s influence, 
Michel Foucault, in his 1981-82 lectures, ―The Hermeneutics of the Subject,‖ treats 
spirituality as the subject‘s concrete efforts to transform himself as a condition of access 
to truth—that is, ―researches, practices, and experiences, which may be purifications, 
ascetic exercises, renunciations, conversions of looking, modifications of existence, etc., 
which are, not for knowledge but for the subject, for the subject‘s very being, the price to 
be paid for the access to the truth.‖ 14  Elsewhere, he designates these practices 
―technologies of the self‖ that ―permit individuals to effect … a certain number of 
operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to 
transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, 
perfection, or immortality.‖15  Foucault distinguishes spirituality from philosophy and 
theology, which treat truth as accessible to all subjects equally upon rational reflection, 
without reference to self-modification.  Spirituality, therefore, has no necessary 
―constitutive or structural opposition‖ to science, for example, if the latter is seen as an 
edifying influence on the self, and not merely a neutral epistemological instrument.16 
                                                 
13 For examples of this approach see: Pierre Hadot, Plotinus, or the Simplicity of Vision, trans. Michael 
Chase (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); David Livingston, Philosophical Melancholy and 
Delirium: Hume's Pathology of Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1998); Ian Hunter, "The 
Morals of Metaphysics: Kant's Groundwork as Intellectual Paideia," Critical Inquiry 28(2002).  
14 Michel Foucault, The Hermenuetics of the Subject: Lectures at the College De France, 1981-1982, trans. 
Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2005), 15. 
15 Foucault, "Technologies of the Self," in Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault, ed. 
Huck Guttman, Luther H. Martin, and Patrick H. Hutton (1988), 18. 
16 Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject, 26-7. Recent work in the history of science confirms the 
importance of spiritual exercises as a component of otherwise novel and rational scientific techniques. See, 
for example, Matthew L. Jones, The Good Life in the Scientific Revolution: Descartes, Pascal, Leibniz, and 
the Cultivation of Virtue (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006); Stephen Gaukroger, Francis Bacon 
and the Transformation of Early-Modern Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
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In England, early legislation of Reformation embraced a religion based in this 
kind of practical spirituality.  The Royal Injunctions of 1538, for example, emphasized 
daily material praxis over dogma—a trend possibly reinforced by a dearth of native 
theologians and Calvinist emphasis on institutional change.  Reform of liturgical and 
popular practice enforced doctrine and political will, but also expressed reformist 
emphasis on conscious lay participation in salutary activity based on the primitive 
church.  For early Puritans that meant especially purging Catholic remnants and practices 
that supposedly diminished introspective piety; official policies embraced, with equal 
pragmatism, common worship in the name of edification.  The parish, the ―basic 
territorial unit‖ of ecclesiastical and civil administration and the center of local culture, 
became the locus of prescriptions for self-reform effectuated through common prayer.17  
These traditional functions led Victorian theorists to identify the parish as the origin and 
foundation of English civil government.18 
This study argues, then, that English subjects into the eighteenth century viewed 
quotidian objects and practices, like those defining everyday parish life, as spiritual 
technologies for inculcating habits of belief.  The religious objects and clothing  that 
feature prominently in texts like Swift‘s Tale were central to post-Reformation debates in 
England—not only as signs of inner faith or expressions of doctrine, but as actively 
creating specific kinds of religious subjects. 
                                                 
17 N.J.G. Pounds, A History of the English Parish: The Culture of Religion from Augustine to Victoria 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 3. 
18 Joshua Toulmin Smith, The Parish: Its Powers and Obligations at Law, Second ed. (London: H. Sweet, 
1857), 5.  On Toulmin Smith‟s politics and a review of scholarship see Benjamin John Weinstein, "Local 
Self-Government Is True Socialism: Joshua Toulmin Smith, the State and Character Formation," English 
Historical Review 123, no. 504.  
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Belief at a Distance 
It would be easy, given the influence of the state church, to tie spirituality or 
spiritual technologies in England to the equally Foucauldian analysis of ideological 
discipline by material apparatuses.  But writers like Swift, beyond acknowledging the 
conditioning influence of spiritual apparatuses (of the state or otherwise) also point to the 
failures of those objects. Employing their own anthropologies of material culture, early 
modern religious controversialists show a hardheaded awareness that subjects can be 
maladapted to culture—that religious belief is not immersive, but bound up with 
resistance and disbelief.   
The modern view of belief tends to preclude, that is, common sense observations 
about religion and religious believers that were routine in the post-Reformation era: For 
example, that believers, instead of experiencing a coherent reality anchored in divine 
purpose, often struggle with disbelief, anxiety and ambivalence in their faith, and even 
because of it; that they are often unable to articulate what they believe, contradict 
themselves, fail to understand or accept basic tenets of their faith and believe anyway; 
that they object to and argue about the religious cultures in which they dwell; that they 
can exploit their faith, often without loss of sincerity.  The assumption that believers are 
more or less perfectly integrated into their faiths neglects the ways sectarians themselves 
saw belief as inclusive of self-doubt, hypocrisy and neurotic performances of piety.  
Belief, that is, includes a variety of psychological and emotional stances internal to 
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devotional practice; it is not simply a way of perceiving the world in light of supernatural 
assumptions. 
Swift, for example, therefore attacks alien liturgical cultures for the ways their 
social rituals tend to produce anxious subjects, neither fully disciplined by their object 
practice, nor able to evade their desire to conform. From a strictly theological 
perspective, one could say Swift‘s archetypal Catholic and Puritan figures in the Tale 
falter between the tenets of Luther‘s Disputation on indulgences: that repentance can be 
understood neither as sacramental penance administered by clergy, nor as mere inward 
contrition.  More pragmatically, though, Swift‘s analysis suggests that cultural objects 
associated with these errors encourage dishonest, self-serving psychological habits that 
are inextricable from faith.  Swift depicts Catholic practice as excessive public ritual 
performance; such cultural imperatives, he assumes, encourage a subjectivity oriented 
toward desperately pleasing the imagined gaze of authority, yet aware of performance as 
a means of concealing antisocial desires.  Conversely, the purported Puritan tendency to 
identify with an ever-diminishing godly community, accomplished by rejecting common 
prayer, helps elevate personal imperatives to the status of truth.  But, he alleges, the 
resulting precisianism and self-scrutiny only repeat, in a subjective form, the Catholic 
tendency to overinvest in psychological objects: the Puritan‘s inner world of obsessions 
gives psychic license to repress his complicity in other, less spiritual acts or attitudes. 
An early-modern-style corrective to modern descriptions of religious culture thus 
involves more than admitting the existence of perfunctory devotions, dissidents or 
unbelievers, or resistance to repressive institutions.  My claim is that English Protestant 
 12 
practice was itself substantially defined by accounts of belief as inherently bound up with 
ambivalence toward one‘s ideals. Gone unrecognized, such alienation is expressed, in 
Swift‘s terms, in hypocrisy or knavery.  The enthusiast hypocrite, for instance, does not 
simply dissemble piety; rather, his very character as believer is fully organized around 
evasive practice— assuaging psychic pressures of both pious performance and his 
wayward urges.  However contradictory his motivations, he is nonetheless organically 
constituted as a subject of enjoyment extracted from all the components of his social 
world.   
In this study I have relied on Lacanian analogies to explicate this mode of reading 
character in a material world; but the limitations of the modern sense of hypocrisy as 
cynical pretense or failure are familiar enough from everyday experience: in, say, the 
irresponsible and lazy person who rejects all censure specifically because they are (they 
claim) more responsible and hardworking than others.  Such a hypocrite, in the Swiftian 
sense, does not only dissemble or reject a painful truth, but incorporates into his 
personality enjoyment of the full dynamic of self-delusion, laziness, righteous 
indignation, and defensive grandiosity.  The response to a narcissistic wound—a 
challenge to his self-image—only partly captures the anti-social pathology of both over-
identification with a chosen signifier (responsible, hardworking) and habitual exploitation 
of that designation as a defense against the burdensome cultural demand to perform to 
perfection.   
For thinkers like Swift there is no perfect capitulation to ideology—no fitting the 
subject seamlessly to his cultural practice without loss.  The question at hand is, 
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therefore, how is this loss to be experienced?  For the zealot, self-righteousness and 
contempt serve to soothe feelings not compatible with severe ideals expressed in their 
material culture.  Swiftian satire therefore sets itself the task of getting the reader to 
recognize his face in satire‘s glass by acknowledging not only his flaws, but also his 
libidinal position.  Critiques of objective conditions (corruption, human vice), are even 
secondary; those most under fire are sectarian-style hypocrites and knaves whose true 
refuge is in criticism itself, in flawed practice that disavows itself in scorn for others—
hence the danger of deflecting satire by identifying with it. 
Less onerous and damaging, Swift suggests, is a conformity regarded as a civic 
duty, not a metaphysical imperative.  Such merely edifying and yet also spiritual practice 
can underwrite cognition—not repression— of one‘s desires and humble self-reform.  
This religious mode, accordingly, does not consist primarily of a mélange of doctrinal 
and ethical prejudices and metaphysical colorings of natural phenomena; it is instead—to 
a significant degree—a psychologically informed social theory that describes morality in 
terms of conscious integration of object practice.  Its impetus comes from the 
Reformation‘s particular adoption of Christian traditions of reform, in Gerhart Ladner‘s 
phrasing, ―the idea of free, intentional and ever perfectible, multiple, prolonged and ever 
repeated efforts by man to re-assert and augment values pre-existent in the material-
spiritual compound of the world.‖19  The element missing from literary history as 
informed by modern concepts of religious belief is, quite simply, Protestantism itself—as 
                                                 
19 Gerhart Ladner, The Idea of Reform: Its Impact on Christian Thought and Action in the Age of the 
Fathers (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), 34. 
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a body of techniques of self-culture uniquely concerned with disrupting the 
epistemological limits often taken as definitive of all religious faith.   
Such strategies of reform can thus be identified in, for example, orthodox 
Anglican practices that seem hard to reconcile with common theories of religion.  Under 
a narrower understanding of belief as internal metaphysical conviction, the tendencies of 
the reconstituted Church of England after 1660 are easily conflated with secular 
positions: Anglican emphasis on reason and free will exalts something recognizable as a 
modern subject; Anglican thinkers embrace elements of modern science; Latitudinarians 
and high churchmen like Swift share a discomfort with dogmatics; divines who rejected 
―difficult and dark‖ Puritan theorizing advocated a clear and precise language that would 
find expression in the methods of the Royal Society and empiricist language 
philosophers.20  
But longstanding assimilations of Protestant discourse to secularization neglect 
the relevance of these techniques to an underlying spiritual psychology.  Such practices 
affirm, for example, that access to truth must be earned—whether in the secular 
courtroom or in the church; that truth and a good will emerge from heeding natural 
evidence and from consensus and debate rather than individual communion with the 
divine; that the Word and literacy underwrite everyday spiritual practice rather than only 
church-based ritual and iconography.  All of these practices serve, in sum, to disrupt 
pathological modes of piety based in self-deceit or supposed privileged access to reality.  
                                                 
20Rivers‟ Reason, Grace, and Sentiment touches on all of these points in the service of a broader argument: 
that orthodox Anglicanism paved the way for the divorce of ethics from religion in ascendant, if originally 
heterodox, fora, and hence, by extension, for the intellectual break toward a modern England. 
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Spirituality, in these terms, might be described as a cognitive tradition, one with roots in 
longstanding Protestant beliefs, but without necessary reference to explicitly religious 
forms. 
Expressed more socially, the model here points to the legacy of virtue politics in 
England, as examined by J.G.A. Pocock, for example.21  But the influence of public 
virtue as part of a religious tradition has typically been traced to Classical ethics; the 
presumed decay of that discourse has therefore been described as the defeat of 
Aristotelian and medieval Christian concepts by Enlightenment models of empiricism 
and utilitarianism.22 This again neglects or passes over what I suggest are distinctive 
qualities and influences of Reform culture into the eighteenth century.  Aristotelian 
models, for example, define virtue as a mean between extremes—a notion antithetical to 
the Protestant cognitivism I am arguing for here.  Consonant with modern ideas of 
religious belief as a coherent set of ethical-symbolic limits, Classical ethics sees virtue as 
a public performance of abstract principles.  In contrast, discourses around reforming 
Anglicanism saw static external proofs of virtue as an invitation to fetishistic practice; the 
better position was to see the virtue of conscious distance from perfection, to see edifying 
object practice as a social norm, not an abstract ideal.   
In this sense, Anglican moderation, the via media, I will suggest, was not 
understood—as Victorian High Church theory later had it—as a perfected compromise 
                                                 
21 J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican 
Tradition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), Virtue, Commerce and History: Essays on 
Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1985) and "Virtue and Commerce in the Eighteenth Century," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 3(1972). 
22 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984). 
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between Catholicism and Reform.  Instead, moderation was conceived along the 
theoretical lines of liturgical adiaphora—not an idealized mean but, as Bernard Verkamp 
explicates, an ―indifferent mean‖: a practice not doctrinally necessary, but whose merely 
formal rehearsal tutored a moderate conscious internalization of the spirit (not the letter) 
of the Law.23  Thus, the Swiftian character analysis of hypocrisy points not to a vice of—
as modern and Aristotelian analyses would have it—―underbelieving,‖ negotiated to an 
ideal Anglican practice when contrasted with zealotry/‖overbelieving,‖ but rather to a 
cognitive failure itself involving wrongheaded ideas of abstract perfection.24   
Medieval or Classical models fail to illuminate a pragmatic religious tradition 
oriented chiefly toward objects and mental practices— something closer to a psychology, 
as we see it today.  For an approach to Swift, at least, that resembles what I am 
proposing, one needs to look to now-unfashionable Freudian criticism, to Norman O. 
Brown‘s remark, in his essay ―The Excremental Vision,‖ that ―Swift hit upon the doctrine 
of sublimation as a new method for the psychoanalysis of religion, specifically religious 
enthusiasm. … If you want a distinctive label for Swift‘s new psychology of religion, it 
can only be called psychoanalysis.‖25 Psychoanalytic criticism, as is well known, has 
tended by turns to pathologize Swift, read him as modern analyst (in mid-century 
America), or make him a whipping boy for cultural misogyny as well as a champion of 
                                                 
23 Bernard J. Verkamp, The Indifferent Mean: Adiaphorism in the English Reformation to 1554 (Athens, 
Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1977). 
24 For this analysis coupled with the modern sense of hypocrisy as an uncomplicated pretense see Jay 
Newman, Fanatics and Hypocrites (Buffalo, New York: Prometheus, 1986), 84-91. 
25 Norman O. Brown, Life against Death: The Psychoanalytical Meaning of History 




 Brown‘s attempt to identify him with Freudian orthodoxy chafes in its fairly 
hydraulic theory of vital energies and overemphasis on sublimation, displacement and the 
―universal neurosis of mankind.‖   
More specifically, Brown adopts a progressive countercultural stance that sees 
secularization as a process of self-actualizing and all religion as a neurotic formation—an 
enchantment, in Weber‘s sense—to be dispelled by re-integrating universally repressed 
bodily desires.27  And yet the now studiously ignored Brown, in pointing to Swift as a 
station on the way to Freud, also locates him in a tradition that he traces to Luther.28  That 
move hints at a more cultural, less totalizing reading of Reform hermeneutics—one that 
finds less of Freud in Swift and Luther, and more of Luther in Swift and (in spirit at least) 
Freud.  For that view, we might turn for a precedent to Erik Erikson‘s Young Man Luther: 
A Study in Psychoanalysis and History (1958).  That work, often misremembered as a 
reductive psychological account of Luther‘s theology as a product of feelings towards his 
father, etc., makes the case for Protestant practice as a psychological theory—one that 
expressed its cognitivist supplanting of id with ego in terms of grace: 
                                                 
26 Ibid; John Middleton Murray, Jonathan Swift: A Critical Biography (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 1967).  Brown‟s chapter on Swift, dating from 1956, reviews several earlier touchstones for 
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relevant discussion, see Carole Fabricant, Swift's Landscape (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1982); Ruth Salvaggio, "Swift and Pychoanalysis, Language and Woman," Women's Studies 13(1988); 
William Empson, Some Versions of Pastoral (New York: New Directions, 1974); Thomas B. Gilmore, 
"The Comedy of Swift's Scatalogical Poems," PMLA 91, no. 1 (1976) and "Freud and Swift: A 
Psychological Reading of Strephon and Chloe," PLL 14(1978); Richard Rodino, "Blasphemy or Blessing? 
Swift's Scatological Poems," PLL 14(1978); Everett Zimmerman, "Swift's Scatalogical Poetry: A Praise of 
Folly," MLQ 48, no. 2 (1987). 
27 Brown, Life against Death, 231. 
28 Ibid., 232. 
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It is obvious that rituals, observances, and performances do evoke transitory 
affects which can be put on for the occasion and afterward hung in the closet with 
one's Sunday clothes. Man is able to ceremonialize, as he can ―automatize‖ 
psychologically, the signs and behaviors that are born of the deepest reverence or 
despair. However, for an affect to have a deep and lasting effect, or, as Luther 
would say, be affectionalis and moralis, it must not only be experienced as nearly 
overwhelming, but it must also in some way be affirmed by the ego as valid, 
almost as chosen: one means the affect, it signifies something meaningful, it is 
significant.29  
Erikson recognized a conceptual, not merely theological, concern with consciousness-
raising object practice, an attempt to overcome unconscious automaticity. 
 
Disenchanting the Disenchantment Narrative 
 The readings I offer here therefore constitute something of a sustained argument 
against the dominant description of religion‘s eclipse as a ―disenchantment‖ of the world.  
This historical narrative, implicit in many accounts of eighteenth-century literature‘s 
cultural context, remains the most stubborn manifestation of modern assumptions that 
religious belief involves subjects integrated into a totalizing faith.  The disenchantment 
narrative is important to literary history because it involves 1) an implausibly narrow 
notion of what counts as religion and religious discourse in eighteenth-century texts; 2) a 
                                                 
29Erik Erikson, Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History (New York: Norton, 1962), 
209. 
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naïve view of religious belief (or indeed of any ideological conviction) in the era; and 3) 
an attenuated description of Protestant culture and its historical place in literary texts.   
For Max Weber, who coined the phrase, the ―disenchantment of the world‖ 
(Entzauberung der Welt) describes the way subjects experience the historical 
marginalization of religion by increasingly rationalist social institutions.30 Weber saw the 
―elimination of magic‖ in Western science and religion itself, in a dynamic with a logical 
end in Calvin‘s rejection of ―sacramental forces,‖ the repudiation of ―all magical means 
to salvation as superstition and sin.‖31 The process issues in the modern conviction that 
―there are today no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather … one 
can, in principle, master all things by calculation.‖32  Along these exact lines, for 
example, McKeon describes Francis Bacon‘s efforts to order knowledge according to 
methods of sensory observation as, inevitably, an instrument of disenchantment:  
In Bacon‘s thought, the hierarchical relation of material signifier and spiritual 
signified may be felt to modulate into a respectful analogy, and this in turn 
threatens to transform itself into an antithetical signifying relationship in which 
the priority of sense experience is felt to have not simply a pedagogic but an 
ontological force.  And from this alternative perspective, the materialist language 
of empiricism does not so much mediate saved truth as comprehend it within its 
                                                 
30 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: 
Scribner, 1958), 117. For another standard account of disenchantment, including Protestantism as a secular 
force, see Keith Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic (New York: Scribner's, 1971). 
31 Weber, Protestant Ethic, 221. 
32 Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: 
Routledge, 1991), 139.  
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own triumphant epistemology, while the claim to historicity is revealed to be not a 
sophisticated weapon against atheism but its supremely powerful ally.33 
Here the attenuation of spiritual culture appears first and foremost an epistemological 
crisis—a change in the ordering, experiencing and representation of sensory data that 
corrodes an enclosed ideological structuring of experience according to supernatural 
beliefs.  This is, in other words, an account of religion chiefly as a way of knowing the 
world and, more importantly, as a way of knowing that absorbs subjects into a coherent 
and pervasive mode of perception. McKeon‘s account takes up Ian Watt‘s influential 
view—following Weber—that an emphasis on individual experience, apart from tradition 
and authority, marked the end of a truly religious era.  That view points to, for example, 
Robinson Crusoe‘s individualism and materialism as ―the progressive desacralizing of the 
world that was implicit in Protestantism, and that ended (in Weber‘s phrase) by 
disenchanting it altogether.‖34 
 Charles Taylor, in A Secular Age (2007), offers a recent and representative 
account of religious disenchantment (his term as well) that has the benefit of being 
explicitly theorized; my argument as it concerns this narrative may be illuminated by a 
comparison.  Taylor describes religious belief in terms of pre-critical background 
assumptions that inform the subject‘s way of being in the world.  With reference to 
Heidegger‘s phenomenology, he argues that belief is best described not by explicit 
theories that subjects might articulate (explanations for natural phenomena; ―credal 
                                                 
33 McKeon, Origins, 87. 
34 Leopold Damrosch, God's Plot and Man's Stories: Studies in the Fictiona Imagination from Milton to 
Fielding (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 192. 
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statements‖), but as the tacit ―conditions of belief‖ or ―conditions of experience‖ that 
structure their everyday lives.  This ―pre-ontology‖ shapes ordinary common-sense 
existence in the presumptively spiritual world of religious eras; it forms the background 
of more doctrinal beliefs.35  Taylor therefore rejects the idea that religion can simply be 
disproven by naturalism, that ―science refutes and hence crowds out religious belief,‖36 or 
that religion can simply be ―subtracted‖ as a superfluous superstition to reveal an ever-
present natural world.37  His sense of belief‘s persistence is therefore arguably stronger 
than may be implied in, say, McKeon‘s account of Bacon.  But I think it is fairer to say 
that Taylor captures exactly the central claim of all disenchantment historiography: that 
religious believers are deeply inscribed in (or predisposed to) a symbolic-spiritual 
perception of reality, one that is ―naïve‖—in Taylor‘s wording—in the sense that it is 
preconscious and, until disturbed by a skeptical epistemological sensibility, automatically 
colors experience of everyday life along religiously prescribed lines. 
 Taylor, accordingly, describes religious belief as a ―[form] of immediate 
certainty‖ ; ―a condition of lived experience, where what we might call a construal of the 
moral/spiritual is not lived as such, but as an immediate reality, like stones, rivers and 
mountains.‖ 38  This is, in short, Weber‘s persistent depiction of religious eras as 
enchanted.  Taylor explains it this way: ―The enchanted world in this sense is the world 
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of spirits, demons, and moral forces which our ancestors lived in‖39; the disturbing 
figures painted by Hieronymous Bosch, for example, ―were objects of real fear, of such 
compelling fear, that it wasn‘t possible to entertain seriously the idea that they might be 
unreal‖40; ―the natural world [believers] lived in, which had its place in the cosmos they 
imagined, testified to divine purpose and action.‖41   
 In this enchanted world, supposedly, people could find supernatural meaning in 
matter itself, which was experienced as suffused with spirit:  
Power also resided in things.  For the curative action of saints was often linked to 
centres where their relics resided; either some piece of their body (supposedly), or 
some object which had been connected with them in life, like (in the case of 
Christ), pieces of the true cross, or the sweat-cloth which Saint Veronica had used 
to wipe his face … And we can add to this other objects which had been endowed 
with sacramental power, like the Host, or candles which had been blessed at 
Candlemas … These objects were loci of spiritual power; which is why they had 
to be treated with care, and if abused could wreak terrible vengeance.42 
Objects are ―charged‖ and ―have what we usually call ‗magic‘ powers.‖43 
 Here it may be useful to make a few casual and preliminary objections.  One 
could reject, for example, Taylor‘s homogenizing of belief, and the apparent Romantic 
animus against disenchantment as a kind of fall into knowledge.  Also, Taylor‘s well-
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founded insistence that belief in pre-secular societies cannot be equated with modern 
belief within secular ones does not suffice to allay the firsthand intuition that belief 
simply does not look like this in any period; as I have suggested, believers have always 
exhibited beliefs and behaviors not consistent with their avowed faiths. His model 
accounts poorly for phenomena like doubt, hypocrisy, religious disputes, and artistic 
representations of spiritual reality that are not naïve, but rather highly conventional (like 
Bosch‘s, certainly), intellectual or pragmatic.  Obviously representations produced in 
religious eras do not simply register the hallucinatory (from our view) experiences of 
their producers; but, significantly, literary histories that deploy the disenchantment 
narrative have been prone to define modern ―realism‖ in a way that understands pre-
modern mimisis as, essentially, realism for people who believe in magic.   
One might also object, more pointedly, that Taylor seems to equate belief with an 
idealized, if not outright fictional, high medieval Catholicism—characterized by fully 
immersive and universal practice, and magical-folk attitudes about relics and sacraments.  
Indeed, if belief is equated with enchantment, including numinous enchantment of the 
object world, Reformation critiques of corrupt or superstitious ritual practice can only be 
described, prejudicially, as a force of secularity.  That is to say, the usual theoretical 
account of belief in general is predisposed to exclude historical Protestantism as real 
religion, as failing to incorporate real enchantment.44  By extension, it foreshortens the 
historical distinctiveness of Protestant culture in favor of an incipient modernity.  And, 
                                                 
44 In theory, Taylor could probably account synchronically for closed groups of modern Protestant 
fundamentalists in terms of feelings of enchantment similar to what he finds in medieval Catholicism.  But 
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only appears here as a disturbing secular force.  
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following Weber, Taylor indeed treats the Reformation almost exclusively as the main 
force of disenchantment.45 
But defining belief in idealist terms as epistemological closure or embedding in 
religious culture means, necessarily, excluding spiritual practice that is interested in 
discerning the limits of ideology.  Indeed, portraying Protestant critiques as, essentially, 
rationalist assaults on fragile, unspoken Heideggerian lifeword completely misses the 
substance of Reformation complaints about Catholic practice.  Taylor describes the 
Reform critique of ―sacramentals; all the elements of ‗magic‘ in the old religion‖ in 
narrowly logical and doctrinal terms: rejecting the idea that humans can influence God 
and achieve salvation through works and rituals, Taylor asserts, reformers denounced 
these practices as blasphemous and without effect.  The consequence was a general 
disillusioning, a loss of the power previously felt to inhabit the world.46  In this Hegelian 
scheme, an intellectual shift mediated by practice accomplishes a change in lived 
experience, in the essence of the historical lifeworld.  One set of ―real‖ beliefs about the 
world is eclipsed in dialectical fashion by another.   
But the reformers‘ objection was never merely that the Roman sacramental 
economy was false doctrine and therefore untrue and unworthy of belief—which they 
consequently eradicated; it was, rather, that the sacramental economy had never actually 
functioned as a coherent belief system in the first place.  In the reformers‘ view, subjects 
were never wholly enchanted in their belief; instead they experienced, time and again, the 
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frustrations of trying to believe in ritual regimens.  Or rather, reformers argued, it was 
precisely feelings of magical enchantment or fear that characterized the immoral fetishist 
or the doubting dissembler.  The Reform position was that faith premised on magical-
seeming acts, objects and privileged manipulators of them inculcated a belief inextricable 
from despair.  For them, Catholic practice testified daily to the co-presence of belief, 
disbelief and resistance—in hypocrisy, knavery and exploitation of the laity.  Reform 
culture furnished, accordingly, sophisticated accounts of belief itself as a struggle against 
mental idols—not just in prohibited objects and practices, but as a general tendency to 
psychologically overinvest in cultural artifacts without necessarily mastering any spiritual 
principles. 
Interestingly, even Taylor‘s theory of religious faith as totalizing mental ideation 
acknowledges the problem of desire and despair around which Protestants built much of 
their theology and culture.  The enchanted world, he argues, refers subjects‘ deepest 
intimations of moral and spiritual coherence or ―fullness‖ to God; the unbeliever or 
humanist, in contrast, seeks this fulfillment within, or in the immanent space of human 
endeavor.47  For believers ―the sense is that fullness comes to them, that it is something 
they receive; moreover receive in something like a personal relation, from another being 
capable of love and giving; approaching fullness involves, among other things, practices 
of devotion and prayer (as well as charity, giving).‖48  Fullness, in general may involve 
―an experience which unsettles and breaks through our ordinary sense of being‖ or 
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feeling ―united, moving forward, suddenly capable and full of energy. Our highest 
aspirations and life energies are somehow lined up, reinforcing each other, instead of 
producing psychic gridlock.‖49  It is, for unbelievers, also in the ―admiration‖ or ―awe‖ of 
reason or ―the sense of ourselves as beings both frail and courageous‖ which ―empowers‖ 
us.50  
  But in so characterizing belief, Taylor opens his standard account to the objection 
that the way of knowing the world he describes is also a way of feeling it—not an 
epistemology so much as an affect, and a participation in public emotions.  And Taylor 
describes, without taking on their theoretical significance, the negative side of these 
structures of feeling: enchanted subjects who order their lives to experience Godly power 
also sense, quite often, ―a distance, an absence, an exile, a seemingly irremediable 
incapacity ever to reach this place; an absence of power; a confusion, or worse, the 
condition often described in the tradition as melancholy.‖51  Unbelievers, too, may feel 
far from their ideals of human flourishing: ―he‘s not really happy in his marriage, or 
fulfilled in his job, or confident that this job really conduces to the benefit of humankind 
… there is something he aspires to beyond where he‘s at.‖52   
 The disenchantment narrative has little to say about these emotive components of 
belief; believers‘ negative affects are assumed to be, as it were, safely contained within 
their broader religious habitus.  Nor does Taylor draw any conclusions from the identical 
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structures of feeling he finds in believer and unbeliever alike.  Yet as a psychological 
rather than an epistemological state—what he is really describing here—it appears that 
belief is not an immersion in a presumptively spiritual lifeworld.  Instead it includes 
feelings of alienation from one‘s most central commitments; it even is that sense of 
alienation—or the drive to assuage it.  Indeed, the closer one is to spiritual centers of 
power, the worse the risk of feelings of exile.  My point, of course, is that this is a 
defining insight of the Protestant movement—that, in reformers‘ eyes, the kind of belief 
Taylor (among others) takes to be religion as such is an impossible idealization of belief, 
and one prone to producing neurotic and dysfunctional failures of real piety.  The main 
product of trying to live fully immersed in the religious imaginary and its artifacts, the 
symbolic Law, is guilt: this is the central point of Martin Luther‘s analysis of exemplary 
orthodox belief:   
The Law accuses and terrifies the conscience on account of sin.  And the sin that 
the conscience feels cannot be removed by pilgrimages, vigils, labors, efforts, 
vows, or any other works; in fact, sin is increased by works.  The more we work 
and sweat to extricate ourselves from sin, the worse off we are. … Many have 
worked hard, inventing various religious orders and disciplines, to find peace and 
a quiet conscience; but instead they have plunged even more deeply into even 
greater misery, for such tactics are merely ways of multiplying doubt and 
despair.53 
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Living experience suggests not only that devout believers are prone to crisis, but that 
belief itself includes a sense of loss and failure.  In this tradition, controversialist texts 
like Swift‘s Tale are informed by the conviction that claims for magical enchantment 
only betray, or cause, a deeper insecurity.  
Our modern sense of faith as firm inner commitment or an enchanted optic on the 
world implies that religious conviction involves asserting a kind of personal knowledge.  
But conviction is also an emotion—compatible even it its strongest manifestations with 
doubt, defensiveness and dissembling.  Mainstream Anglican divines therefore 
commonly distinguished between modes of faith as emotional, not epistemological, 
experiences. Isaac Barrow‘s sermon ―Of Justifying Faith,‖ for example, observes that 
faith, or belief, as common parlance suggests, means ―a firm persuasion of mind 
concerning the truth of what is propounded.‖54  But he also distinguishes healthy belief 
from zealous enthusiast ―firm and certain knowledge of God‘s eternal good will toward 
us particularly.‖55  The former (exemplified by Abraham‘s persuasion that God‘s 
promises were true) results in ―satisfaction, or acquiescence … an effectual obedience; a 
cheerful expectation‖; his faith is not ―his bare persuasion only, but all those 
concomitants thereof.‖56  The latter is a presumptuous certainty incompatible with other 
mental states, including doubt or ignorance or even hope; unlike Abraham‘s salutary trust 
in God, ―it supposes God to become our friend by knowing that he is our friend.‖57  It is, 
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in short, an entirely different emotional complex— one Barrow rejects as contrary to the 
doctrine of faith itself and inimical to healthy, Christian mental dispositions: ―By this 
notion many, or most … humble and modest Christians are excluded from being 
believers … and on the other side, the most presumptuous and fanatical sort of people are 
most certainly the truest and strongest believers.‖58  These two modes of faith are only 
indistinguishable under the modern umbrella sense of faith-as-epistemology. 
Belief of any kind relevant to religion is an emotional, not only an evidential 
process.  Belief is not knowledge, and the enthusiast attempt to discern God‘s good will 
absolutely only leads to a deepening of the negative affective component.  Barrow‘s 
discourse describes real faith as a salutary reverence for religious imperatives while 
acknowledging the subject‘s inevitable distance from them –what we might think of as 
the impossibility of enchantment.  Grace— God‘s promise to embrace imperfect or 
uncertain subjects—here represents not just a theological construction, but also a term for 
a mode of psychological integration: to accept master signifiers optimistically, as 
something one can be without being fully, impossibly subsumed.59    
The hermeneutic concerning the spiritual artifactual environment I locate in Swift 
and Defoe derives from this intellectual move; it adds a detailed account, I argue, of the 
coordinates of ―firm persuasion‖ as conditioned by—broadly speaking—cultural objects, 
the symbolic world.  In this tradition, the divisions between psychological terminology 
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and theology are not so clear. The Lacanian term for the pleasure Charles Taylor 
describes in satisfied religious subjects is jouissance; but the disenchantment hermeneutic 
purges that enjoyment of its manifestations in the death drive, feelings of loss, or in 
transgression—all phenomena given ethical and theological explication by post-
Reformation culture.  It is, however, as an analysis of belief in the vicissitudes of pleasure 
that I think the Protestant tradition as manifest in Swift and Defoe can be understood. 
These literary, psychological presentations of religion differ from modern historiography 
of immersive beliefs—in which, for example, the popularity of Reformation or 
Laudianism in England may be measured by increasingly complex estimations of 
discontent or satisfaction among traditional Catholics or Calvinists—whether through 
written or material culture. The discourse I want to follow past its Reformation roots is 
one—readily seen in Luther‘s own example—that confounds prejudices about 
partisanship by observing that it is the most devout Catholic who may make most fervent 
reformer, the most severe Puritan who finds relief in converting to Catholicism—and that 
a host of libidinal positions fall in between.  The assertion that pre-modern believers 
differ from modern ones by virtue of a more pervasive enchantment may therefore be 
seen as a tendentious defense of religion itself—against the fact that there is nevertheless 
great continuity in the ambivalence or duplicity that can constitute faith as such.  My 
modern-day neighbor‘s religious belief may differ fundamentally from that of his early 
modern counterpart, but my possible analysis that he is a fraud and a hypocrite likely has 
a distinguished early modern pedigree. 
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Idols of the Marketplace (Not Modern Things) 
A psychoanalytic perspective furnishes here not a privileged way of reading the 
content of these texts, but only one possible analogy for a discourse that appears in 
multiple forms across sectarian lines. Another one—deserving of its own explication, but 
beyond the immediate aims of this project—might be found in Francis Bacon‘s 
breakdown of cultural prejudices into different forms of mental idols; his move brings 
together Protestant theology, Bacon‘s own cultural criticism, and a sense of 
psychological objects.   
Bacon‘s ―Doctrine of Idols‖ in the Novum Organum (1620) aims at, in Graham 
Rees‘ description, ―the pernicious illusions, prejudices, mental habits and false 
perceptions that stand between the mind and nature.‖ 60  It identifies four types of mental 
idol: Idols of the Tribe, Cave, Market, and Theater.  Idols of the Tribe include illusions of 
the native human intellect—biases of the senses, projections and generalizations from 
personal experience, misapplications of probability and the like.61  Idols of the Cave 
―originate from the peculiar nature of the individual, both body and soul, as well as from 
education, custom, and accident‖; they are an effect of local acculturation.62 Idols of the 
Market are generated by the confusion of words for things, by carving out reality through 
the contingent terms of culture and reified abstractions; they are the product of broad 
social convention.63  Idols of the Theater, finally, concern illusory realities generated by 
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authority of dubious philosophical sects and systems.64  I will argue that something very 
like this approach guides both Swift and Defoe in assessing cultural objects.65   
It is important, then, to retain Bacon‘s religious sensibility, his conviction that 
idols and the trappings ―must be forsworn and renounced with unwavering and solemn 
resolve, and the intellect must be thoroughly freed and purged of them, since entrance 
into the Kingdom of Man, which is founded on the sciences, differs little from that into 
the Kingdom of Heaven.‖66  John Shanahan notes that ―though it has rarely been a 
sustained subject of Swift scholarship, Bacon‘s account of the ‗idols‘ that plague 
mankind was surely an important source for Swift in that it deployed the ethical force of 
theological iconoclasm while directing it at broadly secular and psychological targets.‖67 
I would suggest, though, that to identify certain targets as ―secular‖ and iconoclasm as an 
import from a more properly religious domain is already to capitulate to modern 
prejudices that religion stood apart from sociological and psychological claims about 
worldly things.  The spirit of Bacon‘s analytic in Swift and Defoe derives from a 
religious practice that took psychological states as its proper object.  Iconoclastic 
discourse is not ―theological‖ in the sense of being tied to doctrine and disputes about 
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church décor, the liturgy or religious imagery: rather, those issues reflect a more 
fundamental spiritual interest in psychic disposition as conditioned by social objects.  
Inasmuch as ordinary objects condition desire and ethical behavior, they remain spiritual 
objects.  Again, I do not at all suggest that these objects were construed to have numinous 
or mystical qualities; on the contrary, I argue for an English Protestant practice deeply 
suspicious of exactly that sense of enchantment construed as a psychic phenomenon.  
This is to erase the common distinction (or way of distinguishing) between 
supposedly secular and religious perceptual/conceptual objects—first, by broadening our 
sense of what counts as early modern religion and, second, by admitting that as 
psychological objects, social artifacts can never be purely enchanted by religious 
ideology or disenchanted into a ―real‖ empirical thing.  What English orthodoxy 
perceived as automatic-literalist aspects of Catholic-enthusiast belief (sacraments directly 
influence salvation; one must discern exact ritual prescriptions or offend God) can be 
characterized equally well as superstitious-magical happenings or as a kind of real 
materialist machine.  Either way, the Christian universe appears to operate like something 
in a Tolkien novel: Frodo‘s evil ring falls into Mount Doom‘s fire and Mordor magically-
automatically collapses.  The mainstream post-Reform critique of such claims does not 
appeal to supposedly more accurate knowledge about God or nature, a differently 
constructed machine.  Instead, it points to the enthusiast (defined in relative terms, of 
course; Defoe, too, condemns enthusiasm) failure to recognize even religious truths as 
artifacts of social consensus: enthusiast claims are magical fantasies in that they originate 
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in artificially small Protestant hermeneutic communities, but it is precisely as such they 
can be experienced as ―real‖ events. 
Protestant controversialists, then, did not seek to locate spiritual events or objects 
metaphysically (as modern emphasis on epistemology implies), but rather 
psychologically. An idol is not a prohibited object (given magical-metaphysical weight) 
as much as one that has fallen into a dubious cognitive role.  Alleged enthusiast 
―mechanical‖ belief of this sort takes place in what Lacan calls the register of the Real—
strictly, among thought-objects outside ordinary social consensus, and here, therefore, 
fantasized to have a quality of independent certainty.  It is in this sense that Slavoj 
Žižek— in terminology not far removed from Isaac Barrow‘s— characterizes 
fundamentalist religion as knowledge rather than belief.68  For the fundamentalist, the 
remains of Noah‘s Ark or the Shroud of Turin can prove his convictions; his claims 
occupy the same psychic plane as science, as understood in the modern era.69  The 
modern view of belief accepts this model rather uncritically, designating religion as a 
realm where supernatural truth claims among believers are sorted very much like 
empirical ones, with the provision that believers need be held to no public standard of 
accountability. 
This view of all objects as psychological objects and hence as spiritually 
significant, therefore challenges the sense, implicit in the disenchantment narrative, that 
secularity can be measured by the prevalence of technological or commercial object 
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culture. This disenchantment narrative gives the exemplary cultural object a genealogy 
that runs from the Catholic sacrament to the commodity as the avatar of a secular and 
commercial society.  Barbara Benedict, for example, observes that ―things‖ in literature 
―become a site of cultural struggle between a religious and a secular approach to 
meaning‖: 
Since the medieval period, sacred objects and relics in the Catholic tradition were 
believed to hold God's spirit, most cogently in the Host, and eighteenth-century 
collecting practices mimicked this reverence for things, albeit desacralized.  
Conventional Protestant doctrine however, held that objects embody the 
irreligious pursuit of wealth and worldly power over the pious worship of God . 
… As the material of consumption, objects also incarnate the satanic power of 
secular desire over spirituality.  Moreover, such objects refuse relationship, 
existing entirely in and of themselves, in a sphere whose detachment from 
quotidian concerns parallels but never intersects with the religious.70 
Obviously one cannot draw so firm a line between Catholicism‘s supposedly numinous 
objects and post-Reformation commodities.  If the enchantment narrative ignores the 
Protestant insight that subjects are never wholly immersed in a magical universe, it also 
construes Catholicism in—oddly—deeply Protestant terms, as a religion of unconscious 
mystical fantasy. Catholicism, for its part, had always been, by virtue of the mysteries of 
the incarnation and bodily resurrection, deeply invested in a sense of the material.  
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Catholic relics were venerated chiefly as signs and a tangible material presence--not 
magical or mystical vessels.
71
  The Eucharist fell into a completely different category, of 
course; it is not a ―most cogent‖ version of a relic. But even prevailing opinion regarding 
the Host was not that it ―held God‘s spirit.‖
72
  It is on the one hand, a wholly material 
object: bread, followed by another wholly material object: God‘s flesh.  Protestantism, 
here, fares little better.  Even foundational secularizing accounts in Weber and Tawney 
argue that zealous Protestant iconoclasts were deeply interested in matter (liturgical and 
otherwise) both as sensible objects and aids to spiritual reflection. Protestant 
otherworldliness found expression precisely in industrious application to trade— ideally 
cognized in a casuistic framework of pious pragmatism in the material realm.
73
  
The disenchantment narrative purports, of course, to take a particular interest in 
the cultural status of objects, yet a central feature has been the tendency to see elements 
of modernity (including scientific discourse or objects of empirical observation) as also 
somehow deprived of social weight: 
The thingness of objects opposes traditional spiritual or social values: the new, 
troubling ubiquity of objects in an urban world of shifting social relationships 
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promotes competition, isolation, insignificance…humans are shouldered aside by 
the parade of commodities that are capturing the center of culture.74 
Such claims too readily equate the object-thing with the commodity and a purely secular 
grid of space-time, all of which are said to be characteristic of the eighteenth century.  
Taylor, for one, is at pains to distance himself from the idea that religion is a 
superstructure easily removed to reveal a real world of bare objects.  But both his account 
and Benedict‘s require a distinction between what they take to be religion‘s defining 
otherworldly sensibility and worldly object concerns taken as necessarily definitive of 
secularity.75   
The move in eighteenth-century studies to a philosophically informed ―thing 
theory,‖ that speaks (in theory) to the pre-conceptual realm of object engagements seems, 
then, chiefly a re-iteration of Taylor‘s disenchantment account.  It has been marked, for 
example, by a tendency to equate modern objects like the commodity form with the bare 
Thing itself and consequently with secular sensibility—a peculiarity related to the idea 
that commodities are objects that are neutral or value-free in a way that religious objects 
are not: secular objects (if not secular cultures) are, supposedly, those reduced to their 
basic essence, exclusive of conceptual additions. 
76
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It seems unfortunate that the ―new materialism‖ should be so intimately tied to the 
commodity, as if the latter suddenly brought an awareness of the material world that had 
previously gone unremarked.  By no means is commercialism an obvious counterpart of 
interest in some obdurate thing-ness:  Bill Brown‘s influential theorizing of breaks in 
cultural understanding that constitute encounters with Things in fact describes them as 
―beyond intelligibility.‖77  At the same time, though, his mixture of Heidegger and Lacan 
suggests that to escape the bounds of cultural rhetorics is to be in touch with the bare 
Thing, which suggests a kind of nominalism.78  But Lacan's Real, incompletely gestured 
at in his formulations, cannot be understood simply as the inexplicably pre- or extra-
linguistic, but rather indicates only the outer edges of a particular, historical symbolic 
competence, the realm of the repellent, the unappetizing, or the foreign, or the surplus 
pleasure derived from objects without being socially sanctioned.  A cultural perception of 
the unspeakable remains a cultural perception. 
Along the same lines, commercial society does nothing to strip objects of their 
social-psychic constitution.  Objects, as Marshall Sahlins points out with reference to 
Marx‘s German Ideology, are for social subjects, themselves produced by a social object 
world; hence ―not even capitalism, despite its ostensible organization by and for 
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pragmatic advantage, can escape this cultural constitution of an apparently objective 
praxis. For, as Marx also taught, all production, even where it is governed by the 
commodity-form, by exchange-value, remains the production of use-values.‖
79
 Here use-
value does not designate an objective, utilitarian quality of a neutral commodity-thing 
opposed in some way to ―social values‖; nor is use-value some authenticity opposed to 
commodification.  Rather, use-value inheres in the object‘s cultural significance—as an 
object of desire in a symbolic social system.80 
 From that perspective, the vague magical quality imputed to the premodern-
religious object and the mysterious notion of use-less Thingness may perhaps be 
identified as simple inversions, projected on an Other, of secular capitals‘ rational and 
utilitarian self-image.  Sahlins observes that ―treating production as a natural-pragmatic 
process of need satisfaction. … risks an alliance with bourgeois economics‖: 
The explanation is satisfied to re-create the self-deception of the society to which 
it is addressed, where the logical system of objects and social relations proceeds 
along an unconscious plane, manifested only through market decisions based on 
price, leaving the impression that production is merely the precipitate of an 
enlightened rationality.81   
It therefore hardly improves this perspective to note, for example, that eighteenth-century 
subjects formed emotional bonds with commercial objects—as if this somehow 
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constituted a surprising resistance to or subversion of the flow of commodities.  Indeed 
one wonders whether thing theory —with its simultaneous embrace of the commodity 
and an alluring thingy substrate—is not itself a mode of commodity fetishism, bringing to 
the literary critic the more palpable pleasures of the antiquarian or the collector.  As 
Žižek suggests, the properly Marxist reproach to the commodity fetishist is not to point 
out that a commodity seems to him a ―magical object endowed with special powers‖ but 
is really ―just a reified expression of relations between people.‖  Instead the interpreter 
should point out that the commodity object may appear as a simple embodiment of social 
relations, but participating in those social relations reveals that one really regards the 
commodity as a magical object endowed with special powers.82  Similarly, the thing 
theorist purports to examine Things in a hard-nosed return to the material world—styled 
as a refreshing overcoming of exhausted historicism or baroque theory—but in doing so 
betrays the fetishist‘s sense that there is something more in the thing than its mere use. 
Most importantly, one should question the assumption that religion is 
compromised from a full ideal when wedded to commercial forms—as if it were not 
always already compromised within traditional religious culture itself: by contested, ever-
shifting material praxis and even orthodox psychological objects.  From the standpoint of 
spiritual practice designed to produce a particular Protestant individual, practices, objects, 
or institutions are heretical/orthodox not because of a doctrinal or technological status, 
but from unconscious position of desire. For English subjects, even those embracing new 
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techniques of commerce and governance, the product of religious reform and technical 
change was less the secular object than the common sense world of the English parish.   
 
A Brief Summary 
The first chapter of this study argues for the importance of discourses about object 
culture in post-Reformation thought and seeks to identify commonplace hermeneutics.  It 
therefore departs from literary history, in the narrower modern sense, to locate this 
materialist sensibility in broader religious culture, including theological texts obsessed 
with objects.  I highlight the unrecognized influence of this material by following recent 
historiography, which—like early modern thought itself—understands sectarian culture 
through local micro-practices and liturgical disputes rather than homogeneous beliefs or 
dogma; but this similarity, I suggest, still fails to capture the nuances of Protestant 
hermeneutics which, as I have indicated, assert that religious subjects are not merely 
conditioned by objects and rituals, but develop strong affective relations of aversion, 
obsession, and ambivalence to them.   
Swift‟s allegorical history of the Reformation in the Tale—the subject of chapter 
two—therefore exemplifies sectarian rhetoric grounded in sensitivity to problematic 
objects.  Catholicism‟s elaborate rituals and “idols” (Peter‟s gaudy coat) allegedly 
encourage pro forma obedience without spiritual introspection.  Zealous dissent (the 
austere Puritan Jack‟s ragged condition) is seen to elevate subjective inspiration at the 
expense of practical morality.  More than this, though, Swift presents alleged Catholic 
knavery and Puritan hypocrisy as neurotic formations, attempts to extract pleasure from 
 42 
immiserating styles of faith.  This chapter serves, then, to demonstrate, in Swift, a kind of 
orthodox norm for this sort of thought.  From this perspective, Anglicanism‟s tendency to 
push liturgical conflicts to the periphery, even as it affirmed orthodoxy, reads more 
coherently as an attempt to secure the territorial church through common praxis without 
recourse to devotional styles perceived to encourage pathological modes of belief.  
Sectarian labels function, that is, as shorthand diagnostic terms: rather than say, with 
Freudian critics, that Swift anticipates a diagnosis of the enthusiast as an obsessive 
neurotic, we might say that the eighteenth-century English descriptor for an obsessive 
neurotic is “enthusiast.” 
Here orthodoxy bears a counterintuitive resemblance to dissenting thought: 
Swift‟s striking comparison of Catholic and Puritan “objects” to artificial belief machines 
follows the logic of Puritan attacks on church ceremony as inimical to the Reformation 
project of raising belief to a level of conscious introspection. A comparison of Swift and 
Defoe (chapters three and four) thus shows a common vision of social objects that furnish 
affective coordinates of a living interpretive community modeled on the primitive church:  
a spiritual-civic ecology.  Defoe‟s Robinson Crusoe expresses the more radical 
Protestant‟s world-building impulse: if community is exemplified by the dissenting 
congregation, traumatic encounters with novelty can be assimilated into a providential 
civic order by isolated souls in the spaces of trade.  Specifically, I argue that religious 
readings of Robinson Crusoe have portrayed an otherworldly providentialism tied to the 
idea of religious enchantment.  But this reading has the unintended effect, I argue, of 
reducing the content of the narrative to a series of disconnected encounters with 
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modernity that take place against a static backdrop of an unappealing and unconvincing 
religious faith.  I therefore read the text as a more active phenomenology of Crusoe‟s 
experience—one that describes a process of mastering new objects and experiences in a 
process of spiritual and psychological self-critique. 
Chapter four reads Swift‟s Travels as a response to Crusoe—seen by Swift as a 
defective devotional manual.  With the premise that Gulliver is a psychic subject not 
unlike Crusoe, the text, I argue, seeks to demonstrate that the freelancing Puritan courts 
neurosis; it charts Gulliver‟s degrading ability to re-cognize events in a Christian frame 
absent the visible church‟s influence.  Equally importantly, the text demonstrates Swift‟s 
early modern psychic approach to religious and material artifacts—as opposed to the 
modern epistemological hermeneutic; in that sense, its critiques of commercial culture, 
popular literature, and proto-scientific projects can be seen not as responses to a creeping 
modernity, but as assertions that these forms function like liturgies or ritual styles that 
create all-too-familiar sectarian subjects.  Swift‟s sermon On the Testimony of 
Conscience serves here as a convenient guide to Swift‟s political-religious imaginary, 
since it offers a schematic view of available cultural styles, their sectarian analogues, and 
their psychic effects.  The Travels, I argue, may be seen as a thick description of these 
cultures as realized in a hypothetical English subject. 
Where those texts fantasize about encounters with novelty, Defoe‟s A Journal of 
the Plague Year (1722)—the subject of the final chapter—responds, in the same terms, to 
real crisis.  With graphic reproductions of vital statistics, quarantine orders, and quack 
medicine advertisements, the text has naturally been seen to reflect bureaucratic 
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governance and aggressive commodification.  But Defoe‟s archive of public speaking 
more plausibly models London as an interpretive Protestant ekklesia.  His view of the city 
as the ideal unit of governance reflects a culturally Presbyterian sensibility—attuned 
neither to the national territorial church, nor to the isolated or amorphously networked 
godly communities of enthusiasm or Independency.  Plague, no respecter of sectarian 
boundaries, but determined by physical vectors of contagion, demands consideration of 
medical data from the city as a comprehensive unit. But Defoe points out Dissenters‟ 
legal or civic invisibility as a crucial gap in London‟s historical and statistical records: the 
failure to realize a unified Protestant hermeneutic community is both unchristian and a 
health hazard.  The Journal thus affirms aspects of modern technical governance within a 
city space—but in the service of a spiritual community. 
I have tried to be consistent in the use of religious labeling.  “Anglican” and 
“Anglicanism” are inevitable anachronisms, and I use them for established church 
positions with an awareness that this was a contested norm.  For practice outside or 
critical of orthodoxy I have tried to use the neutral term “nonconformity” with a sense 
that nonconformists were not necessarily entirely outside the church.  Similarly, I have 
used the term “Puritan” in the sense of cultural Puritanism—the more specific  historical 
style or complex of practices as defined by modern scholarship—and with intent to 
invoke the thought of Patrick Collinson and others who insist on the constructed nature of 
the term.  I have used “dissent” chiefly regarding the legally defined set of 
nonconforming subjects and practices after 1662, though I have not capitalized the term.  
Where I construe Swift to be speaking broadly of zealous Protestantism, I have tried to 
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use his term, “enthusiasm.”  I have tried to avoid construing Swift as referring to 
“Calvinists,” despite the allegorical presence of “Jack,” in the Tale, in that it seems 
misleading to associate all Reformed churches with Calvin (again the term was originally 
pejorative), and all dissenters with the Reformed churches; an unfair association is likely 
Swift‟s point.  Similarly I have avoided the term Presbyterian as a catch-all, though 
Swift‟s contemporaries certainly employed it this way.  In keeping with the argument 
here, I have tried to be true to the sense that all of these positions claimed authority over 








PART I: DISAPPOINT AND PUNISH: ENGLISH PROTESTANTISM 





Chapter 1:  The Long Reformation and the Object World 
 
Beyond Religious Style 
This chapter outlines a particularly English mode of religious discourse centered 
on the object world.  In what follows I attempt to develop insights of historians who have 
focused on local Protestant micro-practices and liturgical objects, particularly the 
conflicts over these in the English Church in the post-Reformation era. Such recent 
historiography has examined religious groups in terms of their local identities, practices 
and material cultures, rather than in terms of homogeneous beliefs or theological dogmas.  
Missing from this otherwise convincing historical method, I suggest, is an overt 
recognition that English Protestants themselves made sophisticated analyses of material 
objects and everyday practices as spiritual technologies for inculcating habits of belief.  
Using these traditional methods, they developed new ideological critiques of Catholicism, 
as they saw it, and of competing religious groups, charting the effects of specific 
liturgical object-practices on individuals striving for a conscious sense of grace.   
 I therefore first suggest a parallel between modern historical method and this 
Protestant mode in which everyday interactions with liturgical and cultural objects are 
understood in terms of what Foucault has termed “care of the self,” the conditioning of 
the religious subject into a spiritually acceptable state of being and feeling.  I then suggest 
that this parallelism fails to capture an additional nuance of native Protestant discourse in 
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that, unlike modern histories, the accounts of identity produced this way include a strong 
sense that religious subjects are not merely conditioned or habituated by their use of 
objects and rituals, but also develop strong feelings of aversion, obsession, and 
ambivalence regarding religious duties.  The more complicated mode of cultural analysis 
that I find here approaches a kind of religious psychology, defining religious belief  not 
only as a set of mental contents, but also in terms of its ability to initiate and frame 
unconscious psychic dynamics, including neurotic commitments to social forms.  These 
dynamics, analyzed as ideological pathologies that structure belief itself, are presented in 
the era under question as inimical to the Protestant project of raising belief to a level of 
conscious introspection—to a set of practices guiding life choices, rather than a static 
body of knowledge.   
 In these terms, I argue, it is possible to see sectarian rhetorics (narrative forms 
regarding Puritan or Roman Catholic character, for example) as predicated on a common 
structural analytic of the psychological object, rather than as merely giving voice to 
disparate cultural prejudices or styles.  Such rhetorics are not only expressions of 
particular states of spirit, but also active cultural logics, available to believers to approach 
the understanding of new experience and for structuring their selves.  Similarly, I suggest 
that diverse religious forms, including Puritanism and Laudian ceremonialism—and, 
more broadly, the Anglican “via media”—were understood on the same plane, as 
strategies for structuring belief and knowledge of the world in terms of object practices 
that do not devolve into mere unconscious ideology. 
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Reformation and Micro-History  
It is by no means surprising that post-Reformation texts address the world of 
religious objects and technologies.  The field of religious conflict in England was 
substantially defined by closely fought engagements over material forms: the liturgy and 
sacraments, church layout and public ceremonies—all signposts of daily parish life.1  
Early Reformation bans on relic veneration, altars and rood screens, offerings to images, 
pilgrimages, the use of holy bread and water, the Latin mass itself, and assaults on 
practices such as prayers for the dead and devotional guild activities set the terms for 
partisan wrangling that continued unabated into the eighteenth century.  As Anglican 
tradition sought to codify practice and the accepted array of religious objects in the 
evolving Thirty-Nine Articles and Book of Common Prayer, enforced through various 
acts of uniformity, sectarian debates remained fixed on the specific materia of religion. In 
short, the laity experienced Reformation—broadly construed as the ongoing struggle to 
define English religious identity after the break with Rome—as a series of abrupt and 
drastic changes in familiar objects and practices in favor of novel spiritual protocols.
2
  An 
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account of churchwardens at St. Michael‟s, Gloucester hiring laborers to lower the altar 
floor and install a communion table in 1551, only to require the table removed and the 
altar raised up again two years later under Mary I, captures something of this experience, 
as does the thrifty conversion of priestly vestments to surplices, communion tablecloths, 
or even cushions.
3
 At an everyday level, the religious world was 
disrupted, sometimes in sudden and wrenching ways.  One month people were 
being urged to make pilgrimages to shrines which housed holy relics; the next 
month the relic was gone. … Some would welcome the new religion each time it 
was promoted, others would rejoice in every swing back toward the old.
4
 
But liturgical style or the status of sacred objects needs to be considered more broadly, 
since objects marked only the most discrete and contentious center of wider changes in 
public rituals, the ordering of the calendar, or sanctioned forms of recreation (as laid out, 
for example, in James I‟s Declaration of Sports).  Even here, one barely touches on the 
radiating effects of official prohibitions as they impinged on whole social networks and 
socializing processes.  A praxis as humble as church seating, for example, could affirm 
local hierarchies, even as it helped unite individuals in a community, while rites like 
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communion and baptism served as social markers and touchstones for group identity.
 5
 
For practicing Christians, changing traditions, especially those tied closely to forms and 
objects, meant more than affirming or denying underlying dogma, and more than 
confronting the strange and novel—it meant psychologically accommodating oneself to a 
potentially new identity and reconfiguring senses of space and reality.  
In line with the crucial role played by parish politics in reflecting doctrinal shifts, 
historiography of the English post-Reformation increasingly has emphasized everyday 
interactions  over ideological disputes across the borders of official regimes spanning 
from Roman Catholicism to the Elizabethan settlement—and back again— to rising 
Calvinism, Laudian Arminianism, contending Puritanisms, and a reconstituted 
Anglicanism.  If the once-standard model of popular Protestantism, in influential 
accounts like that of A.G. Dickins, opened up the field of local histories, revisionists like 
Eamon Duffy, in charting popular resistance to reform, further raised awareness of 
intense allegiance to local traditions.  Later evaluations, also attuned to parish-level 
micro-histories have proposed even more cellular models of religious and cultural change 
and have pointed to a more complex and divided popular Protestantism.
6
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This trend in scholarship underscores the difficulty of pinning down religious 
identity in individual communities, particularly in terms of broad doctrinal labels; parish 
practices, notwithstanding the sharp social divides suggested by partisan rhetoric, were 
highly syncretic and idiosyncratic in ways that resist idealogical generalization.7  Modern 
ecclesiastical history consequently has embraced a Long Reformation, supplanting the 
idea of dominant, stable Anglican or Puritan traditions in favor of a plurality of modes of 
worship and devotion competing over time, substantially within the church, to embody 
Reformation ideals.8  Exemplary here is Peter Lake‟s important notion of a “style” of 
divinity or piety, which stresses concrete habits and quotidian traditions in a spectrum of 
positions:9 
By [a style of divinity or piety] we mean a synthesis of positions, opinions and 
modes of affect, constructed by a variety of contemporary groups always in 
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polemical struggle the one with the other.  What marked one such style off from 
another was not an ideology or theology made up of opinions or positions peculiar 
to that grouping—that would have been impossible, all these people were 
Christians.  Rather it was the way in which the synthesis was constructed, the 
relative stress or value placed on the constituent parts that tended to mark off one 
group from another.10 
A label like “Laudian,” as Lake has employed it with his example of a “Laudian style,” 
for instance, defines sectarian interest not in terms of a homogeneous ideology, but 
instead by a set of family resemblances—acts and performances that clearly look to be 
related—pertaining to concrete practices of the self and the material stuff of worship.  
The rubric of style meshes with a general move to understand sectarian differences as 
praxes reflecting different points of emphasis around, for example, the visible or the 
gathered church.11 Lake‟s analytic is in this sense ideally suited to the broader trend that 
sees rifts in English Protestant practice as at once continuations of longstanding disputes 
and irreducibly local and contingent.  Like the new historicism or new cultural history, 
ecclesiology has embraced an ethnographic turn congenial to materialist analysis of 
micro-practices or the writing of so-called micro-histories.12 
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Protestant Discourse Around Objects 
Current scholarship has begun to match, in other words, a certain cultural 
materialist analytic to a religious history acknowledged to turn on local traditions and the 
material stuff of devotion.  But we can easily add a discursive claim to these historical 
and epistemological frames: simply, that English subjects across the Long Reformation 
developed their own complex modes of writing about and analyzing material culture and 
artifacts, not just as matters of cultural preference or religious dispute, but in terms of 
their psychic and ideological impact.  That is, while it has been a tenet of ecclesiastically-
oriented materialist history that the fine points of, say, wearing the surplice or railing the 
altar table could define religious constituencies and had powerful ideological effects (as 
in analyses of effects of church seating), it has been less remarked to what degree post-
Reformation Protestants themselves developed sophisticated conceptual schemes 
regarding the psychic interaction of English subjects and their (religious) object-world—
that is, how conscious they were of the correlation between practices and the cultural 
logics they espoused.  As noted, each shift in liturgical practice also reconfigured 
individuals‟ experience of space, community, and objects, often disrupting what had been 
“normal” experience of everyday life.  Controversialists of that era were already attuned 
to the formative power of material culture, as they dealt with these transformations, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
interpretive strategies of new historicism: “The narratives and performances at the centre of this book 
should be seen as providing contemporaries with a complex, interconnected and gendered web of narrative 
conventions, images and tropes that allowed them to confront and control, to scare themselves and reassure 
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also Patrick Collinson‟s remarks in “The English Reformation, 1945-1995,” 354.  
 55 
second-order echo of doctrinal shifts; but modern readings neglect this aspect of religious 
texts, seeing English subjects as naively advocating for specific liturgical cultures or 
formed by them, without a serious analytic mode of their own informing their 
preferences.  
 One way of making this case is to observe that recent artifactual historiography 
resembles nothing so much as the texts of post-Reformation religious disputants 
themselves.  Kenneth Fincham and Nicholas Tyacke‟s Altars Restored (2007) might 
serve as a case in point.13  The study takes up national religious conflict across a longue 
durée by tracking parish-level changes in the placement, construction and status of the 
altar, a focus of reforming iconoclasm and conformist ritual. The authors thereby insist 
on the laity‟s critical influence on Reformation and counter-Reformation based on 
complex and passionate attitudes toward familiar object-practices, recovered from 
arguments about altar placement. Their set of historical data for this micro-history of 
parish customs, they note, includes “the fabric of church buildings, and furnishings such 
as communion tables and rails, fonts, imagery in stained glass, painting, or plasterwork, 
and communion plate. … [sources] usually left to the tender mercies of art historians and 
antiquarians.”14  Only now, following Duffy and others, we might say, does modern 
scholarship, in the form of a book-length study on the positioning and railing of a 
common table, attend to the altar controversy with the same exacting, perhaps 
excruciating, detail and attention it commanded at the time and has commanded since, 
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14 Ibid., 1-7. 
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within the church itself.  The modern volume bears generic comparison to the material 
focus and liturgical genealogies of Bishop John William‟s nuanced argument against 
altar-wise placement of the communion table in Holy Table Name and Thing (1637), 
contemporaneous Laudian texts, or even their Victorian Tractarian analogues.15   
 But here we must also draw a distinction: Modern history writing in this vein 
veers somewhat between 1) cataloging emergent constituencies (and texts) surrounding 
various local or object-practices—as in the Fincham-Tyacke work—and 2) charting the 
socializing effects of praxis (supposed psychic resultants)—just as has been fashionable 
respecting, say, the ideological apparatuses of the modern state, or the confessional 
mechanisms of the Catholic Church.16  Gone missing is a discussion of the original texts‟ 
own materialist hermeneutics, as voiced from a specifically Protestant perspective—the 
longstanding interest in spiritual technologies, and the way that interest in some sense 
defined the Protestant project itself.  That is, these studies largely miss how ritual and 
other material forms were sociologically analyzed within sectarian conflict to discern 
certain results in the hearts and minds of believers. 
The native interest in materialist hermeneutics that today‟s scholars may be 
undervaluing is easily recognized in the earliest Puritan texts.  We need only renew 
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appreciation of these critical strategies regarding what we now term the “micro-politics” 
of power.  John Field‟s An Admonition to Parliament (1572), for example, attacks 
specifically the concrete ceremonial signs of incomplete Reformation: infant baptism and 
confirmation, as well as such customs as last rites and saint‟s days.
17
  These attacks—
simply an amplification of more mainstream Protestant assaults on Catholic mystification 
and liturgical elements unsanctioned by scripture (“matters of custome, and not in the 
booke”) exemplify a profound awareness of material objects and practices and their 
spiritual implications.  Thus, the un-reformed wedding service, alleged to idolize the 
beloved improperly, is for Field characterized by a material object: the couple‟s unseemly 
interaction with the wedding ring, “taking it up and laying it downe”; in “churching” a 
woman after childbirth “she must lie in with a white sheete upon her bed, and come 
covered with a vayle, as ashamed of some folly”; there is, Field insists, “no edification” 
in church services in which “they tosse the Psalmes in most places like tennis balles.  The 
people, some standing, some walking, some talking, some praying by themselves, attend 
not to the minister.  He againe posteth it over, as fast as he can gallop.”
18
  Observable 
material moments signaled for him breakdowns in desirable new practice. 
Far from a dogmatic rejection of symbolic activity in favor of the Book, then, 
Protestant piety in such accounts remains linked to the physical activity or performance 
of the service.  The Puritan authors regard liturgical practices as techniques—for practice 
and acquiring the habits of a Christian life that underwrite skillful, conscious 
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participation in a Christian community, technologies of practice that will lead souls to 
Christ.  In Field‟s example, that means quiet attendance and stillness before the Word, 
and personal “edification,” rather than, as in the Catholic mass, mere presence or busy 
inattention.19   
William Bradshaw‟s 1605 attempt at a semi-sociological account of “Puritanism” 
as it then existed within the church acknowledged this concern with practice in terms of 
its underlying logic rather than simply the set of material preferences; it is the group‟s 
defining feature:20 
They hold that all outward means instituted and set apart to express and set forth 
the inward worship of God, are parts of the divine worship and that not only all 
moral actions but all typical rites and figures ordained to shadow forth in the 
solemn worship and service of God, and spiritual or religious act or habit in the 
mind of man, are special parts of the same; and therefore that every such act ought 
evidently to be prescribed by the word of God, or else not to be done.21  
For the present argument, it is critical that Bradshaw identifies these zealous Protestants 
by their theory of subject formation, the connection they draw between external acts and 
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an internal spiritual habitus.  Further, Bradshaw himself privileges such a definition of 
religious style over dogma in his account.  Like modern historians, he uses material 
predilections to assign a convenient label (Puritan), tacitly making use of a pragmatic 
understanding of faith common even to those who did not consider themselves Puritans.   
Pitched toward the same Reformation ideals touted by hotter sorts of 
Protestants—against innovative rites and works in favor of a conscious Christian 
community—the conformist or ceremonialist perspective can be said to employ the same 
object-oriented mode of argument.  Along these lines, as Peter Lake has shown, Laudian 
ceremonialists in the 1630s also were quick to connect external ceremony and internal 
spiritual disposition, to the disadvantge of lax parishioners: 
How unseemly is it, to see some kneele, some stand, some sit, some leane upon 
their elbowes? As if they thought of any thing rather than of God, and his service; 
as if necessity, and not devotion, brought us hither.  Distraction in our behavior 
manifests distraction in our minds, and gives a just advantage to the enemies of 
our Church.22 
While the text emphasizes elegant and compulsory ceremony rather than deliberate and 
introspective simplicity, the notion of a spiritual habitus conditioned by outward activity 
is clear.  The idea that “such correspondency, and sympathy between the Soule and the 
body; as maketh to accord one with an other, like those Creatures and wheels, mentioned 
                                                 
22 Edward Boughen, A Sermon Concerning Decencie and Order in the Church (London:1638), 11.  Lake 
quotes an immediately preceding portion of Boughen‟s sermon, regarding the bracing effect of the 
congregation behaving in unison with “reverence and decency.” See Lake, “Laudian Style,” 166-7. 
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by the prophet [Ezekiel]” brings out a decided parallel with Puritan analytic modes.23  
Bodily activity, within an ecology of  liturgical objects, the whole environs of worship, 
was seen to shape pious habits of mind in particular directions.  Accordingly, 
ceremonialists denounced the emphasis on preaching facilitated by the prominence of the 
pulpit, just as Puritans decried transformation of the communion table into an altar,— a 
material struggle manifested even in the physical design of parish churches for two 
centuries after the Civil War.24  In both cases, a physical setting accommodates a 
liturgical discipline, including both practice and objects, in which theological positions 
(stressing a mediated sacrament or universal access to scripture) link directly to practical 
ecclesiological and political concerns (whether communion might be received seated or 
whether preachers might extemporaneously speak beyond their political authority) and to 
mundane but psychologically powerful contingencies that could undermine parishioners‟ 
beliefs (whether the altar might chance to be profaned by use as an ordinary table).  
Those concerns are therefore expressed not strictly doctrinally or in terms of the objects‟ 
symbolic potential, but in terms of the objects—altar and pulpit—themselves.  These 
things, in their spatial, auditory and physical possibilities, crucially facilitate opposing 
spiritual modes; they are not simply the requisite furnishings or signs of underlying 
belief. 
Consequently, the Puritan position condemning mindless, rote popish ritual may 
neatly be set alongside the ceremonialist estimation of Puritan sermonizing; both demand 
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liturgical supports for conscious education of the laity, as opposed to mechanical 
attendance.  In fact, far from defining a distinctive Laudian style opposed to 
nonconformist austerity or slackness, the ceremonialist charge against preaching and 
pulpit closely mimics the logic of early nonconformist complaints against the Elizabethan 
church: that reformed Christianity risks a return to automatic behaviors that inhibit self-
transformation—in this case by nonconformists passively auditing sermons while 
neglecting the deliberate behaviors, prayer and reverent ceremony, characteristic of an 
engaged and present mind.  Lake‟s exemplar, Foulke Robartes, thus condemns 
Puritanism for all activities—whether zealous displays of prayer or asceticism or passive 
attendance—that are taken as beneficial in and of themselves, without reference to 
conscious and sustained commitment to duty: 
If a man thinke that though he neglect the true duties of godlinesse, he is yet a 
godly man; because he is very exact in all the gestures of outward reverence in 
God‘s worship: I parallel that man with an other sect of hypocrites, whose whole 
godlinesse consisteth, in going to some selected Church, and in being present 
where a Sermon is: though in the meane time, they learne nothing and practice as 
little of true godlinesse.25   
Both Puritan modes amount to fetishism, in contrast to Laudian ceremony, which 
Robartes endorses not for its own sake, but as a vital support for pious training of the soul 
within.  Both tendencies of English Protestantism, toward the visible and the gathered 
church, availed themselves of the same deep discourse regarding the material elements 
                                                 
25 Robartes, God's Holy House and Service, 68. 
 62 
and practices of worshipful life; indeed Robartes‘ charges employ the same logic as 
attacks on Laudianism‘s own affinity for ―gestures of outward reverence.‖  Lake 
therefore crucially notes that for Laudians the outward act ―served both to express and to 
inculcate various spiritual qualities or habits of mind.‖  But his formulation that lay piety 
could be equated with ―mere assiduous attendance at and participation in the services of 
the established Church‖ or ―puppet-like obedience‖ runs directly counter to Robartes‘s 
explicit emphasis on genuine internal change as opposed to rote activity, and obscures a 
common disdain for ―mere‖ ceremony of any sort. 
 The well-known doctrinal/theological touchstone here is of course the Pauline 
notion of edification, seen from two points of view, as inculcating decency and order in 
the soul, and as participation in the living church.  But a common acute awareness of the 
object-world‟s tendency to generate ideological investments binds this familiar 
opposition.  Sectarians grasped rival artifactual cultures expansively, in terms of 
interlocking objects and praxes that conditioned a given spiritual habitus.  More broadly, 
we might say that writers across a spectrum of beliefs developed analyses directed at 
cultural artifacts as embodying—actually crystallizing or petrifying— religious logics 
that in turn territorialized authorized users of those material infrastructures.  In that sense, 
the tenor of English anti-Catholicism, striking many scholars and observers over time as 
variously out of proportion, can be understood in the light of the sense that Catholicism 
persists even less in its adherents than it does in its stubborn material residues—including 
the very parish churches in which English Protestants worshipped.  As long as spaces, 
objects, and physical habits remain, so, too, will traces of hated corruption of doctrine.  
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Similarly, nonconformity‟s ad hoc conventicles were seen not merely as spaces for 
secreting illicit belief, but as physically generating—mutating and evolving—belief itself. 
 
Maladapted Subjects: The Insufficiency of the Object 
 Similarities between contemporary historiographic method and Protestant 
discourse contemporaneous with the Reformation can help highlight the ways English 
subjects appraised material culture in a religious language calibrated for that purpose.  
Artifacts fell under severe scrutiny for their implications in regimes that could shape a 
religious disposition co-extensive with everyday activities.  With this observation we 
supplement the historian‟s analytic of religious style with a sense that Reformation 
liturgical disputes were already conditioned on just such a hermeneutic—what is, as 
style, potentially dismissed as almost anterior to dogma is in fact its physical correlate. 
Because it had a clear view of this correlation, Protestant culture was particularly 
invested in its mental furniture and, by extension, in the environment‟s spiritual impact.   
But I wish to push the notion of liturgical—and cultural—style further: When we 
speak of a religious style, habitus, or subculture, our thinking remains drawn to notions of 
enculturation, inscription in power relations, or, less stringently, the mutually reinforcing 
texts and institutions scrutinized in the best practices of finely-tuned historical 
contextualism.  Yet English sectarian texts, for all their interest in objects‟ formative 
power, insist also on the failure of cultural conditioning, as evidenced by psychic, 
affective—and ultimately spiritual—costs of investment in cultural objects.  The basic 
Reformation critique of the Roman Church remains the paradigmatic instance.  Far from 
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asserting that Roman Catholic subjects are harmoniously, or even repressively, inscribed 
into a misguided ritual belief system, Protestant tropes depict Catholic subjects held in 
place by deep ambivalence, by a strictly neurotic attachment, and even resistance to, the 
sacramental economy of rites, works and objects.   
This analysis of Catholicism as the ritualistic religion par excellence underwrites 
the most fundamental Reformation-era critiques following Luther‟s re-conceptualization 
of Romans I: 17 as affirming justification by faith over good works.  The emphasis on 
faith implies an concomitant account of unreformed Catholicism as imposition of an 
elaborate symbolic network of religious objects, rituals and prescribed behaviors, which 
nonetheless fails to provide a subjective experience of justification—a technology that 
has become an empty form, purportedly without spiritual content.   
More than this, it is precisely the inadequacy of these object-practices (this 
orientation to outward practice rather than to a state of soul) to assure a sense of salvation 
or full membership in God‟s communion that secures the subject‟s investment in the 
sacramental economy.  The more the subject fails, the more desperate he is to conform.  
Conversely, the more the subject strives, the more alienated he becomes.  Early English 
reformers consequently reconceived of their Catholic past in these terms, borrowed from 
Luther‟s account of the Gospels as a threat afflicting him with a bad conscience even as 
he redoubled his efforts to live righteously.  In the words of one evangelical: “How we 
ran from post to pillar, from stock to stone, from idol to idol, from place to place, to seek 
remission of our sins. … How were we bewitched to believe, that in observing the pope‟s 
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ceremonies there was everlasting salvation, and in neglecting them eternal damnation.”
26
  
In contrast, Protestant faith meant a saving grace that dispelled guilt unassuaged by 
immoderate religious devotion or self-mortification. 
 This baseline theological narrative may also be expressed in terms of the 
materialist hermeneutic I am targeting here: Protestant discourse furnishes, in one 
moment, a language for the material social machinery that promises adequation of the 
historical subject to his milieu; in this sense, one‟s belief is external and conditioned by a 
network of prescribed object-practices acting as master signifiers within the social order.  
They saw subjects as, in Althusserian terms, interpellated by an ideological apparatus.  
Catholic sacramental structure therefore furnishes them with an exemplary instance of 
just such a material culture or style deployed to inculcate the habits of belief and hence 
with a domain of experience that may need to be managed in new ways.  Using this 
insight, English reformers emphasized the edifying power of ritual and everyday practice, 
as well as their potential for harm.  
But Protestant texts depend also upon a second insight: that custom gains its 
unconscious power by catching subjects in a relation of desire (as Lacan would use the 
term), in which habituation is identified as a by-product of the social order‟s inability 
fully to contain or satisfy the subject.  The array of cultural objects, in this sense, 
fascinates by virtue of its failure to grant the subject what it promises, or the subject‟s 
proximity to his own resistance.  Protestant texts thereby posit a decidedly more complex 
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relation to the object world than that proposed in recent models, one involving 
ambivalence, obsession, and alienation.  Bluntly, recent historiography sees religious 
discourse as coextensive with cultural values and belief, underwriting preferences for 
cultural objects, and objects as the environing conditions of largely complimentary 
ideologies.  Instead, in these Reformation-era examples, religious discourse often 
functions in a meta-critical capacity to describe belief itself as unconsciously structured 
around what cultural objects ultimately deny the subject, or force him to repress. The 
subject is therefore not positively conditioned and subjectivized by the object, but by the 
gap between the object‟s promise of social place and its real status as a mindless 
injunction supported by a collective fiction/fantasy.   
In this sense, the object (the pew, the pulpit, the liturgy…) acts not just a 
Foucauldian disciplinary machine or an Althusserian ideological apparatus, but rather 
becomes, as I have hinted, the Lacanian Thing: an “object a” or signifier in the dominant 
symbolic order of a community around which an individual‟s desire is formed—not 
harmoniously, but in the vexed attempt to remedy a constitutive lack in the Other, some 
state of affairs that is not in the subject‟s present.27   The subject relates to social objects 
in libidinal/affective terms, as imagined remedies to his deficiency.  In Lacan‟s less 
existentialist formulation, “there is no big Other,”—no guarantee of the consistency of 
                                                 
27 The most familiar recent attempt to articulate the interlocking of belief and material practice in these 
Lacanian terms is Slavoj Žižek‟s critique of the Althusserian model of ideology.  As his project insists, 
ideological belief consists in subjecting oneself to automatic social behaviors and rituals.  These 
unconscious coordinates of the subject‟s commitment to the social “big Other,” far from opposing true, 
inner belief, are its positive condition.  See especially Slavoj Žižek, For They Know Not What They Do: 
Enjoyment as a Political Factor (New York: Verso, 1991) and The Sublime Object of Ideology (New York: 
Verso, 1999). 
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the social symbolic in an absolutely secure existence of satisfaction, and no signifier for 
what the subject truly seeks.  Good works and penance remain, ineluctably, just a dead 
set of rituals that never offer fulfillment; but they also serve to deflect scrutiny, to transfer 
belief by fooling witnesses, real or perceived, thought to believe more fully than the 
subject. 
In this sense, Roman Church practice in these texts stands in for a typical, not an 
exceptional, social form—a representative instance of the lure of cultural objects and 
their capacity to disappoint and punish.  Its particular failure rests, allegedly, in 
representing religion, a realm of struggle for self-mastery, in terms calibrated to demand 
simple obedience to the network of objects, the sacramental economy. English 
Protestantism‟s counterpoint to that assumption, its cognitivist concern with devotion as 
an internal conscious state, takes aim at this automatic belief structure, locating piety 
instead in an introspective gap between practical activity and self-representation.28 
 This account of a subject‟s relation to the Roman Church-as-Thing clarifies the 
formal roots of two emblematic complaints regarding Catholicism by reformers.  First, 
Catholicism encourages, in the Protestant view, an overzealous and hopeless pursuit of 
individual acts that cannot properly confer a sense of justification.  Second, and perhaps 
more familiar, is the charge that Catholic practice that is supposed to correlate with 
feelings of justification actually countenances purely superficial and externalized forms 
of penance—indulgences and pardons or confession—that permit a speedy return to 
                                                 
28 This is not to suggest that all Protestant texts contain this specific proposition—rather, Protestant 
discourse, in all its variety and conflict is structured around the introduction of the cognitivist demand, 
which produces—as I will discuss below— a persistent tension between polarities of fetishism and self-
authorizing revelation. 
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private sin—a quick fix rather than a true change of heart.
29
   The subject will use the 
form to reinforce or guarantee the state of his soul, rather than to interrogate that soul 
directly.  A merely rhetorical analysis of these narratives thus might well deconstruct 
English Protestant prejudices along these lines, revealing apparently mutually exclusive 
accusations, indicative of an unfalsifiable set of biases: the Catholic is crazed with 
ostentatious religion; the Catholic is careless about religion, confesses his sin or 
purchases indulgences, and happily goes back to his vices.  Both charges, however, stem 
from the same structural account of religion expressed, in the Protestant view, as pure 
performance through signifying forms, without spiritual content.   
The notion of a “Catholic” subject, then, the butt of English stereotypes as the 
passive victim of arbitrary government or the obsessive ritualist, stems not strictly from 
rhetorical-social construction (othering; narrative tropes) but from an analysis of the 
                                                 
29 The latter charge‟s longevity can be measured by George Orwell‟s dry comments apropos of one of 
Graham Greene‟s many afflicted Catholic characters: “If he really felt that adultery is mortal sin, he would 
stop committing it. … If he believed in Hell, he would not risk going there.”  Indeed, Greene‟s rather 
irritating novels of Catholic faith conveniently illustrate the dynamic here: In The End of the Affair (1951), 
Sarah Miles abruptly ends her adulterous affair during the London blitz after pledging to God that she will 
return to the Church if only He will spare her lover from death during a German bombing raid.  The Heart 
of the Matter (1948) finds protagonist Major Scobie, out of a misplaced sense of pity and guilt, continuing 
an adulterous affair while attempting to shield his wife—which ultimately leads him to compound his error 
by taking communion while in a state of sin.  Out of a sense of his own unworthiness, Scobie commits the 
sin of suicide.  On the one hand, then, one finds a profound connection to the purely formal aspect of 
obedience: Sarah Miles expresses her deep love precisely by obeying the formal stricture not to see her 
lover.  On the other hand, one finds a certainty that mere formal obedience cannot express the true religious 
self: the sinner Scobie is led further into sin exactly out of his own acute sense of guilt and duty; the sinner 
who feels subjectively unworthy of grace and cannot objectively obey has the sensibility of the saint.  
Greene‟s unsatisfying gambit is to adduce these seeming paradoxes, the impossible absurdity of these 
conundrums (love expressed as rejection, saint as sinner), as proof of the profound and sacred character of 
the religious life.  He misrecognizes his own perceptive analysis of paradox as a constituent quality of faith 
itself, rather than a quality contingent on a Catholic faith-structure organized around symbolic obedience, 
rather than cognitive activity.  This is not to say that Greene‟s presentation of Catholicism is not one he 
could defend; if Orwell‟s complaint is insensitive to Catholicism, it is so simply to the readiness of the 
Catholic to admit that membership in the institutions of the Church is exactly what is at stake.  See George 
Orwell, "The Sanctified Sinner," The New Yorker, July 17 1948, 61-3. 
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subject in relation to his object world—not only his habituation to the ideological work of 
the object, but in his evasion of challenges to it, and in its inherent failure to include his 
deepest desires.  In this estimation, the Catholic subject is formed not (only) in 
conformity with his objects, but in a neurotic and hopeless relation to them or—just as 
undesirable—evades them with rote performance while seeing through the dead gaze of 
the social Other—at benefit to his peace of mind, but at a cost to his soul.  In this sense, 
the subject adopts ritual, socially sanctioned norms, as a means of keeping “real” belief at 
a remove, handed off, as it were, to the social Other, which believes for him.  Put another 
way, the apparently cynically-preforming subject remains just as fetishistically bound as 
the zealot, but through his disavowal.   
 It is critical to note that this explanatory strategy is not confined to the 
Catholic/Protestant divide.  The same analytic, which locates belief in relation to 
psychological objects, may also be found in familiar English conventions regarding so-
called Puritan character, typified by the gloomy ascetic, the hysterical enthusiast, or the 
hypocritical busybody. 30 These prejudicial conventions derive from consistent claims 
about the way objects condition—and fail to condition—subjects.  A key distinction, 
however,  lies in the sense that the Puritan liturgical apparatus and, more broadly, the 
subjectively-defined godly community—unlike Catholicism‟s external works—
encourages a self-aggrandizing sense of inner spirit, authorized by charismatic preaching 
and the like and by the perceived neglect of official church public performance.  But the 
                                                 
30 Patrick Collinson, The Puritan Character: Polemics and Polarities in Early Seventeenth-Century 
English Culture (Los Angeles: William Andrews Clark Memorial Library, University of California, 1989). 
Collinson‟s remarks on this subject are invaluable. 
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same object-logic is evident in the—again familiar—claim that Puritan culture 
encourages despairing self-recrimination in a somewhat Catholic vein—the characteristic 
problem, in William Perkins‟s words, “that a man may seem both unto himself and to the 
Church of God to be a true professor of the Gospel, and yet indeed be none.”31  This 
psychic symptom of failure fully to inhabit one‟s ideal is caused not by the need to 
perform endless duties under the eye of a universal church, but, in a kind of inversion, by 
the failure to permit any commonly recognized external duty to signify the limit of 
responsibility and an end to self-criticism.   
This quintessentially Puritan neurosis stems from its own psychic insight—
inasmuch as self-examination means suspicion that in renouncing enjoyment (including 
the satisfaction of cleansing one‟s self with works) in favor of godly introspection, I leave 
myself open to grandiosely enjoying my sense of sanctity and asceticism.32  To a critic, 
that internal self-policing potentially gives rise to projection of negative impulses on 
one‟s neighbors, and a hypocritical self-justifying sense that one‟s actions do not matter, 
so long as one is consumed with the question of inner sanctity.33  The critic finds the 
Puritan, like the Catholic subject, at once a wretched slave to his impossible drive toward 
                                                 
31 William Perkins, " A Treatise Tending Unto a Declaration Whether a Man Be in the Estate of Damnation 
or in the Estate of Grace," (London:1590). 
32 Peter Lake, Moderate Puritans and the Elizabethan Church (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1982), 158-68. 
33 A common formulation seen, for example, in John Wilson‟s play, The Cheats (1664), in which Scruple, 
a nonconformist minister, assures a married woman that she might satisfy her appetite for adultery, 
“provided always she have no intention of sin.”   See also the dialectical presentation of Puritan desire in 
W.H., The Puritan Convert, Not to Prelatick Protestantism and yet to Prelatick Protestantism 
(London:1676).  Here the Puritan is described as wracked with guilt and repressed desire, which issues in 
paranoid jealousy of others, from which he find shelter in the notion of imputed righteousness, which 
permits him hypocritically to engage in illicit behavior, which issues in a further paranoid resentment of 
outward ceremonies and devotion. 
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satisfaction/grace, and also liable to neglect his Christian duty even as he chastises his 
fellows .  This hypothetical Puritan lacks the pacifying effect of collective social 
institutions, not only out of his refusal to identify with the Church of England as universal 
arbiter, but also out of the instability of his connection to his own milieu. He never trades 
his desire to realize his ideal for integration of a stable sublimating social structure, never 
anchors/submits himself to mere public duty.  He thereby regards his neighbors in 
specular or mimetic terms, as relative points of comparison to be judged abstractly and 
inwardly by his own defensive standard—as doubles, or rivals with unacceptable 
dispositions from whom he may be forced to schism. 
In short, we can perceive an important and logically consistent spiritual 
hermeneutic enacted in the long Reformation neither by theological doctrine per se, nor 
by the broad cultural norming we might expect as a subcultural styles confront, 
domesticate or demonize foreign liturgical-social material through narrative webs and so 
forth.  Important analyses of competing sects don‟t merely enumerate false beliefs and 
condemn rejected objects as their trappings; nor need they be read primarily, as recent 
historiography suggests, as but one expression of cultural tradition and ideology among 
others. Neither the tenets of faith nor the predilections of culture can sufficiently account 
for an English religious tradition that manifestly explored belief styles as psychic—
ultimately ethical-spiritual—states conditioned by material interactions.  Instead, 
exploring how sects interpreted objects shows a much more practical set of problems that 
may have driven individuals into schism. 
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 The point here is not to translate early modern discourse into psychoanalytic 
terms (still less to rehearse arguments about the applicability of psychoanalysis to 
historical data), but rather,  by way of judicious application of Lacanian  strategies for 
understanding how individual psyches related to hegemonic discourses, to emphasize the 
way Protestant materialist hermeneutics aspired to a form of object relations psychology: 
objects were linked not simply to doctrine, nor even to indoctrination, but to particular 
psychic-spiritual states of individuals—to situated believers, not just sectarian theologies.  
This analytic takes aim at pathologies manifest in believers and in specific sects that are, 
nonetheless, part of ideology‟s normal functioning.  In an obvious sense, this formulation 
reiterates Enlightenment-style accounts of Reformation as ideological critique, but with a 
fundamental difference.  Rather than assert Reformation as a project aimed at dispelling 
false consciousness—mystification, mindless ritual, priestcraft—we discern texts vitally 
concerned with ideology‟s very ineradicability, because of its material interpellations, its 
stubborn clinging to social objects and its return even in disavowal and self-criticism.  
Reformation in this sense reveals itself as an ongoing critical approach to states of being 
in the world, as opposed to a stable and proper practice undertaken once error has been 
cleared.  Further, acknowledging these textual strategies confutes once-standard accounts 
of individualism—Puritan or Protestant—as supposed tonic to ideological illusion, and 
suggest not a Reformation theory of individual consciousness, but a Reformation, like its 
modern psychoanalytic analogue, interested in the ubiquitous collective, embodied in 
objects.   
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What I am tracing here as the real Protestant interpretive intervention into 
material culture is therefore both ethical and epistemological: Devotional activities 
involving libidinal relations to cultural objects potentially represent a sub-ethical 
commitment to godly activity, secured by a fantasmatic relation to reality. Further, faux-
pious commitment to arbitrary social forms, instead of conscious mastery of techniques 
(technés) for developing the soul is psychically untenable, empirically associated with 
immiserating or antisocial behaviors.  Edward Fisher‟s Puritan text, The Marrowe of 
Modern Divinity (1646), for example, clearly locates the spiritual defect in legalist 
adherence to the law of works in a psychic dynamic related to this kind of thought about 
cultural objects: 
Though a man before he believe God‟s love to him in Christ, may have a great 
measure of legall humiliation, compunction, sorrow and griefe, and be brought 
down (as it were) to the very gate of hell, and feele the very flashings of hell fire 
in his conscience for his sins; yet is it not because hee hath thereby offended God, 
but rather because he hath thereby offended himself, that is, because hee hath 
thereby brought himselfe into the danger of eternal death and condemnation.34 
Precisianism of this sort leads to self-condemnation, a purely psychological guilt effect, 
rather than true abasement before God.  On a philosophical level, Fisher‟s reasoning is, 
we might say, flawlessly Kantian: only a pure motive of duty, detached from pathological 
                                                 
34 Edward Fisher, The Marrow of Modern Divinity Touching Both the Covenant of Works, and the 
Covenant of Grace (London:1646), 174. 
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objects of desire, can count ethically as love of God and the Law (of works).35  He thus 
invokes the characteristic Puritan problematic to state his problem: how to securely 
identify one‟s motives.  Glossed another way:  The Law‟s very efficacy rests in the 
inevitable emergence of this question of motive, in the relentless potential for guilt. Thus, 
the problem is not merely how to distinguish selfish motives from godly ones, but rather 
how to change one‟s psychic relation to the Law so that right perception of one‟s state of 
being is assured.  Fisher‟s immediate theological answer is, in its own right, 
psychodynamic in nature.  He reminds his reader that knowledge that God has, by love 
and grace, released man from the covenant of works can secure for man respect for the 
Law as such, as a concrete set of principles in the world, rather than as a psychic object.  
Consciously mastering objects and knowingly applying spiritual principles—that is, 
realizing the spirit rather than, pathologically, the letter of the Law, depends first upon 
sublating the notion of God as simply the personification of cultural imperatives, as the 
Thing itself. 
But in more social terms, the problem for such Protestant explanation remains one 
of individual ideological inscription into a dead, non-reforming collective—to which may 
be opposed a more lively image of salvation in an interpretive community, devoted to 
conscious institution-building and communal deliberation about spiritual goals and 
desires; a living, evolving communal spirit, in other words, that supersedes mere Law.  
For Fisher, as is evident in his text, severe Presbyterian legalism appears much in the 
same light as would crypto-Catholic conformist practice; this static structure, he 
                                                 
35 Law, in other words, as obedience to social forms, psychological objects. 
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indicates, has its mere dialectical opposite in the figure of the antinomian (“they that can 
talke like believers, and yet do not walke like believers”), who likewise denies 
responsibility to a community of fellows in the real world.36  
Crucially, that is, Fisher locates within generically Puritan practice itself both the 
psychic dynamic associated most generally with Catholicism (and located by Puritans 
within conformity, and by Independents within Presbyterianism) as exemplary of a 
religion of ritual (Law/works) and the tendency toward antisocial solipsism generally 
directed at Puritanism as a whole.   The point here is that Fisher‟s text does not merely 
assign these variant tendencies to particular doctrines or styles, depending upon their 
particular theological system.  Instead, he identifies them as constituent features/dangers 
of object practice (including his own) in general—which tends to perform ideologically 
in these two directions, one internal and one relating to objective practice. 
We see, then, a general tendency of this Protestant explanatory logic to define the 
self and relate to other sects in relative terms, based upon a common analytic of the 
object‟s ideological work, not as nuanced against a norm—almost a deductive, rather 
than an inductive analysis.  Thus I claim here the need to see the sectarian field not only 
in terms of unique, or even interacting, theological and cultural positions, but also as 
structurally-related positions that sought variously to accomplish ostensibly non-
pathological or ideological forms of social binding around the cultural Thing:  Opposing, 
                                                 
36 As I have indicated, the characteristic Puritan refusal to Oedipalize oneself within a universal social 
structure strictly relates the antinomian to the legalist.  Fisher‟s own tendencies, in spite of his formulation 
here, are arguably rather antinomian. See David R. Como, Blown by the Spirit: Puritanism and the 
Emergence of an Antinomian Underground in Pre-Civil-War England (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2004). 
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for example, elite authority and its practices with local parish traditions, or opposing 
solipsistic inner light with the national body and public duty—or, in Fisher‟s case, 
opposing the solipsistic legalist and antinomian with a community of mutual critique.37 
This interpretive stance is less revolutionary (oppositional, in the Hegelian sense) than it 
is reforming, aimed at improving the practice of Christian doctrine. 
 Fisher‟s A Touch-Stone for a Communicant (1647) confirms this kind of reading.  
It imagines a would-be communicant, Simon, who claims to be versed in Christian 
doctrine, but who is shown by his minister-interlocutor to be deficient in humility as 
compared to his (mildly) sinning but more authentically pious neighbor, whom Simon 
deplores. Fisher‟s lesson, beyond the theological corrective against prideful legalism, 
may be found in the text‟s dialogic structure itself: the Protestant requires examination by 
his spiritual peers within a communion of believers.  Simon‟s devotional practice is 
thereby revealed as psychically structured around his own covert sense of superiority and 
hence his individualism—the “stain of enjoyment” on his ostensible renunciations in 
favor of duty, for which he must be made to take responsibility like the less formally 
pious neighbor does.38  Certainly we may put institutional predilections in terms of 
cultural forms, like the visible or invisible church, but speaking in terms of textual 
hermeneutics, we can see how various formulations were justified also in terms of 
objects—with institutional forms as means of intervening between the subject and his 
psychic commitments.  The broader discussion of institutional structures may be seen 
                                                 
37 See Edward Fisher, A Touch-Stone for a Communicant (London:1647).  It goes without saying that 
Fisher‟s own formulation remains open to similar critiques from different relative positions. 
38 Žižek, For They Know Not What They Do, 239. 
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hand in hand with the liturgical disputes that contain so much of the content/volume of 
sectarian argument, but which seem, in a certain sense, also strangely narrow unless we 
grasp the larger place of the analytic of the object.   
 
On the Psychological Via Media 
 The Protestant controversialist (or modern psychoanalyst) whose perspective I 
am arguing for might first complain, then, regarding the usual cultural materialist analysis 
of religious subgroups, that subjects are not rhetorically or ideologically inscribed: they 
remain at a remove of desire from their objects; they are not simply what they own or do.  
But his second, more serious complaint ought to be that subjects, by virtue of not being 
fully inscribed, are also positively involved in a fantasy structure (a Lacanian  imaginary, 
if you will), some almost-inevitably neurotic—because it attracts and repulses at the same 
time—commitment to the social field.39   
I am in this arguing for the era‟s perception of ideology as externalized in 
things—as the unconscious fantasy that permeates and structures reality itself—which 
underwrites the severe reactions to spiritual technologies said to evoke pathological 
rather than devotional states of mind.  In the post-Reformation, in a common analytic of 
conscious grace conditioned by salutary object practice resolves into fear of public 
fetishistic ritual and solipsistic neglect of common worship and public duty—a world 
seeking balance between ideologues and the things of the world.  Sectarian texts locate 
                                                 
39 For a version of this argument as a critique of Foucauldian historicism, see Joan Copjec, Read My 
Desire: Lacan against the Historicists (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1994).  
 78 
these dialectically-related pitfalls in object-practice itself, rather than associating them 
with particular world views along conformist-“heart religion” or visible-invisible Church 
binaries.  Sects are not only identified by dogmas, but also by how their dogmas are 
practiced.  Referencing the primitive church‟s edifying purity, conformists and 
nonconformists alike condemned on the one hand, automatic behaviors involving rote 
duty and, on the other, innovating practice that led to self-involved schism from the 
spiritual community.  It is natural, therefore, to find this theoretical splitting mirrored 
within constituencies on either side of the Hot Protestant-Ceremonialist divide as sects 
sought to triangulate between negative poles—and managed to ascribe both qualities to 
their opponents.40 These tendencies are, in other words, not distinguished as cultural 
binaries or oppositions; they are identified as mutually implicated symptomal relations to 
objects of ideology in any cultural system. 
But inasmuch as Protestant logic of Reformation cognized these problems, it also 
formulated prescriptions for the salutary use of objects, also working out of a structural-
psychic analytic to set all Reform off from Catholicism.  The real aim here is a conscious, 
educated laity involved in public and communal mastering of—as opposed to cynical 
obedience or consuming enthrallment to—the social symbolic.  The goal was to 
formulate a conscious community beyond the sub-ethical realm of neurotic cultural 
investment, to alter the psychic relation to social practice, rather than simply mint a novel 
practice prone to the same forms of false piety (prone, that is, to subordinating the ethical 
                                                 
40 I assert here, that is, a common analytic about social practice, in addition to common thematics regarding 
the doctrine of “faith versus works” or similar formulations. 
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to the contingently social).  From this perspective we find, across the religious spectrum, 
particular condemnation of lukewarm pragmatic solutions that embrace cognitively naive 
compromises between liturgical-cultural extremes. 
Indeed: It is a recurrent commonplace (Puritan, Methodist, Victorian …) that 
official Anglicanism, at least as constructed or projected by critics, risks an unsatisfying 
pragmatic compromise, a kind of desiccated virtue ethics coupled with a disenchanted but 
excessive pseudo-Catholic ceremonialism. This, allegedly, the result of a merely 
expedient, strategic attempt to find a middle way between Catholic ceremony and 
Calvinist enthusiasm—neither quite committed to ritual objects and doctrine, nor 
democratically-affectively inclined.  Similarly, against dissenting groups one finds 
stereotypes and charges of antinomian zeal and austere precisianism, but coupled with an 
even dimmer view of baroque and dogmatic attempts to resolve this impossible split.  
That is, the ultimate negative stereotype of the predestinarian is neither the ranter nor the 
ascetic busybody, but the dark and obscure apologist, endlessly glossing or claiming to 
resolve the contradictions of a bleak, nonsensical doctrine.  The point—particularly with 
respect to Anglicanism—is that the oft-cited middle way of moderation in the sense of 
classical virtue between two extremes, a kind of idolatrous practice itself, was also the 
subject of the most withering analyses—and in fact constituted an even greater objection 
than collapse into either crypto-papist fetishism or enthusiasm. 
 The reading I am suggesting here thus has long-standing implications for our 
understanding of the position of religious rhetoric in Protestant thought. The nature of 
triangulation between these limit cases, arguably characteristic of the English Church, for 
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instance, therefore requires some new thought, in light of Protestant discourse that 
frowned on strategic moderation as an insufficient solution to a structural problem: 
neither the Law (of works/prescribed objects) nor its repressed can condition true faith 
and piety.  Anglicanism‟s own defense of this ideal—as distinct from the tepid 
compromise attacked by critics—in fact often insists explicitly on a cognitive standpoint 
beyond moderation as “style.”  Along these lines we can see, in certain positions 
regarding adiaphora, for example, solutions to the twin problems of the fetish object and 
solipsistic schism. We can, from this perspective, perhaps restore a certain luster to 
various Anglican apologetics as theories of the object, part and parcel of English 
religion‟s liturgical focus. 
 The church of course held, with perfect logical consistency and institutional bias, 
that it could dictate uniform liturgical praxes to edify and prevent schism, while 
maintaining that it in no way held those praxes to be soteriologically necessary.  Still, one 
understands nonconformist objections that the position is at best disingenuous or an 
outright contradiction (―If it be a thing indifferent, why is it then so rigidly imposed, as a 
thing of absolute necessity to be observed?‖) and at worst an invitation to idolatry (―Seem 
it never so pious and specious to mans carnall fancie, yet being idolatrous … it is but 
pious idolatry, or idolatrous piety; and God abhorreth that piety‖).41  
What we might re-emphasize in the more or less familiar Anglican position, is 
that the arbitrariness of the prescribed object practice is precisely the point.  Rather than a 
somewhat underhanded position, designed to justify theologically a passionate 
                                                 
41 Henry Burton, Jesu-Worship Confuted (London:1660), 6. 
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commitment to a particular ―moderate‖ Anglican style (in other words, as was charged, to 
remove the theological taint of idolatry from a privileged ceremonial practice), the 
formula endorses object-practices not for their own sake, but, quite the contrary, by virtue 
of their ultimately arbitrary and indifferent nature—for the sake of conscious formal 
obedience to a national civic ethic as opposed to fetishistic investment in a multiplicity of 
local forms.  This is not quite the same as demanding interpellation in some ideal 
Anglican structure so much as it represents, in theoretical terms, the ideal as conscious 
freedom from passionate attachment to any fetishistic or merely mechanical set of rites, 
in favor of universal communal participation in a formally outlined state.  In other words, 
conformity to an ultimately arbitrary, in the sense of manifestly socially and historically 
contingent, and strictly formal set of rules is seen partly as the psychic guarantee of 
freedom from merely pathological activity, rather than conformity or the rites of 
Anglicanism as ideal in and of themselves.42 A certain lack of passion is, in this sense, 
regarded as a salutary psychic and spiritual virtue, not a liability—the individual believer 
must know experience, not be swept up into it.   
In a way, this formulation of the position of a proper Protestant believer courts the 
hypothetically Catholic problem of paying hypocritical lip service to a set of rites in place 
of spiritual development—but with a crucial difference.  While the Roman Catholic 
sacramental structure is alleged to imply (mere) obedience as both necessary and 
                                                 
42 This is not to say that edification was not held to be important—simply that edifying practices were not 
seen as unique or timeless or fully realizable (as in purification of the reformed church‟s rites) and that 
accession to formal uniformity and conformity (acting in unison, etc.) was  itself part of beauty and 
edification.  Arbitraryness, in the sense of social contingency obviously does not imply practices selected 
capriciously. 
 82 
sufficient for grace, the Anglican analysis touts obedience as simply the guarantor of 
participation in the community whose ethical judgments supercede any punishing 
regimen of idealized devotional practice.  This set of consciously mastered activities was 
meant to teach the subject more generally to apply not the rote letter but also the active 
principles of the Law—that is, to master the logic of analysis  even to the theoretical 
point of violating its strict letter in favor of its spirit (at least to the point of accepting the 
State‟s right to set indifferent practice) while accepting fellow citizens as spiritual peers.  
Conformity, in these terms, teaches membership in a deliberative national Protestant 
community whose public self-reflexivity replaces passionate subjective rituals and their 
pitfalls with a conscious free-floating and deliberative ethics, a state of mind rather than 
set activities.  
Thus, the hypothetical Catholic subject who is being reformed by this Protestant 
optic, while allegedly engaged in a mechanical sort of obedience (or precisely because he 
is), is the one who “really believes” in the efficacy of ritual.  While engaged in symbolic 
ritual as the material support for a fantasy structure, it is the Catholic subject who, either 
through obsessive-fetishistic behavior, or through fetishistic denial (passing off belief to 
the Other) clings to the efficacy of the rite/object in the Lacanian Real—thus mistakenly 
taking such material trappings of belief as more than a social contract, as needed for 
salvation, a magical act, etc.43  A merely legislated ceremony, on the other hand, makes 
no claim to being (unlike neurotic abstention from acts, or Catholic rites) directly 
efficacious, as Robartes explains:   
                                                 
43 On the idea of belief through the other, see Žižek, The Plague of Fantasies, 107-8. 
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If we held, that some prayers were not acceptable to God: except that they were 
made precisely in this or that place: Or if we reputed the Supper of the Lord to be 
uneffectual, if it be not received in the Chancell: then here were superstition.  But 
when we do things not upon any such fancy: but in obedience and conformity to 
discipline and order, for decency and comelynesse; we are no way to be, either 
taxed or suspected, for Superstition.44  
The analysis specifically rejects the charge of superstition for Protestant ritual, since the 
rituals, however desirable, are in no way equated with a real function apart from their 
social-symbolic one; this manifestly arbitrary and communal function is denied the 
function of unconscious ideology. Overall, Protestant reform levels the charge that true 
Christians need to participate body and mind in their faith, not disassociate the two. 
Exactly this analysis also underwrites charges exchanged between Protestant 
subgroups, as I have suggested with the examples above. Tellingly, one finds relatively 
few accusations that a given object-practice is inherently forbidden by God/superstitious; 
instead, the typical reformist critique aims at an the underlying psychic dynamic of 
fixation on the object, which  is generally said to lead to idolatry, in the specific sense of 
unconscious pathological devotion to the object rather than its spiritual referent.45  
Against crude notions of Puritans as fundamentalist iconoclasts, that is, one finds that 
their charges of lapses into papism rest on this more sophisticated analysis.  They tend to 
avoid rhetoric concerning directly idolatrous acts, in favor of a social analysis, regarding 
                                                 
44 Robartes, God's Holy House and Service, 43. 
45 See, for example, Burton, Jesu-Worship Confuted.  Of course, this was in a sense the official Roman 
Church position as well, as reformers acknowledged in their sense that the church had not so much 
advocated idolatry as abdicated its responsibility to regulate local practices. 
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the education of the populace, the tainting of practices by association with Catholicism‟s 
more general errors, and the risks of giving aid and comfort to Catholic recusants and so 
forth.  They, too, seek to talk about Reformed Protestantism as psycho-social, not just 
doctrinal.  Robert Crowley‟s Briefe Discourse Concerning the Outwarde Apparell and 
Ministring Garmentes of the Popishe Church (1578), for example, links conformist 
concern with vestimental decency and order to idolatrous images—but strictly by way of 
analogy, in the sense that even images themselves are not forbidden qua images, but by 
virtue of God‟s awareness that people fall into error and build up “deificies around 
things.” 46   Crowley‟s real concern is the ready-to-hand English object and the logic of 
cultural habituation that scripture warns about —not a scriptural injunction concerning a 
particular class of objects. 
Of course the same logic of object practice could easily be deployed by 
conformists against their hot Protestant critics.  A ceremonialist like Robartes easily turns 
the tables on Puritans, pointing out that their plain style—crudely, their supposed knee-
jerk iconoclasm—in no way immunizes them from superstitious idolatry.  On the 
contrary, one is just as easily bound to an obsessional fixation on abstaining from certain 
acts, or eschewing certain objects as to espousing them, as the Puritans' typological 
Catholic did. Superstition inheres not in the object itself, nor only in positive 
(obsessional) acts, but also in phobic aversion—in the psyche of the believer: 
                                                 
46 Robert Crowley, A Briefe Discourse Concerning the Outwarde Apparell and Ministring 
Garmentes of the Popishe Church (s.n.:1578). 
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The apostle setteth forth the disposition of superstitious people, afraid to touch, 
taste, or handle, those things in the touching tasting, and handling whereof there is 
no danger.  Of this abstaining superstition I may say as David speakes of some 
men, they were in great feare, where no fear was. … Superstition is the very 
foolery of the minds of men, for it is like a scarecrow in the brain, and maketh 
man afraid of his owne shadow, as he that durst not looke out, for feare the skye 
should fall.47 
Fear characterizes the metonymic shift of aversions, the inescapable fear, strictly 
analogous to unsatisfying Catholic zeal.  Robartes simply repeats a longstanding charge 
that the precisian mindset is, as evidenced by the fervor of adherents, not directed at a 
reasonable discussion of difference about efficacious style. (Such a dispute in itself, seen 
as such, need not necessarily have affronted Robartes; indeed the inevitability of such a 
disagreement is implicit and central to the Anglican ceremonialist position.  By virtue of 
“indifference,” it simply falls to the authorities to settle the matter by fiat.)   
Instead, the Puritan betrays an unconscious commitment in excess of any 
pragmatic result; his belief is, we might say, magical: 
As for example: if a man should now abstaine from eating Swineflesh, in a 
conceit that it doth now defile or make a man a sinner, This were plain 
Superstition. So if in time of Lent, or on any of the days upon the which we are 
commanded by Law to abstaine from eating flesh, a man should imagine now, 
that it is a sinne to eate flesh, not so much in regard of the wholesome Lawes of 
                                                 
47 Robartes, God's Holy House and Service, 37-8.  
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the State and Church, which do indeed bind the conscience … as in a conceit, that 
flesh as it is flesh, eaten on such a day, hath a special power to defile or make a 
man a sinner: this also were mere Superstition. … And as, thus the rule holdeth in 
the use of the Creatures of God; so doth it also in the actions of men which are in 
themselves indifferent,  neither good nor bad: but as they be applied. As for 
example, to kneele, to bow, to stand.48 
The contrast here is between conscious acts of devotion (conscious because their 
necessity has been explicitly evacuated in favor of mere authority), and unconscious 
fixation on an ideal perceived to be absolute: the alleged Puritan position, in this 
estimation, is that there is a right way to act that somehow, out of biblical or divine 
sanction, transcends the mere social compact and thus becomes its own kind of zealotry.  
Such a position, that a transcendently right way (as opposed to a legislated way) to do 
things exposes the purely pathological, rather than moral nature of his concern.49  And 
again, it resembles in logical form the arguments leveled against Catholics. 
 This set of charges has long been noted, but I would contend not entirely 
understood as pertaining to the psycho-social in the way I am explicating here.  Along 
these lines, controversialists diagnosed Puritan vehemence against alleged idolatry 
principally in pathological terms, as a function of projection, stemming from their own 
                                                 
48 Ibid., 96. 
49 The same argument that the nonconformist is ruled by superstitious fear in avoiding certain rites and 
enjoining other activities, along with the charge that he knows God to be directly pleased or displeased by 
such acts, may be found in Simon Patrick, A Friendly Debate Betwixt Two Neighbours, the One a 
Conformist, the Other a Non-Conformist (London:1668), 117-20. Whiting quotes Richard Baxter in noting 
that the work was widely influential. C. E. Whiting, Studies in English Puritanism from the Restoration to 
the Revolution, 1660-1688 (New York: A. M. Kelley, 1968), 499. 
 87 
excessive fears, and not as pertaining to the community of believers.  In denouncing 
ceremony as quasi-Catholic mysticism the Puritan betrays his own investment in exactly 
that possibility, his tacit implication in a social imaginary that includes magical God-
pleasing acts. Indeed, he betrays his desire for Catholic-style enjoyment, the hope for an 
action (rite or abstention) that could indeed confer satisfaction, and his resentment at 
those who might obtain it.  Ceremony here is invested with the power of the Catholic 
repressed, as Matthew Parker suggests in his psychologically astute 1566 rebuttal to 
Puritan objections to priestly vestments: 
This many men thynke very straunge in you, that you stande in greater feare that 
men wyll beleue rather your apparell then your wordes: your coate, then your 
preachyng: your outwarde shewe, then your inwarde mynde often opened by 
speache, and playnelye set before them to perceyue. What do you iudge of Gods 
people, that they be so muche without sense & vnderstandyng? You feare the 
thyng yourselues imagine, and imagine euen what you lyst [my emphasis].50 
 For Parker, as for Robartes, Puritan fear of a rite with efficacy in the Real marks off the 
space of superstition—a hardened spiritual practice is as dangerous as any Catholic ritual 
object might have been to the believer.  Here the position gets an additional twist: the 
Puritan reaction stems from the rite‟s function for him as a symptom, a cause of phobic 
aversion and excessive pleasure.  The Puritan‟s supposed interior sanctity is linked 
directly to his reliance for his identity on the continued social meaning of Catholic 
symbolic structure.  His outward show functions as a sign solely out of a structural 
                                                 
50 Matthew Parker, A Briefe Examination (London:1566). 
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opposition to Catholic practice, and derives its psychic power from a libidinal investment 
in that same material system. 
 To put this chapter, finally, in methodological terms, Foucault‟s notion of self-
care, with which we might provisionally associate the cultural/anthropological turn 
toward religious styles, identifies theology as the termination of religion as technique and 
its modern (degradation, implicitly) into bare sets of doctrinal propositions.51 But with 
respect to English history, doctrine proves to be stubbornly inextricable from debates 
about spiritual techniques.  It can and must be seen as itself directly concerned with 
material culture so that the handling of objects in general will be straightforwardly 
revealing of Protestantism's new optic on the individual.
                                                 




Chapter 2:  Swift’s A Tale of a Tub, Adiaphora and Folk Psychology 
 Things Indifferent and Indifference to Things 
 The account, in Gulliver’s Travels (1726), of religious conflict between the Big-
Endians and Little-Endians—sectarians who dispute the proper side on which to break an 
egg— has an iconic status as a parable about sterile debates over religious dogma and the 
absurdity of war in God‟s name.  The allegory‟s logical machinery is obvious enough: 
Swift compares religious schism to a trivial and irresolvable dispute and ridicules the 
ways believers argue about matters of no earthly consequence, willfully disregard the 
plain sense of sacred texts, and rupture violently on the results.  Swift, a great anti-
modern conservative, seems here an exemplary modern: strangely, in arguing through 
these partisans, in fact, for liturgical conformity to the state church, Swift seems to 
produce one of literature‟s great secular liberal set-pieces.1 
 The same temptation to minimize Swift‘s religious prejudices has arguably guided 
accounts of A Tale of a Tub (1704) and the appended A Discourse Concerning 
Mechanical Operation of the Spirit, as Swift‘s liturgical fixations have been 
                                                 
1 Popular readings that neglect Swift‟s Anglican orthodoxy are understandable, and perhaps reflect, as well, 
recent decades when secular modernity‟s triumph seemed more certain. The undergraduate resource 
SparkNotes glosses the episode this way: “The egg controversy is ridiculous because there cannot be any 
right or wrong way to crack an egg, so it is unreasonable to legislate how people must do it” [my 
emphasis].  SparkNotes Editors, "Sparknote on Gulliver‟s Travels," SparkNotes LLC, 
http://www.sparknotes.com/lit/gulliver/section3.rhtml.  See also Ann Cline Kelly, Jonathan Swift and 
Popular Culture: Myth, Media, and the Man (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 184.  
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overshadowed by his apparent disdain for such concerns as the mark of zealotry.  The 
Tale‘s central Reformation allegory features, of course, the three brothers—Peter (a 
Catholic), Jack (a Calvinist/dissenter), and Martin (the orthodox Anglican heir of 
Luther‘s magisterial reform)—who are bequeathed coats signifying ―the Doctrine and 
Faith of Christianity‖ (1:44).2  Peter‘s coat, ridiculously adorned, and Jack‘s, shamefully 
stripped in protest, artfully distinguish Anglican moderation from the Roman Church‘s 
apocrypha and pomp and Puritanism‘s scriptural fundamentalism and austerity.  The 
supposed transparency of Swift‘s allegory has led, in some measure, to its neglect; the 
clothing signifying three major Christianities functions at the expense of its literal 
referent, the liturgical controversies that significantly defined the Reformation in 
England, in which the style of clerical vestments was a central issue.3  This implicit 
interest in post-Reformation ritual culture has, by and large, either been read so broadly 
as to be lost in the Tale’s larger narrative of temperance, or so narrowly as to be a 
footnote to the text.  Indeed, a book-length study of Swift‘s ―vestimental‖ metaphor 
makes only passing mention of religious debate or the legacy of the Vestments 
Controversy of the 1560s, the conflict over priestly garb—specifically the surplice and 
square cap— that encapsulated divisions about common prayer and ecclesiastical 
                                                 
2 Parenthetical references to Swift‟s texts cite The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift, ed. Herbert Davis et al., 
14 vols. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1939-1968) and are given as volume and page number. 
3 Philip Harth noted the tendency to concentrate “upon the simple equations of Peter for Catholicism and 
Jack for Puritanism” at the expense of the larger religious argument.  He makes the related point that the 
Tale does not function as a strict allegory—and argues for the term “parable.”  Phillip Harth, Swift and 
Anglican Rationalism: The Religious Background of a Tale of a Tub (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1961), 13-14. 
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authority, liturgical practice, and the very idea of Reformation in the English Church.
4
  
Yet this ―historic bifurcation in English Protestantism‖ marked the very origins of 
dissenting culture, a major concern in the Tale.5 
 The tendency to look past Swift‘s apparently contradictory promotion of narrow 
ceremonial orthodoxy as a tonic to ritual extremism reflects the difficulty of grasping the 
underlying Anglican position on adiaphora, or ―things indifferent‖ — elements of 
worship deemed inessential for salvation but whose legislation, for the sake of their 
edifying value, fell to the discretion of the episcopal structure in tandem with civil 
authority.
6
  This ―corner-stone of Anglicanism,‖ in Patrick Collinson‘s words, represents 
a difficult position between dismissing such matters as a kind of spiritual trivia, and 
insisting on these visible institutions as the very core of the established church, the 
neglect of which amounted to a challenge to authority and a schismatic affront to one‘s 
fellow Christians.
7
   
I want to suggest here that Swift‘s orthodoxy—and that of the church—seems 
opaque because we‘ve neglected early modern Protestantism‘s tendency to regard 
religious belief as conditioned by interactions with the material object-world.  I will 
argue, in particular, for a kind of inversion of the usual view of Swift‘s parable in the 
                                                 
4 Deborah Baker Wyrick, Jonathan Swift and the Vested Word (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1988), xvi; 32-3.  On the Vestments (or Vestiarian) Controversy, see Collinson, Elizabethan Puritan 
Movement, 71-97; Patrick Collinson, Archbishop Grindal, 1519-1583: The Struggle for a Reformed Church 
(London: J. Cape, 1979), 167-83; Brett Usher, "The Deanery of Blocking and the Vestiarian Controversy," 
Journal of Ecclesiastical History 52, no. 3 (2001); M.M. Knappen, Tudor Puritanism (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1965). 
5 Patrick Collinson, Archbishop Grindal, 1519-1583: The Struggle for a Reformed Church (London: J. 
Cape, 1979), 168. 
6 Verkamp, Indifferent Mean. 
7 Collinson, Elizabethan Puritan Movement, 27. 
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Tale: instead of representing (implicitly reducing or simplifying) sectarian faiths by their 
vestimental styles, the Tale affirms that it is precisely ritual forms that transmit belief.  
The clothing and devotional objects that feature so prominently were central to post-
Reformation debates in England not only as signs of inner faith or expressions of 
doctrine, but as actively creating specific kinds of religious subjects.  Accordingly, the 
Tale relies on longstanding Protestant critiques of sectarian psyches shaped by these 
object-practices.  Specifically, Catholic sacraments are seen to encourage grandiosity and 
defensiveness, while Swift links zealous reform‘s rejection of public ritual to self-deceit 
and crippling resentment. 
 This liturgical hermeneutic, as I have already argued, involves a specific 
psychological insight: that ritual objects and cultural ―things‖ do not simply enculturate 
or discipline subjects, but encourage obsessive and antisocial forms of belief that are 
driven by underlying doubt and insecurity.  Accordingly, Swift‘s intervention in the Tale 
ascribes to his foes vices drawn not from Classical or biblical Christian ethics, but from 
sectarian rhetorics linking devotional styles to psychological character flaws like knavery 
and hypocrisy.  The Tale presents these vices as neurotic formations, attempts to extract 
pleasure from mentally impoverishing styles of faith.  From this perspective, Anglican 
liturgical moderation reads more coherently as a psychological strategy, an attempt to 
secure the national church through common praxis without recourse to devotional styles 
perceived to encourage pathological and spiritually dishonest modes of belief 
One goes a long way toward grasping this early modern sensibility by reflecting 
on the modern sense of hypocrisy, which sees mainly cynical deceit in the failure to 
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uphold professed beliefs: one is shocked (or gratified) to see the sanctimonious politician 
caught in a sordid scandal.  But the early modern narrative tendency is not merely to 
decry and expose the puritanical hypocrite, but also immediately to identify Puritan 
institutions as inevitably generating hypocrisy within faith itself, as a complex of 
enthusiastic grandiosity and gloomy self-loathing. 
  Charges of crypto-Romanism or enthusiasm therefore served English Protestants 
as pejoratives that also conveyed specific claims about psychological and spiritual 
constitutions.  Sectarian labels could function, in effect, as shorthand diagnostic terms.  
Here, rather than condescend to some early modern proto-psychoanalysis, we might 
observe that the charge of enthusiasm, for example, simply furnishes one term in a 
religious folk-psychology.
 
 By “folk psychology” I intend the everyday semantic relations 
that form a working theory of human behavior.  In Paul Churchland‟s words:  
The fact is that the average person is able to explain, and even predict, the 
behavior of other persons with a facility and a success that is remarkable.  Such 
explanations and predictions standardly make reference to the desires, beliefs, 
fears, intentions, perceptions, and so forth, to which agents are presumed subject.  
But explanations presuppose laws—rough and ready ones, at least—that connect 
the explanatory conditions with the behavior explained.  The same is true for the 
making of predictions. … Reassuringly, a rich network of common sense laws can 
indeed be reconstructed from this quotidian commerce of explanation and 
anticipation; its principles are familiar homilies; and their sundry functions are 
transparent.  Each of us understands others, as well as we do, because we share a 
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tacit command of an integrated body of lore concerning the lawlike relations 
holding among external circumstances, internal states, and overt behavior.
8
   
 
Rather than say, with Freudian critics, that Swift anticipates a diagnosis of the enthusiast 
as an obsessive neurotic, we might say that the eighteenth-century English descriptor for 
an obsessive neurotic is ―enthusiast.‖   
In what follows I will first propose that scholarly neglect of the nuances of 
Anglican liturgical debate has generated an apparently intractable difficulty, an inability 
to reconcile Swift‘s authoritarianism and his calls for moderation.  Resolving this 
problem requires us to re-examine Swift‘s use of post-Reformation commonplaces 
linking sectarian devotional styles to behavioral traits, an acknowledged focus of the 
Tale.  I therefore propose a re-evaluation of the text‘s genealogy: Swift‘s predecessors 
have been read mainly for diagnoses of enthusiast madness derived from medicine or 
natural philosophy; but their remarks on common prayer and parish ritual traditions may 
be the more crucial influence.  The Tale’s analysis of Catholic and Puritan devotional 
                                                 
8 Paul Churchland, "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes," in The Nature of Mind, ed. 
David M. Rosenthal (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).  Despite his useful formulation, the 
balance of Churchland‟s article, which argues for the potential supersession of “functionalist” folk 
psychology by neuroscience, is obviously at odds with the linguistic emphasis of my arguments. Wilhelm 
Wundt coined the term “folk psychology” to describe something closer to a mentalité, world view, or 
episteme (to use Foucault's term), a shared approach to understanding the world.  See Wilhelm Wundt, 
Elements of Folk Psychology: Outlines of a Psychological History of the Development of Mankind 
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1916).  The idea of stereotypes used within a quasi-predictive religious or folk 
psychology might be compared to Weber‟s notion of the “ideal type”: “Those ideas which govern the 
behavior of a population of a certain epoch, i.e., which are concretely influential in determining their 
conduct, can, if a somewhat complicated construct is involved, be formulated precisely only in the form of 
an ideal type, since empirically it exists in the minds of an indefinite and constantly changing mass of 
individuals and assumes in their minds the most multifarious nuances of form and content”; Max Weber, 
"On the Ideal Type," in Structures, Symbols, and Systems: Readings on Organizational Behavior, ed. 
Marshall Meyer (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 45. 
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―mechanical operations,‖ reveals a common hardheaded recognition that (religious) belief 
includes pathological forms of ambivalence regarding piety or cultural norms.  Swift‘s 
broader politics may be read as an extension of this psychological insight, as an attempt 
to posit cultural authority that does not breed zealous antisocial civic and spiritual 
behavior. 
 
Swift’s Predecessors and Liturgical Psychology 
Defenders of a state-sanctioned liturgy who denigrated Catholic pomp while 
advocating reverence for the space of the church and the institutions of common prayer 
naturally had a longstanding awareness of the symbolic form‘s double-edged potential to 
discipline and edify.  Meric Casaubon, whose Treatise Concerning Enthusiasm (1655) 
served as a source for Swift‘s Tale, justified the established church position by carefully 
noting even the iconoclast Calvin‘s use of the symbolic object in Of the Necessity of 
Reformation in, and Before Luther's Time (1664): 
In civil worldly things, that outward visible Signs and Ceremonies have great 
power and influence upon men, ordinarily, to beget affection, or reverence; is 
acknowledged by wisest men and Politicians. … I remember I have read in 
Calvin, of a certain Staff, which was the Insigne or proper badge of Supreme 
Authority, in that Town where he lived. He calleth it Sacrum baculum; a Sacred 
Staff; and saith plainly, that the people generally gave so much respect to it, that 
the very sight of it (when the authority of the persons did not, or could not: so I 
understand him:) did appease tumults, and prevent slaughters: so that the breaking 
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of that Staff, in a tumult, which at other times did use to appease tumults, was 
looked upon, as highest contempt, and rebellion. … If this be the nature of men, 
in point of Signs, and Ceremonies, civil: why should not Religious Signs and 
Ceremonies (used with moderation, and discretion) be a help to devotion, and a 
preservation to reverence, as well? 
9 
In these terms, Catholic innovation and dissenting iconoclasm appear as extremes 
between which one might discern a golden mean of reverence without intemperance.  
Familiarly, as Martin‘s sartorial restraint suggests, we can see Swift as a proponent of the 
Anglican via media, as intellectually attributed to Thomas Cromwell and Richard 
Hooker, between alleged superstitious Catholic excess and a zealous Protestantism.
10
  We 
find here the distinct position between Jack‘s demented and hysterical stripping of 
tradition and Peter‘s florid innovations; Swift‘s imagery directly conveys Archbishop 
Bramhall‘s estimation of the English Church in 1660 as ―neither garish … nor yet 
sluttish.‖11 
But this formulation of liturgical compromise, too, glosses over the ambiguity, or 
at least the subtlety, of the state church position.  Casaubon‘s self-defeating example— a 
bludgeon as an instrument of peace, broken in a ―tumult‖ it is alleged generally to 
prevent—suggests the contradictory nature of an enforced moderation.  Nonconformists 
                                                 
9 Meric Casaubon, Of the Necessity of Reformation in, and before Luther's Time (London:1664), 152.  
10Dickens, English Reformation, 203; Patrick Collinson, “Sir Nicholas Bacon and the Elizabethan Via 
Media,” The Historical Journal 23, no. 2 (1980). It is worth noting that Cromwell‟s critique of zealous 
Protestantism  in fact contained, in addition to critique of austere jettisoning  of “pious customs,” a sense of 
sectarian innovative excess, in “licentious” heresies; that is, the moderate position was generally 
conceptual, not necessarily tied to triangulating between different iterations of Christianity. 
11 Quoted in Collinson, “Nicholas Bacon,” 256. 
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quite reasonably asked what remained indifferent about ceremonies if they were to be 
legislated, particularly if instead of encouraging decency and order in worship they 
tended to promote superstitious practice.12  An anachronistic shorthand for the contested 
ground taken by the church following the Elizabethan Settlement, the term via media was 
itself popularized by nineteenth-century Anglican conservatives eager to assert a 
longstanding high church tradition at the expense of historical struggles to define reform 
within the English church.13 Even so, the term‘s suggestion of a chiefly practical or 
qualitative compromise unwittingly conveys the dissenting tradition‘s sense that political 
expedience resulted in the paradox of a Church of England marred at once by 1) arbitrary 
quasi-Catholic ritual and authoritarian acts of uniformity and 2) a tepid neglect of 
doctrine and affective piety.  The latter sense of Anglican moderation or toleration of 
course informs progressive narratives of secularization—in which a liberal Anglicanism 
is perceived naturally to give way to civic virtue ethics or secular sentimentalism.14 
Anglican orthodoxy (as much as it can be defined), therefore involves a stubborn 
apparent contradiction.  On the one hand, it employs a devotional disciplinary apparatus, 
enforcing consensus through liturgical conformity and attacks on competing ritual forms.  
                                                 
12 Robert Crowley, A Briefe Discourse Concerning the Outwarde Apparell and Ministring Garmentes of 
the Popishe Church (Emden:1566); Verkamp, Indifferent Mean, 61-92.  
13 John Henry Newman, The Via Media of the Anglican Church: Illustrated in Lectures, Letters and Tracts 
Written between 1830 and 1841 (New York: Longmans, 1897-1899).  For discussion of historiography and 
the notion of the via media, see Diarmid MacCulloch, "The Myth of the English Reformation," The Journal 
of British Studies 30, no. 1 (1991); Tyacke, “Anglican Attitudes: Some Recent Writings on English 
Religious History, from the Reformation to the Civil War.”  Verkamp‟s Indifferent Mean makes clear that 
the notion of a via media in the Reformation-era English church was directly related to a theory of 
adiaphora; but he notes that, without specifying the complex debates around the latter term, the idea of a 
via media means “next to nothing” (xiv). 
14 Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment: A Study of the Language of Religion and Ethics in England, 
1660-1780. Vol. I: Whichcote to Wesley; Crane, “Suggestions toward  a Genealogy of the „Man of 
Feeling‟.” 
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But to the extent that the English Church also counseled detachment from zealous 
devotions, it likewise appears, in a secularizing mode, to reduce belief to private 
convictions within a neutral civic sphere. 
Naturally, the state church‘s historical tendency to push religious conflict, 
particularly over ritual forms, to the periphery even as it affirmed liturgical orthodoxy has 
parallels in Swift, with vexing results for critics.  Swift‘s suspicion of zealotry fits equally 
well with ―the moderate skepticism of emerging civil society‖ and an entrenched 
religious conservatism.15  The elements of civic humanism that inform Philip Harth‘s 
identification of Swift with ―Anglican rationalism‖ have been set against the observation 
that such tropes of moderation and common sense formed precisely the ideological 
appearance of Tory authoritarianism.16  From another perspective, Swift‘s presumptive 
mainstream orthodoxy has been contrasted with his manic prose and unrelenting critique, 
which are perceived to act corrosively on his attempt to assert the authority of tradition.17   
Efforts to explain or resolve Swift‘s paradoxical style have variously explored 
aesthetic categories, cultural authority and epistemic shifts, but have not investigated the 
                                                 
15 James Noggle, The Skeptical Sublime: Aesthetic Ideology in Pope and the Tory Satirists (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), 72.  Noggle reviews Swift‟s “ideologically divided position” between 
skeptical critique and authority as perceived by critics.  Daniel Eilon, similarly, points to “skeptical and 
authoritarian elements in Swift‟s politics” and “revolutionary modernism alongside strains of profound 
conservatism.” Daniel Eilon, Faction's Fictions: Ideological Closure in Swift's Satire (Newark: University 
of Delaware Press, 1991), 16. The apparent contradiction also frames Warren Montag‟s discussion in 
Warren Montag, The Unthinkable Swift: The Spontaneous Philosophy of a Church of England Man (New 
York: Verso, 1994).  
16 Harth, Swift and Anglican Rationalism; Montag, The Unthinkable Swift, 13-14. 
17 A.E. Dyson, "Swift: The Metamorphosis of Irony," Essays and Studies 11(1958); Terry J. Castle, "Why 
the Houyhnhnms Don't Write: Swift, Satire and the Fear of the Text," in Jonathan Swift, ed. Nigel Wood 
(New York: Longman, 1999); Judith C Mueller, "Writing under Constraint: Swift's "Apology" For a Tale 
of a Tub," ELH 60, no. 1 (1993).  Noggle observes that “the Tale’s use of sublime language to parody the 
inflated convictions of ideologues tends to exaggerate [Swift‟s] skepticism so much that it makes 
recuperation of any authority, however mediated or cautious, seem impossible,” Skeptical Sublime, 71.     
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specific texture of his Protestantism—in particular, Anglican thought about adiaphora. 18 
The concept of ―things indifferent‖ may be seen in light of calls, not exclusive to 
conformity, for material Protestant institutions that connect parishioners to an affective 
community without courting idolatry— understood less as doctrinal error than as psychic 
over-investment.  This is to read moderation as a coherent cognitive goal rather than a 
cynical authoritarian pretense or skeptical compromise.  Swift‘s ―Tory anarchy‖ may best 
be approached through broader discourses of psychically attuned ceremonial 
indifference.19  
Swift‘s addition to the Tale, A Discourse Concerning the Mechanical Operation 
of the Spirit advertises itself as a novel examination of ―launching out of the Soul, as it is 
purely an Effect of Artifice and Mechanick Operation‖ (1:175). But that concern appears 
throughout the Tale, in several iterations of mechanical or material methods of religious 
self-formation: in, for example, the discussion of the pulpit, the ladder, and the stage-
itinerant as oratorical ―machines‖ associated with Puritan public identity (1:34), the 
depiction of the tailor as a maker of ―vestimental‖ social personae (1:46), and the 
description of the Aeolist sect‘s wind-inducing, comic-infernal devices (1:96-7).  The 
                                                 
18 For example: for Terry Castle, Swift‟s proto-deconstructive insights into unstable textuality compete 
with his fantasy of an authoritative text.  Swift‟s satire, she argues, is a “hallucinatory” performance of this 
tension (253).  Dyson argues for a similar suspended play, in Swift‟s irony, between moral critique and 
unbounded iconoclasm.  Noggle develops Swift‟s use of the “skeptical sublime” as an aesthetic category 
expressed in “withering critical exposure” of ideology that nevertheless “accepts the ideological 
enforcement of unthought authority on the mind as the true expression of humanity‟s epistemological 
predicament” (32).  These approaches have in common a recasting of Swift‟s contradictory impulses into 
privileged aesthetic modes whose defining feature is a critical awareness co-extensive with the modern 
critic‟s perspective on ideology.  I hope, less anachronistically, to find a model for Swift‟s negotiation of 
dogmatism and doubt in spiritual prescriptions deployed around liturgical objects, rather than in modern 
formulations concerning epistemology. 
19 George Orwell, "Politics Vs. Literature: An Examination of Gulliver's Travels," in The Orwell Reader: 
Fiction, Essays and Reportage (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1956), 293. 
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Discourse itself purports to supplement attempts to define religious enthusiasm as a kind 
of madness, the result of natural or pathological processes.   
And, as Casaubon‘s remarks above show, Swift‘s predecessors in anti-Puritan 
genres associated with the Tale also addressed sectarian conflict in terms of liturgical 
objects and practice, offering materialist analyses of belief predicated on man-made ritual 
paraphernalia rather than, as is usually noted, internal convictions or natural causes.  
Casaubon‘s own Treatise Concerning Enthusiasm promises an analysis of ―Mechanical 
Enthusiasm‖ as the ―eighth and last‖ species of delusional divine inspiration to be 
investigated, after taking up inspiration caused by more directly physiological disorders.20  
Casaubon never delivers the projected chapter, however, having forewarned readers in 
prefatory remarks that he may have overextended himself: ―that I shall go through all 
these kinds [of enthusiasm], at this time especially, is more than I can promise my self.‖21 
 It is intriguing to speculate on what Casaubon might have written—perhaps a 
more novel, modern or Swiftian text.  But it seems likely that the missing chapter simply 
would have reiterated the traditional Reformation discourse of liturgical dispute that 
Causabon treats elsewhere.  The precedent for Swift‘s notions about ―mechanical 
operations,‖ that is, may perhaps be better located in these ceremonial quarrels than in the 
specific forays into enthusiastic madness via medicine and natural philosophy with which 
he is usually directly linked.22  Casaubon‘s Of the Necessity for Reformation in Luther’s 
                                                 
20 Meric Casaubon, A Treatise Concerning Enthusiasme, as It Is an Effect of Nature, but Is Mistaken by 
Many for Either Divine Inspiration, or Diabolical Possession (London:1655), 18. 
21 Ibid., 19. 
22 Henry More‟s Enthusiasmus Triumphatus (London: 1656), too, sidelines artificially induced inspiration, 
which he associates with Quakerism, as irrelevant to his immediate subject, “natural” enthusiasm (28-9); 
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Time, for example, arguably provides as many important connections to Swift as the 
often-cited Treatise.  The former offers a model for Swift‘s literal and figurative concerns 
with devotional praxis, social conformity, and spiritual health.  Addressing the imposition 
of devotional uniformity on reluctant nonconformists, Casaubon explicitly takes up 
liturgical forms as psychological objects—points of affective investment that provoke 
severe reactions because they are deeply inscribed in the laity‘s sense of self and 
community: 
It is true, when a Rite or Ceremony, though never so good and warrantable, hath 
been disused in a place, or never used; it may seem strange at first; as apparel, that 
a man hath not been used unto, though never so comely of itself; by children, and 
fools, especially: (such I mean, that know little of the world, besides the place of 
their birth, and usual abode) is looked upon with admiration, if not derision. But 
wiser men, who judge of what they see, by the nature of things, and not by vulgar 
apprehensions; they will soon be satisfied, if their reason be satisfied. Yet some 
men, though wise and prudent enough, otherwise, (too much austerity, perchance, 
                                                                                                                                                 
but his anti-Papist Appendix to the Late Antidote Against Idolatry (London: 1673) does address the issue, 
identifying idolatrous liturgical practices as fomenting “the highest Devotion, and reverential affection and 
passion, that humane nature is excitable into or can express by his look or mind, and profoundly devout 
motion of the spirits of his eyes, which passion and signification thereof is due to God alone” (37).  The 
major anti-Puritan text in the more naturalistic vein, besides Casaubon‟s Treatise and More‟s Enthusiasmus 
Triumphatus, is Robert Burton‟s Anatomy of Melancholy (1621).  On Swift‟s predecessors and sources, see 
C.M. Webster, "Swift's Tale of a Tub Compared with Earlier Satires of the Puritans," PMLA 47, no. 1 
(1932), "Swift and Some Earlier Satirists of Puritan Enthusiasm," PMLA 48, no. 4 (1933) and  "The Satiric 
Background of the Attack on the Puritans in Swift's a Tale of a Tub," PMLA 50, no. 1 (1935).  On naturalist 
explanations of enthusiasm and their perceived influence on Swift, see also Angus Gowland, "The Problem 
of Early Modern Melancholy," Past and Present 191, no. May (2006); Michael Heyd, "The Reaction to 
Enthusiasm in the Seventeenth Century: Towards and Integrative Approach," The Journal of Early Modern 
History 53, no. 2 (1981); John Sena, "Melancholic Madness and the Puritans," The Harvard Theological 
Review 66, no. 3 (1973).  For related theological background, see Geoffrey F Nuttall, The Holy Spirit in 
Puritan Faith and Experience, 2d ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1947). 
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may be some cause:) have naturally such an antipathy to Ceremonies, that Nature 
(if they look not to it carefully) will sooner overcome their Reason.
23
 
Strange rites mark the limit of familiar objects and places, the everyday realities that 
define a parishioner‘s identity and psychic home.  Casaubon‘s own vestimental metaphor 
of ―comely‖ apparel directly alludes to priestly garb and the Vestments Controversy, the 
―comely surplice with sleeves‖ demanded in Archbishop Matthew Parker‘s 1566 
Advertisements.  At the same time, Casaubon explains dissenting resistance in terms of 
emotional ties to apparel, an obvious and familiar nexus of public identity and bodily 
comfort.  The metaphor acknowledges the laity‘s visceral links to congregational 
subcultures even as it derides these commitments, as the comparison with children and 
fools suggests, as trivial, provincial and temporary. 
 The analysis goes beyond the church service‘s symbolic or doctrinal particulars to 
the larger social project at stake, to the state‘s deliberate attempt to forge and enforce a 
national religious identity beyond the parish or conventicle.  Casaubon explicitly defines 
comforting and familiar liturgical life in terms of its spatial boundaries—the place of 
one‘s birth and usual abode—literally the bounding of a social self by the parish‘s 
physical limits and the reach of local traditions marking passage from birth to marriage to 
death.24  Against this, the Church of England‘s more cosmopolitan community stands for 
him as the source of ―reason‖—used in an entirely pragmatic sense—by which to judge 
social praxis truly, and not by means of ―vulgar apprehensions.‖  Common prayer 
                                                 
23 Casaubon, Of the Necessity of Reformation in, and before Luther's Time, 153.  
24 Cressy, Birth, Marriage, and Death. 
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appears here in its aspect as social re-education, implicated even in the cognition of 
geographic space.  More than arguing for one spiritual disciplinary apparatus over 
another, Causabon implicitly recognizes quotidian objects as catalysts for complex 
emotional resistance or loyalty metonymically extended to a background of linked 
cultural institutions.  
 A related argument may be found in Jasper Mayne‘s anti-Puritan Sermon Against 
False Prophets (1647), which complements Casaubon‘s advocacy of ―strange‖ 
conformity in recalcitrant parish backwaters by opposing Puritan attempts to 
defamiliarize state church customs as superstitious and heretical:25 
Have not these Prophets dealt with the mindes of vulgar people, as Melancholy 
men use to deale with the clouds, raised monstrous formes and shapes to fright 
them, where no feare was? Have they not presented strange visions to them? 
Idolatrie in a Church window, Superstition in a white Surplice, Masse in our 
Common-prayer Booke, and Antichrist in our Bishops? Have they not also to 
make things seem hideous in the State, cast them into strange, fantasticall, 
Chymera figures? And have they not, like the fabulous, walking Spirits wee read 
of, created imaginary Apparitions to the people from such things, slight, unsolid 
melting Bodies as Ayre?26 
The Puritan challenge, as Mayne perceives, comes not in terms of doctrine or even 
iconoclasm per se, but rather represents a struggle to reconfigure the laity‘s feelings 
                                                 
25 Webster identifies Mayne among Swift‟s generic predecessors. 
26 Jasper Mayne, A Sermon against False Prophets (s.n:.1647), 17-18. 
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about the parish‘s object world.  Familiar items turn out to be psychic avatars of abstract 
concepts—idolatry, superstition—that demand the believing Christian‘s ethical-
emotional reaction.  Mayne represents Puritan influence as the familiar object world‘s 
dissolution into fearful ghost objects—signs of a mental meltdown of sorts, in which the 
meaning inhering in cultural things bleeds out, leaving an unassimilated flux of anxieties 
projected on matter.  In what amounts to a high compliment to the effectiveness of 
Puritan cultural revolution, Mayne can only object in frustration that the Puritan strategy 
sidesteps rational argument.27  
 The same concern for psychological objects pervades multiple domains of 
sectarian and political debate.  For example, Swift‘s apparent distrust of textuality and the 
promiscuous possibilities of language —on display in his Proposal for Correcting, 
Improving and Ascertaining the English Tongue (1712)—has generally been linked to 
Enlightenment attempts to stabilize language, the plain style of emergent science, or 
Anglican orthodoxy‘s distaste for abstruse theological speculations.28  In this regard, 
Swift has been associated with John Eachard‘s Grounds and Occasions of the Contempt 
of the Clergy and Religion Enquired Into (1670), which rails in part against the 
―inconsiderate use of frightful metaphors‖ that find their way into the sermons of 
provincial clergymen influenced by Presbyterianism.29  But this attempt to cleanse 
                                                 
27 Ibid. 
28Marilyn Francus, The Converting Imagination: Linguistic Theory and Swift’s Satiric Prose (Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1992), 22-32. 
29 Eachard is not explicit about his Puritan targets, but alludes to these divines‟ use of the Geneva Bible.  
Whiting links the text to the influence of dissent in Studies in English Puritanism, 404.  See also my 
discussion of John Flavell in chapter four, below—a likely Presbyterian target known for his devotional 
texts aimed at mariners—who was purged in 1662 but whose career demonstrates the lingering influence of 
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language away from poor style or politically dangerous religious speculation can also be 
associated with longstanding discourse regarding the object world seen in its spiritual 
aspect.  Eachard, for example, emphasizes the thingly ―vehicles‖ of figurative speech, as 
in his complaint that preachers explain doctrine using metaphors drawn from narrow or 
specialized worldly experience: 
Perhaps one Gentleman's Metaphorical knack of Preaching comes of the Sea: And 
then we shall hear of nothing but star-board and lar-board, of stems, sterns and 
fore-castles, and such like Salt-water Language: So that one had need take a 
Voyage to Smyrna or Aleppo, and very warily attend to all the Saylers terms, 
before I shall in the least understand my Teacher. Now, although such a Sermon 
may possibly do some good in a Coast-Town, yet upward into the Countrey, in an 
Inland Parish, it will do no more than Syriack or Arabick.30   
Eachard, like Causabon, condemns narrowing the religious imaginary to the geographical 
and material bounds of the parish or the preacher‘s or tradesman‘s cognitive map, to an 
idiosyncratic lifeworld of customs and technologies. 
 Eachard explains that the homely language of Christ‘s parables, unlike these 
specialized references, the exotic locales or heterotopias to which preachers increasingly 
refer, makes salvation explicable to the entire Christian community, defined by common 
sensory and conceptual waypoints: ―As for our Saviour when he spoke a parable, he was 
pleased to go no further than the Fields, the Sea-shore, a Garden, a Vineyard, or the like; 
                                                                                                                                                 
cultural Puritanism. Ronald Paulson sees attacks on Eachard primarily in terms of abuses of prose style in 
Theme and Structure in Swift's Tale of a Tub  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), 36-39. 
30 John Eachard, Grounds and Occasions of the Contempt of the Clergy and Religion Enquired into in a 
Letter Written to R.L. (London:1672), 58. 
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which are things, without the knowledge whereof, scarce any man can be supposed to 
live in this world.‖31  
 For these controversialists, as for Swift, the liturgy in its original sense of ―the 
work of the people‖ furnished the affective coordinates of a living community modeled 
on the primitive church.  Everyday rituals and symbolic culture could draw subjects into 
communion or drive them into solipsistic schism, limiting Providence away from the 
space of the nation  
 
On Spiritual Machines as Dead Technologies 
From this materialist perspective, Swift‘s orthodoxy bears a counterintuitive 
resemblance to the Puritan hermeneutic that saw hardened social institutions as potential 
idols, analogous to Catholic ceremonies that devolved from spiritual acts in a shared 
epistemological community into an arbitrary complex of objects worshipped for their 
own sake. Swift‘s comparison of Catholic and Puritan cultural artifacts to artificial belief 
machines follows the logic of Puritan attacks on ceremony as inimical to the Reformation 
project of raising belief to a level of conscious introspection. 
Nonconformists of course charged that the established church used the liturgy in 
an arbitrary idolatrous fashion, trampling local traditions and embracing unreformed 
parishioners through rote ritual while arbitrarily excluding a godly minority.  Swift‘s 
support for the national church against enthusiasm actually shares or extends features of 
attacks on clerical vestments and the Catholic-style mass—as furnishing exciting points 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 63. 
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of libidinal investment, teaching blind commitment rather than edifying introspection, 
and conferring membership without regard to spiritual effort.  The Tale’s portrait of 
Jack‘s Reformed Church habits by means of his ―Meddley of Rags, and Lace, and Rents, 
and Fringes‖ (1:88), a mere semblance of Peter‘s equally outré attire, owes much to early 
Puritan texts like William Bradshaw‘s 1604 attack on the surplice.  Jack‘s appearance 
calls to mind Bradshaws‘ unflattering association of priestly vestments with a beggar‘s 
cloak: 
Those that abhorre Idolatrie … cannot but accompt that priestly attire that is 
enjoined to us by our Prelates, an apparel more unbeseeming the Minister of the 
Gospel than a Cloake with a thousand patches, or a coate with foure elebowes, for 
beggary and folly being judgmentes and not siness, the notes of beggarie and folly 
can not be so odious in a spiritual eye as the notes of Idolatry.32 
To take another example, Swift‘s description of enthusiasm‘s panoply of liturgical props 
closely resembles Calvinist-inflected attacks on conformist ceremony as enforced under 
Archbishop Laud.  Indeed, Peter Smart (1569-1652?), in his colorful objections to 
Laudian liturgical innovations at Durham Cathedral, written in 1628, could serve as 
Swift‘s Low Church counterpart.33  This irate appraisal, nicely distilled in Smart‘s 
aperçus that not even Jesus Christ received so much bowing and scraping as the Laudian 
altar, revives Reformation critiques of excessive (Catholic) ritual as a kind of belief 
                                                 
32 William Bradshaw, A Treatise of Divine Worship (Middelburg:1604), 38. 
33  Peter Smart, A Short Treatise of Altars, Altar-Furniture, Altar-Cringing, and Musick of All the Quire, 
Singing-Men and Choristers When the Holy Communion Was Administered in the Cathedrall Church of 
Durham, by Prebendaries and Petty-Canons, in Glorious Copes Embroidered with Images (London:1643).  
The text attacks high church liturgical innovation in terms of its blind emotionalism, carnivalesque theatrics 
and absurd apparatuses. 
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machine, designed to produce mystified, unthinking subjects who replace ethical-spiritual 
transformation with superficial obedience and rote behaviors.  Swift, likewise, marks this 
problem efficiently in the Tale:  Peter‘s Catholic faith is not only marred by pageantry 
and novelty, but manufactures passive adherents in a sacramental economy of artificial 
assemblages.  The same tendency underwrites Peter‘s denigration of the inner, spiritual 
truth of the Eucharist in favor of a vulgar, literal interpretation—parodied in his 
delusional non-transubstantiation of bread into mutton (1:72).  In this sense, Swift‘s 
―literalization‖ of Catholic doctrine—exemplified by Peter‘s ―universal pickle‖ or the 
―office of ensurance‖ as parodies of holy water and indulgences—illustrates 
Catholicism‘s deepest tendency, as a largely symbolic religion to reside purely in the 
formal automaticity of rites and sacraments falsely endowed, Protestants charged, with 
direct, magical effects on the spiritual world (1:67).   
 The mechanical operations Swift associates with enthusiasm, designed to bypass 
the public space of conscious understanding in favor of inspiration in this sense share the 
automatic quality of the Roman sacramental structure Smart associates with High Church 
ceremonialism.  Like Catholic ritual, enthusiast liturgical innovation springs from alleged 
indifference to conscious spiritual reflection—replacing edifying practice with 
interchangeable props (―the Spirit being the same in all, it is of no Import through what 
Vehicle it is convey'd.‖) for sensory excitement (1:183).  Similarly, the dissenting 
predilection for preaching tends to bypass the conscious mind such that ―cant and droning 
replace sense and reason‖ and is ―in greatest perfection, when managed by ignorance‖ 
(1:182).  In both cases emotional theatrics suggest that devotional activity, rather than 
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facilitating an ongoing conscious transformation of self, functions with direct—
mechanical—efficacy.  For Swift, this conviction marks out the space of madness and 
superstition: the believer either places his faith in the direct ―objective‖ influence of rites 
and works on God and his soul, or he comforts himself that his solipsistic search for 
grace has been confirmed by (materially conditioned) subjective excitement, mistaken for 
the Holy Spirit‘s presence. 
But Swift‘s critique of religious formalisms marks enthusiasm not only as 
qualitatively similar to Catholicism, but as a structural complement of its ideology, a shift 
that is less a doctrinal repudiation than a psychological reaction formation:  
The reason of which is easy enough to apprehend; for, the phrenzy and the spleen 
of both having the same foundation, we may look upon them as two pair of 
compasses, equally extended, and the fixed foot of each remaining in the same 
center; which, though moving contrary ways at first, will be sure to encounter 
somewhere or other in the circumference. (1:127) 
Rather than depict two extremes as discrete belief systems or cultures exemplified by 
contrasting liturgical styles, Swift confers on them an identity, conveyed in the image of 
―two Pair of Compasses‖ circumscribing the same circle (1:127).  Puritanism‘s 
internalized spirituality—invisible membership in the elect, or a purely subjective sense 
of salvation based on mental self-policing—suggests a simple Hegelian reversal of the 
Catholic public performance hierarchy, a straight-line transformation of the good into the 
bad, the desirable into the undesirable and vice versa.  Such a reversal is considerably 
less than a thorough-going reform of the bases for individuals‘ spiritual justification.  
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From an external structure, one would turn solipsistically inward, to virtually no gain, 
albeit with a change of style—of vestments, as it were.  From a rote confessional 
sacrament that neglects one‘s lasting internal disposition, one turns to institutionalized 
self-scrutiny without necessary public morality.
34
  Jack rejects common ritual out of hand 
as a quasi-Catholic remnant.  But in turning reflexively inward, Swift suggests, he opens 
himself to the same fruitless search for certainty that he is saved: if he need not perform a 
symbolic duty, a work, he must meet his own impossible standard, and devote himself to 
avoiding, in an equally superstitious fashion, the accoutrements of Catholicism.   
Jack‘s decision to ―dress up Necessity into a Virtue‖ (1:88) and embrace an ethic 
of austerity leaves him, Swift shows, with a ―strange Variety of Conceptions‖ (1:121) 
designed to affirm sanctification through sensory excitement or by marking off a true 
godly community from the territorial church.   Swift‘s veiled catalog of these object-
practices, from austere dress to adult immersive baptism, shows that Jack‘s efforts as a 
―Person of great Design and Improvement in Affairs of Devotion‖ merely repeat Peter‘s 
superstitious formalism (1:124). 
Mechanical operations—Catholic sacraments or Puritan obsessions—represent, to 
borrow the Marxian metaphor, dead spiritual labor, and service not to living cognition of 
spiritual reform, but to an alien edifice.  These modes offer materiality—smoke and 
mirrors, pompous regalia, or the charismatic‘s speaking platform—as superficial evasions 
                                                 
34 This is a very Lacanian move; any position for a subject within the symbolic order constitutes itself by 
means of an appeal to what it is not, its Other.  The qualitative identity of the allegorical figures of Swift‟s 
time evidently runs along these lines, as well, as he shows how the subject of Dissent and the Other of 
Catholicism are part of the same social-symbolic. 
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of spiritual work in  material world, in favor of passive performance or production of a 
subjective state of excitement. 
 
Objects, or Idols?  
Swift‘s materialist analysis of sectarian customs resembles, to a degree, modern 
critiques of ideology or contextual analyses that see subjects embedded in religious 
cultures or styles.  Along these lines, James Noggle recently has argued, alluding to 
Slavoj Žižek‘s work, for the Tale’s insistence on ideological inscription at the brute or 
banal level of reality, in the ―dead degraded matter‖ of (paradoxically) ―sublime objects 
of ideology‖ that permit no analysis35:  
In short what the Tale offers is an account of the subject in society not as a 
―political animal,‖ … but as something like an ideological one.  Our social being 
is determined not by what we choose to think about it but by psychological 
powers that necessitate particular thoughts and actions and involve us in sects, 
crowds, and unthinking discipleship.36 
For Swift, that is, cultural and religious objects, material bodies that ―exhaustively define 
all that we can know,‖ enforce automatic behaviors and determine unconscious cultural 
commitments.37 
But this misses the liturgical context that leads Swift to associate unconscious 
object-practices with abnormal and fragile forms of religious belief, and symbolic culture 
                                                 
35Noggle, Skeptical Sublime, 96, 76.  Noggle‟s reference to Žižek is to Sublime Object, 206-8. 
36 Noggle, Skeptical Sublime, 81. 
37 Ibid., 95. 
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not with constraint but with superficial appearance. Swift‘s intended critique of 
―Corruptions in Religion and Learning‖ (1:1), far from describing helpless, 
epistemologically circumscribed subjects of ―cognitive failure,‖ offers a moral critique of 
subjects responsible for the way they exploit, as well as suffer under, cultural objects.38  
Swift‘s erring believers, Peter and Jack, routinely operate outside their public faiths, 
using cultural objects, idols, merely to prop up their public personae.  This does not make 
them free of ideology—it suggests, in quite a different analysis, that belief as such is 
fraught with ambivalence.  More specifically, symbolic cultural items signify but do not 
fully represent or contain the subject:  
‗Tis true, indeed, that these Animals, which are vulgarly called Suits of Cloaths, 
or Dresses, do according to certain Compositions receive different Appellations.  
If one of them be trimmed up with a Gold Chain, and a red Gown, and a white 
Rod, and a great Horse, it is called a Lord-Mayor; if certain Ermines and Furs be 
placed in a certain Position, we style them a Judge, and so an apt Conjunction of 
Lawn and black Sattin we entitle a Bishop. (1:47) 
The speaker—like Casaubon—makes a strong case for symbolic object‘s inescapable 
power: outward forms determine identity.39  But Swift also mocks this view, inasmuch 
as its adherents, obviously, confuse social signifiers with the actual subject. 
                                                 
38 The remark is in Swift‟s 1710 “apology” to the Tale; Noggle, Skeptical Sublime, 95. 
39 Montag argues that the brothers‟ coats point to religion as a material practice that runs no deeper than its 
signifiers; he remains, however, close to those who see Swift‟s conformity as a political expedient, 
“necessary fictions” deprived of real religious status as ideological apparatuses; Montag, The Unthinkable 
Swift, 98-100. 
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 Swift links vested symbolic authority in general with controversial ecclesiastical 
garb in particular, bringing out the Catholic emphasis on public performance –or Puritan 
aversion to it—as idolatry, supplanting ritual‘s transformative, edifying influence with its 
mere mechanical rehearsal.  The Tale compares the brothers‘ religious innovations to 
sartorial displays, explicitly developing Peter‘s budding Catholicism as an expression of 
slavish devotion to external forms and fashions.  The subsequent account of the tailor, 
who ―creates‖ men affirms the ordinary workings of social signifiers, while warning, in 
religious terms, of excessive investment in outward ceremony:  ―They worshipped a sort 
of idol, who, as their doctrine delivered, did daily create men by a kind of manufactory 
operation‖—ultimately, the unhealthy confusion of self identity with one‘s public 
function, a veneer rather than an essence (1:46).   
 The Tale accounts for ideology strictly in terms of longstanding Protestant 
critiques of liturgical cultures that overstress vestimental reality.  Only the hack tale-
teller, in the Digression Concerning Madness (1:102-114), embraces the notion of an 
inescapably closed consciousness limited by ―the Superficies of things.‖40  His mockery 
of the limits of rational inquiry (―the pretended philosophy which enters into the depth of 
things‖ [1:109]) seemingly leaves no alternative but mystification conditioned by 
depthless objects: 
Last Week I saw a woman flay’d, and you will hardly believe how much it altered 
her Person for the worse.  Yesterday I ordered the Carcass of a Beau to be 
                                                 
40 Noggle identifies Swift‟s position with that of the Tale-Teller: “Swift‟s spirituality always lies in this 
absolute denial that we may reach beyond our immediate, bodily experiences, beyond „the Superficies of 
things‟ to find some satisfying subjective mediation between them and the absolute,” 76. 
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stripped in my Presence; when we were all amazed to find so many unsuspected 
Faults under one Suit of Cloths: Then I laid open his Brain, his Heart, and his 
Spleen; But I plainly perceived at every Operation that the farther we proceeded, 
we found the Defects increase upon us. (1: 109-110) 
The hack is correct, inasmuch as the nominalist (here, the vivisectionist) simply misses 
socially constituted reality, the communal codes and signifiers that make psychological, 
not empirical, objects.  But the hack‘s hyper-corrective embrace of the superficial 
―wisdom which converses about the surface‖ leads to a similar error: neglect of the way 
the subject always exceeds his social identity (1:109).  His preference for ―superficies‖ 
throws us back on Swift‘s association of surfaces with sectarian garb and symbolic 
practice. The speaker‘s odd surprise that the beau‘s vestment is not the man himself 
points to a naivety about social convention, in reality a dead code whose reality rests in a 
contingent social agreement.  The ―unsuspected faults‖ concealed by the beau‘s public-
vestimental identity as a dandy—that is, an exemplary dissembler and idolater of 
fashion—cruelly designate his humanity, but as external to both social and empirical. He 
neither lives up to his pretensions, nor can quite escape their judgment to be reduced to 
brute matter: the more he is discovered as an excess of his symbolic function, the more it 
lingers to condemn him.41 
                                                 
41 Noggle‟s reading mistakes Lacan‟s “object a”—Žižek‟s sublime object— for an epistemological limit 
(32), an entry point to blind belief, a “material body that exhaustively defines all that we can know,” or an 
incarnation of the ideology in which subjects are inscribed.  On the contrary, the Lacanian model, like 
Swift‟s, describes the object‟s lure precisely in terms of a subject‟s distance from social ideals, the fact that 
there is no public signifier that can exhaustively represent him.  Far from being solely “an instrument of 
ideological enforcement,” (31) the sublime object emerges only as an unconscious fantasy, a desire for an 
objective remedy for the subject‟s “unsuspected faults,” as Swift terms the failure to embody a symbolic 
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The Digression Concerning Madness in fact argues that to be completely 
―invested‖ in superficial social forms is to occupy an exceptional or fanciful, not an 
inescapable condition.  The hack‘s ironic definition of the ―Point of Felicity‖ as ―the 
Possession of being well deceived‖ concerns the unusually lucky subject who is simply 
too willfully stupid to realize that intersubjective reality is a collective fiction, a condition 
that gives him the dubious distinction of being a ―fool among knaves‖ (1:110).   Swift 
indicates (in qualified fashion, in the tale-teller‘s excessive enthusiasm) that blissful 
ignorance is a rare improvement on the usual human burden, which is not epistemological 
blindness but, quite the opposite, something like knavery—an all-too-knowing 
participation in a fraud. 
 
Material Culture and Moral Psychology  
 Swift‘s intervention remains a critique of religious corruption and not an 
exploration of epistemology or tendentious ideology.  The modern, fideist prejudice that 
sees belief as installation of internal epistemological limits sees all cultural inscription as 
equally representative of the trivially broad category ―ideology.‖  But Swift‘s text, surely, 
seeks to differentiate spiritually between precise modes of involvement in social forms. 
As seen by controversialists like Swift, liturgical styles channel believers toward distinct 
ways of managing gaps between their symbolic duty, their self-image and their remaining 
desires.  In this sense, knavery denotes worshipful complicity with conventions, even as 
                                                                                                                                                 
role.  It therefore grounds an ideological reality, but entices the subject toward social norms only to the 
limited degree that he can interpolate his fantasy; it also embodies precisely the subject‟s experience of 
those norms as a mindless imposition to be evaded.  It is only as a result of the subject‟s failure to be fully 
inscribed that the sublime object can be referred to as a kind of dead remainder. 
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the subject feels them to be false.  This is, on the one hand, a feature of ―normal‖ social 
integration—the level of outward conformity and etiquette that form the social Other; on 
the other hand, Swift identifies hyper-formalism as a nonconformist pathology that 
actually leads to religious laxity. Accordingly, Swift sketches representative subject 
positions in Peter and Jack, with thick descriptions of social behaviors or neuroses 
associated with each style of faith. 
 Peter‘s character, certainly, reflects the psychic dishonesty Swift sees in the 
Catholic permutation of allegiance to social ideals—one that privileges the hierarchies of 
public function due to over-identification with symbolic/vestimental roles.  Peter‘s 
―pride, projects, and knavery‖ (1:71), his grandiosity and insecurity speak to the fragility 
of maintaining an authority (―emperor,‖ ―God Almighty,‖ ―Monarch of the Universe‖ 
[1:71]) he knows fundamentally to be false:  
To support this Grandeur, which he soon began to consider could not be 
maintained without a Better Fonde than what he was born to; After much Thought 
he cast about at last to turn Projector and Virtuoso, wherein he so well succeeded, 
that many famous Discoveries, Projects, and Machines which bear great Vogue 
and Practice at present in the World, are owing entirely to Lord Peter’s invention. 
(1:65) 
His papal attire, mechanical signs of sanctity and arrogance both buttress his claims and 
convey his fear of exposure, further generating yet distancing the ―real‖ authority he 
seeks to inhabit.  The satire on transubstantiation, in which Peter maintains against all 
evidence that his loaf of brown bread is in fact mutton and wine, likewise involves 
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maintenance of a public fiction—even to the point that Peter‘s brothers, before effecting a 
―reformation,‖ are drawn in, reluctantly supporting Peter‘s brittle identity by acceding to 
his fantasy.  More than Peter‘s personal intransigence, we see the social production of the 
delusive collective reality alleged to characterize Catholic culture.  Faced with his rage 
and doggedness, Jack and Martin capitulate to his fancy: 
Such a thundering Proof as this left no further Room for Objection: the two 
Unbelievers began to gather and pocket up their Mistake as hastily as they could.  
Why, truly, said the first, upon more mature consideration—Ay, says the other, 
interrupting him, now I have thought better on the Thing, your Lordship seems to 
have a great deal of reason. (1:73) 
Peter, in part, represents demanding church authorities to whom Catholic subjects make 
professions of belief.  But Swift undermines this priestly image, presenting Peter less as a 
panoptic authority than a gaze whose innocence must be preserved—for whom 
appearances must be maintained lest he crumble.  In this sense, Peter embodies the 
symbolic order itself, in its aspect as an idiotic set of conventions sustained only by 
collective participation, but secured by individual reluctance to disturb the field of 
socially sanctioned knowledge and propriety.  Catholic belief, we are told, consists not in 
an inner conviction, but in compulsion to perform publically, even or especially as a 
means of concealing mental reservations.  Against the domineering inquisitory apparatus, 
Swift points to the repressive power of politesse and civil custom.  It is precisely as 
complicit ―unbelievers‖ that Martin and Jack stand in as paradigmatic Catholic subjects. 
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 Peter‘s psychic problems derive, in Swift‘s portrait, from the Catholic tendency to 
endow rituals with directly spiritual benefits exceeding their merely social function.  The 
inevitable gap between the subject and his over-valorized role or duty is experienced as 
severe guilt—resulting, in Swift‘s analysis, in Peter‘s extreme defensiveness and angry 
fear of exposure: 
However, it is certain that Lord Peter, even in his lucid Intervals, was very lewdly 
given in his common Conversation, extreme wilful and positive, and would at any 
time rather argue to the Death than allow himself to be once in an Error.  Besides, 
he had an abominable Faculty of telling huge palpable Lies upon all Occasions; 
and swearing not only to the Truth, but cursing the whole Company to Hell if they 
pretended to make the least Scruple of believing Him. … In short, Peter grew so 
scandalous that all the Neighbourhood began in plain words to say he was no 
better than a Knave. (1:75) 
Peter‘s defensive pretenses and commitment to outward sanctity, as encouraged by 
Catholicism, stem from an excessive need to fully inhabit ideals or mechanically achieve 
justification through works.  At the same time, the strictly formal nature of those duties 
encourages belief as superficial conformity – mechanical obedience-- and as attempts to 
deflect scrutiny, to transfer belief by fooling witnesses, real or perceived, thought to 
believe more fully than the subject.  Swift designates this psychic structuring of self in 
society as knavery —the dishonest promulgation of a severe Law, while exempting the 
self from real inward reform.  Or, rather, participating in the Law precisely as means of 
evading responsibility for one‘s own perceived deficiencies and temptations.   
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   Neither the notion of a subject of confessional discipline nor an Enlightenment-
style critique of priestcraft quite captures Swift‘s complaint.  Peter, no wholly inscribed 
subject of ideology, holds himself outside of his belief system, resists or dissembles his 
lofty ideals; indeed, his severity and misery stem from that failure.42  Similarly, Jack and 
Martin‘s complicity points to Catholicism as a delusion sustained by a silent crowd of 
equally alienated souls.  By the same token, the notion of a cynical priestly manipulator 
operating from a realist position outside belief, of (im)moral freedom, clearly fails to 
capture Peter‘s extreme libidinal investment in social forms, both in trying, and failing, to 
occupy the place of sanctification, and in his subsequent defensive enjoyment of social 
status within the sacramental hierarchy.   
 Swift matches the Catholic zealot immersed in superficial ceremonialism with a 
familiar Puritan type: the pious hypocrite, who repeats the Catholic dynamic of 
inadequacy and ostentatious performance in a quest for sure signs of election. Jack‘s self-
scrutiny and austerity merely replace works and sacraments.  Ostensibly in pursuit of 
spiritual perfection, Jack regards self-punishing rigor as itself a sign of grace, a self-
aggrandizing source of satisfaction without reference to actual self-reform: 
[Jack] would stand in the Turning of a Street, and calling to those who passed by, 
would cry to One; Worthy sir, do me the Honour of a good Slap in the Chaps: To 
another, Honest friend, pray favour me with a handsom kick in the Arse: Madam, 
shall I entreat a small box in the ear from your ladyship’s fair hands?  Noble 
Captain, Lend a reasonable Thwack, for the love of God, with that Cane of yours 
                                                 
42 That is, Peter is no subject of ideology in the sense intended by Noggle, above. 
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over these poor Shoulders.  And when he had by such earnest Solicitations made 
a shift to procure a Basting sufficient to swell up his Fancy and his Sides, he 
would return home extremely comforted, and full of terrible Accounts of what he 
had undergone for the publick good. (1:126)  
Where the Catholic type can use rote obedience to deflect the imperative of reform, Jack 
exempts his real behavior from scrutiny on the grounds that he is subjectively consumed 
with the question of grace.  His adolescent-style rebellion against Peter captures precisely 
the affective hysterical negation of Catholic identity that is a failure to shift the deep 
conceptual terrain.  We also see an emotional cost as Jack remains, through its mere 
disavowal, actually invested in ceremony—experiencing his austerity as a decided loss. 
Whereas Peter‘s sense of inadequacy issues in a characteristic defensiveness, Jack is 
associated with extreme resentment.  His wish to see Martin reduced to his own state 
rather than remedy his own condition reflects an incomplete renunciation of symbolic 
forms—his lingering sense that those who retain them will access enjoyment that he has 
denied himself: 
That which most afflicted him was to observe his Brother‘s Coat so well reduced 
into the State of Innocence, while his own was either wholly rent to his Shirt, or 
those Places which had escaped his cruel Clutches were still in Peter‘s livery.  So 
that he looked like a drunken Beau half rifled by Bullies, or like a fresh tenant of 
Newgate when he has refused the payment of Garnish. … He would have been 
extremely glad to see his Coat in the condition of Martin’s, but infinitely gladder 
to find that of Martin’s in the same Predicament with his. (1:88) 
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In short, if Swift shares conceptual space with Lacanian theorists, it is less in the analysis 
of inescapable ideology than of ineradicable enjoyment.  In Swift‘s exemplars, we see 
religious subjects who are, both in their obsessive involvement with cultural forms, and 
in their alienation from or evasion of them, essentially in pursuit of their own satisfaction.  
Swift premises his ethical critique on this unacknowledged enjoyment: the way these 
subjects fail to take responsibility for their own basic libidinal pleasure as their real 
motivation -- ritual soothes, in whatever form, and renders world experience intelligible.  
The categories of knavery and hypocrisy designate the behavioral correlates of sectarian 
styles that sustain these pleasures.  This means that the culture of dissent, originally a 
conscious embrace of alterity, has become a kind of dominant symbolic order that 
sustains individuals outside the kind of conscious commitment that Protestantism had 
demanded of its members.   
Swift‘s remark that ―satire is a sort of glass wherein beholders do generally 
discover everybody's face but their own; which is the chief reason for that kind reception 
it meets with in the world, and that so very few are offended with it‖ (1:140) touches on 
the problem endemic to zealous nonconformity and social forms generally: individuals 
are psychically constituted at a distance from the social reality in which they participate. 
They accrue to themselves its benefits and rewards, even as they exempt themselves from 
responsibility for the injustices they thereby inflict on others.  Swift‘s fat unwieldy fellow 
who fails to see himself as part of the crowd in which he participates exemplifies the 
antithesis of the Reformation project that Swift upholds: 
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A Mountebank in Leicester-Fields had drawn a huge Assembly about him.  
Among the rest, a fat unwieldy Fellow, half stifled in the Press, would be every fit 
crying out Lord! what a filthy Crowd is here?  Pray, good People, give way a 
little,  Bless me! what a Devil has raked this Rabble together:  Z——ds, what 
squeezing is this!  Honest friend, remove your Elbow.  At last, a Weaver that 
stood next him could hold no longer:  A Plague confound you (said he) for an 
over-grown Sloven; and who (in the Devil‘s Name) I wonder, helps to make up 
the Crowd half so much as your self?  Don‘t you consider (with a Pox) that you 
take up more room with that Carkass than any five here?  Is not the Place as free 
for us as for you?  Bring your own Guts to a reasonable Compass (and be d——
n‘d) and then I‘ll engage we shall have room enough for us all. (1:28) 
The weaver takes up the satirist‘s burden, his aggression an attempt to get the fat fellow 
to discover his own face despite his fetishist disavowal of complicity.  By extension, we 
might reread Swift‘s observation that ―Principally I hate and detest that animal called 
man; although I heartily love John, Peter, Thomas, and so forth‖ as a kind of therapeutic, 
charitable (in a strictly Christian sense) inversion of the more usual pretence that 
principally I am full of love for my neighbor, although I heartily detest John, Peter, 
Thomas and so forth.43 
 
Obey, But Only Obey 
                                                 
43 Swift to Alexander Pope, September 29, 1725 in The Correspondence of Jonathan Swift, D.D., ed. 
David Wooley, 4 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1999), 2:606. 
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  Swift‘s exploration of sectarian vestimental-liturgical objects implicitly offers 
Anglican moderation as an alternative to neurotic and antisocial devotional cultures.  But 
Swift‘s modern reception has had difficulty imagining the adiaphoric ideal of edifying, 
rather than disciplinary spiritual technology.  The problem is understandable, given that 
Swift‘s critique of sectarian pathologies runs close to his analysis of socialization as such.  
An idealized Anglican style, however restrained its qualitative features, seems merely 
another set of vestments or idols.  Alternatively, if orthodoxy means taking distance from 
passionate commitment, it surely risks resemblance to secular civic religion, or a call for 
just the sort of religious hypocrisy—public orthodoxy with private detachment—Swift 
condemns in the Tale and the Argument Against Abolishing Christianity (1708). 44  
  As Claude Rawson points out, Swift‘s interpretation of religious duty seems to 
call for public behavior as a kind of pious façade; ―want of belief is a defect that ought to 
be concealed when it cannot be overcome‖ (9:261).45  This dissembling seemingly 
approximates Catholic emphasis on objective tokens of belief, in violation of Swift‘s 
association of ceremonial dogmatism with spiritual decay.  One finds the same 
                                                 
44 The apparent conflict is obvious enough in criticism surrounding the Argument Against Abolishing 
Christianity and The Project for the Advancement of Religion which offer, respectively, a critique of 
Christian hypocrisy and a direct call for the public to dissemble virtue. The texts divide critics, as Judson 
Curry notes, into contending visions of Swift, either as cynical or disillusioned authoritarian (implicitly 
opening himself to the secularist charge), or a proponent of a pious orthodoxy whose plan in the Project 
must be rejected as ironic;see Judson Curry, "Arguing About the Project: Approaches to Swift's an 
Argument against Abolishing Christianity and a Project for the Advancement of Religion," Eighteenth-
Century Life 20, no. 1 (1996).   
45 Claude Rawson, "The Character of Swift's Satire: Reflections on Swift, Johnson, and Human 
Restlessness," in The Character of Swift's Satire: A Revised Focus, ed. Claude Rawson (Newark: 
University of Delaware Press, 1983), 27.  Rawson‟s discussion of the tension in Swift, between the call to 
outwardly conform and distaste for hypocrisy (45-52) captures precisely the conflict that I believe a closer 
examination of religious debate can illuminate.  
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formulation in Swift‘s A Project for the Advancement of Religion and the Reformation of 
Manners (1709).  First, Swift embraces symbolic identity, censuring clergymen whose 
behavior diminishes the sartorial tokens of their authority, at a cost to their social 
function: 
The Clergy are the only Set of Men among us, who constantly wear a distinct 
Habit from others; The Consequence of which (not in Reason but in Fact) is this, 
that as long as any scandalous Persons appear in that Dress, it will continue in 
some Degree a general Mark of Contempt. Whoever happens to see a Scoundrel 
in a Gown, reeling home at Midnight, (a Sight neither frequent nor miraculous), is 
apt to entertain an ill Idea of the whole Order, and at the same Time to be 
extremely comforted in his own Vices. (2:54) 
Swift‘s solution, a decidedly panoptic scheme for moral discipline, culminates in an 
explicit endorsement of religious hypocrisy in vestimental terms:   
Neither am I aware of any Objections to be raised against what I have advanced; 
unless it should be thought, that making religion a necessary Step to Interest and 
Favour might increase Hypocrisy among us: And I readily believe it would. But if 
One in Twenty should be brought over to true Piety by this, or the like Methods, 
and the other Nineteen be only Hypocrites, the Advantage would still be great. 
Besides, Hypocrisy is much more eligible than open Infidelity and Vice; it wears 
the Livery of Religion, it acknowledges her Authority, and is cautious of giving 
Scandal. Nay, a long continued Disguise is too great a constraint upon human 
Nature, especially an English disposition. Men would leave off their Vices out of 
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meer Weariness, rather than undergo the Toil and Hazard, and perhaps Expence, 
of practising them perpetually in private. And I believe it is often with Religion, 
as it is with Love; which, by much Dissembling, at last grows real. (2:56-7; my 
emphasis) 
Here, however, Swift‘s embrace of convention is exactly what sets him apart from the 
hypocrite sectarians he attacks.  Against Puritan precisianism, which aspires to certain 
sanctity, or the Catholic sacramental economy, which endows ceremony with 
soteriological effects, Swift embraces the strictly superficial nature of social norms.  
Conformity, in this more knowing sense, entails the conscious burden of one‘s distance 
from social ideals, as opposed to the delusion that symbolic ideals could fully inform us 
or be fully realized.  Indeed Swift portrays conformity frankly, as a wearying, dullish 
imposition best relieved by mastering one‘s impulses, or by a calculated decision that 
private vice is more trouble than it is worth.  Obedience and resistance are thereby 
depleted of the enjoyment characteristic of nonconformist belief, the promise of both 
social sanction and private indulgence undisturbed by guilt.   The hypocrite-enthusiast, 
that is, is free to pay mere lip service to his ideal precisely because he ―really believes‖ in 
it, can evade the gaze of the Other, by conforming in an entirely narrow sense. 
In part, Swift commends public performance as disciplinary training; but only to 
the extent that restraint leads to recognition of one‘s flaws, not denial or secret guilt, and 
to a good will rather than punctiliousness, never allowing the letter of the Law to triumph 
over its spirit. True devotion means struggle to inculcate a spiritual disposition that can 
be applied spontaneously, even in excess of particular duties.  That lesson appears in 
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Swift‘s analysis of politeness in the Treatise on Good Manners and Good Breeding 
(1754), which argues for the foundations of civility in compassion and good sense rather 
than ―bigotry of forms.‖ Swift, remarkably, makes his case in terms of an anti-Catholic 
historiography:   
As the common forms of good manners were intended for regulating the conduct 
of those who have weak understandings; so they have been corrupted by the 
persons for whose use they were contrived. For these people have fallen into a 
needless and endless way of multiplying ceremonies, which have been extremely 
troublesome to those who practice them, and insupportable to everyone else: 
insomuch that wise men are often more uneasy at the over civility of these 
refiners, than they could possibly be in the conversations of peasants or 
mechanicks. (4:214) 
One does not obey the Law; one masters it, understanding when its letter must be 
superseded.46   
By insisting on rituals as quotidian points of conscious social binding, Swift 
counters the destabilizing neuroticism of sectarian zealotry, offering the compulsory as a 
tonic against the compulsive.  The Anglican imperative might therefore be formulated 
not: Obey, but rather: Obey, but only obey.47  The adiaphoric ideal of indifferent 
                                                 
46 Swift‟s fairly mainstream discomfort with Christian mystery and opposition to metaphysical speculation 
may also be contextualized as a psychological corrective to Puritan or Calvinist speculations on election or 
scriptural ideals against which to measure absolute spiritual success or failure. 
47 The idea that one practice without belief, or accede to purely legal forms of obedience was, of course, 
from the dissenting standpoint, exactly the problem with the Church of England.  Without the same sense 
of the national church, the proposed minimal obedience could only appear as a lure to a form of Catholic 
hypocrisy. 
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conformity represents a coherent psychic ideal for cultural integration; acknowledging it 
obviates the need to posit Swift‘s writerly mode or attitude toward governance as divided 
between anarchic or skeptical impulses and reactionary authoritarianism—or, indeed, as 
an aesthetic or deconstructive performance of insight and blindness. 
 
Folk Psychology and Sectarian Identity 
In a sense, the Tale paints religious beliefs as epiphenomenal symptoms of more 
fundamental ways that subjects relate to cultural artifacts in their lives.  Catholic practice, 
in this sense, exemplifies the tendency of any cultural-spiritual practice to degenerate into 
unexamined prejudices and routines—idols—valued for their own sake rather than as 
spiritual or moral exercises.  Swift‘s allegorical history in Section II of the Tale, for 
example, presents Catholic doctrine as an effect—of the three brothers‘ desire to indulge 
material wants and fashions; they develop the Roman church‘s interpretive practices and 
apocryphal traditions secondarily, to rationalize neglect of primitive Christianity‘s plain 
virtues and edifying practice in favor of fetishistic obsessions. If Catholicism is here a 
worldly religion, it is also the native religion of worldliness, the cargo-cultish norm 
symbolized by the tailor and the ladies representing the early church‘s chief temptations 
to greed, ambition and pride, ―the Duchess d’Argent, Madame de Grands Titres, and the 
Countess d’Orgueil‖ (1:45). 
Similarly, Swift‘s description, in the Argument Against Abolishing Christianity, of 
religious orders on the Continent as a series of asylums for particular mental disorders, 
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while narrowly polemical, also captures the pervasive—and unmodern—tendency to 
think of the body politic and religious practice in terms of mental disposition: 
The Institution of Convents abroad seems in one Point a strain of great Wisdom; 
there being few Irregularities in human Passions which may not have recourse to 
vent themselves in some of those Orders, which are so many Retreats for the 
Speculative, the Melancholy, the Proud, the Silent, the Politick, and the Morose, 
to spend themselves, and evaporate the noxious Particles; for each of whom we in 
this Island are forced to provide a several Sect of Religion to keep them quiet 
(2:45) 
Swift‘s prejudicial account is not, in the end, so far removed from Richard Baxter‘s 
Puritan sense of pastoral psychology—the way he classifies parishioners into the 
spiritually weak, those ―that labor under some particular distemper,‖  those who are 
declining due to scandal or lack of zeal, those who ―lie under temptation,‖ and so forth.48  
That impulse toward taxonomy informs, as well, Baxter‘s sociological-spiritual accounts 
of his flock and of conformists and nonconformists after 1662. Swift‘s notion of 
governance remains intertwined with discourses of psychological care of the laity. 
The notion of a folk psychology captures the way a coherent signifying network 
for familiar behavior patterns can be built out of these analyses, as our own use of the 
word ―puritanical‖ suggests.  This shorthand (Puritan, enthusiast, hypocrite, knave …) for 
complex but recognizable cognitive dynamics —something more than stereotypes— 
served within the constraints of the rhetorical and social contests that forged (for 
                                                 
48 Richard Baxter, The Reformed Pastor (Richmond, VA: John Knox Press, 1956), 51-60. 
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example) Puritanism itself, but more flexibly across the eighteenth century to represent 
the symbolic order of international cultures of dissent and Catholicism, within which 
individual subjects seeking their senses of justification persistently functioned.   
Swift‘s analysis, while grounded in at least a pretense of empirical observation, is 
perhaps best categorized as a working-out of the logical possibilities of contending 
Reformation-era cultural and thought structures—or, rather, as a delineation of limit 
cases defining the edges of the Anglican-national symbolic.  The clinical existence of 
Puritan psychology or of the stereotyped version of Catholicism that Swift presents is 
thus somewhat beside the point.  Indeed, the question of who counted as a Puritan was 
strictly relative to one‘s own idealized object-practices.  In this sense, the analytic itself 
helps condition the varying positions to which constituencies gravitated.  What people 
meant by a term of abuse like ―Puritan‖ was, to a significant degree, already freighted 
with a number of quasi-sociological observations, by virtue of sectarian interest in mental 
dispositions conditioned by the material environment.  Put another way: my claim is not 
that Swift‘s texts make empirical-sociological claims that transcend ideology, but rather 
that the ideological universe of English Protestantism was itself constructed at least partly 





PART II:  MODERNITY AS LITURGY 
 
Spiritual Ecology in Swift and Defoe 
The early modern tendency to assess cultural artifacts for their potential to edify 
and bind the community or devolve into idols might be described as a concern with an 
environing spiritual ecology.  This scheme implies several overlapping domains of 
concern, including material culture, church polity, hermeneutics, doctrines of salvation 
and ethical disposition.  In ecclesiastical terms, conformists and dissenters alike sought a 
reformed church defined by conscious ritual practice.  The liturgy, in its original sense of 
―the work of the people,‖ furnished affective coordinates for a living community modeled 
on the primitive church as it rehearsed connections between states of mind and the object 
world.  The resulting (territorial or godly) community served epistemologically to counter 
superstitious belief through public inquiry.  For thinkers like Swift, dissenters were linked 
through idiosyncratic rites with cellular congregations, isolated locales or ambiguously 
defined networks of the godly.  In theory, these unregulated subcultures could interpret 
scripture or providential signs without submitting to full public scrutiny; they could lend 
authority to spiritual claims by limiting the sphere of debate and evidence.  Puritans 
voiced similar concerns about rituals they saw as arbitrary Roman-style idols, inimical to 
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conscious hermeneutic community.  In turn, controversialists linked conscious practice to 
civic and ethical self-reform.  The non-pathological Christian subject‘s resulting sense of 
grace spoke also to the psychic relief of dispensation from the letter of the Law. 
The real dispute here concerns conflicting visions of the church body as manifest 
through object-practice, with varying emphases on the visible territorial church and the 
invisible church of godly souls.  Which version of the primitive church, partisans asked, 
best served to guarantee a critical eye on the practices that supposedly inculcated public 
virtue?  In this regard, it may be useful to set Swift alongside Daniel Defoe, whose 
dissenting perspective is perhaps not so far removed from him as one might think.  The 
relation between the authors—and then I will take up an obvious point of comparison, 
Robinson Crusoe and Gulliver’s Travels—has been summed up with striking brevity: 
―Defoe embodies everything that Swift hates‖: 
He is the other half of England that Swift struggled all his life to suppress or 
ignore. … Defoe, with his brickworks and bankruptcies, is the rising small 
businessman whom Swift saw very correctly as the man who would unseat his 
timocracy of landed gentleman and substitute an economy of stocks and shares for 
one of estate and title. He is the Roundhead Dissenter to whom the Whigs run as 
an ally in their fight with the Tories of the Established Church.1  
                                                 
1 Nigel Dennis, Jonathan Swift: A Short Character (New York: Macmillan, 1964), 123. 
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The extreme polarity here has been variously nuanced, but stands as a familiar point of 
contrast in literary history.2 
In these terms, a critical distinction between the authors lies in their relative 
comfort with elements of modernity.  Their most popular texts, Crusoe and the Travels, 
likewise, have often been evaluated along these lines: the former seems, consciously or 
not, to embrace a new episteme characterized by empiricist truth-seeking, capitalist 
commerce, the commodity form and ideologies of bourgeois individual self-
determination; the latter seems fundamentally opposed to the erosion of public virtue by 
these presumptively secular phenomena.  
But early modern concern with psychic-spiritual objects suggests changing the 
terms of this comparison to bring out a different set of opposing tendencies:  Namely, the 
way different visions of the church as a guarantor of psychic health and problem-solving 
guided evaluations of new forms as spiritual technologies—a debate about how to 
modernize, not about modernity itself.   
For Defoe, the isolated dissenter guided by scripture offers sound analog for the 
church itself; encounters with novelty simply suggest the zealous Protestant‘s opportunity 
to build a godly community from the ground up.  Robinson Crusoe therefore may be 
seen, in part, as a metaphorical account of exemplary Protestant practice not necessarily 
                                                 
2 See, for example, McKeon, Origins, 338-9; Montag, The Unthinkable Swift, 2.  For a less personal 
comparison related to the discussion here and in the next chapter, see J. Paul Hunter, "Gulliver's Travels 
and the Novel," in The Genres of Gulliver's Travels, ed. Frederik N. Smith (1990).  See also John Ross, 
Swift and Defoe: A Study in Relationship (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1941); 
Paula Backscheider, A Being More Intense: A Study of the Prose Works of Bunyan, Swift and Defoe (New 
York: AMS Press, 1984). 
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at a modern frontier, but within England‘s unreformed spaces.  Even isolated individuals, 
he suggests, can competently assimilate (psychological) objects to spiritual purpose, and 
their activity in this direction can inhibit pathological investment in dead culture.  
Defoe‘s comfort, in other words, with ―modern‖ forms stems from a religious prejudice 
toward self-reform through worldly activity; it need not represent a secular predilection 
toxic to enclosed inner beliefs. 
Swift‘s partial re-imaging of Crusoe as Gulliver suggests the orthodox reaction to 
Defoe‘s vision of the freelancing nonconformist: divided from the national church‘s 
corrective influence, the zealous Protestant risks mistaking his own fantasy for reality.  
Gulliver is a likely fabulist who ultimately drives himself into schism, not only physically 
in his journeying, but through a definitively dissenting psychic illness.  Modern social 
and technological forms in Defoe‘s text —tools of business and exploration, nautical-
journalistic prose, middle-class domestic culture—appear to condition psychological 
isolation and unspiritual desire.  Swift‘s critique of these popular forms has often been 
understood to extend to commercialism, the commodity, and empiricism—all of which 
are presumed to instantiate a secular world view.  Yet we see here a critique of artifacts 
that threaten not with disbelief, but with familiar and flawed mental habits.  The master 
pejoratives of Swift‘s analysis—idolatry, fashion, innovation and artificiality—do still 
still have their roots firmly in the liturgical disapproval of ―newfangled‖ practice, as the 
Book of Common Prayer puts it, in which cancerous or unnatural growth of new forms 
appears chiefly as a deviation from the cognitive health ensured by the established 
church. 
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Chapters three and four will set Crusoe and the Travels side-by-side in these 
terms.  My evaluation of Crusoe, below, will take up the way Defoe‘s text describes a 
spiritual habitus in terms of mental states keyed to material encounters and spiritual 
exercises,  including experiences with artifacts presumed to belong to the secular.  The 
following chapter (four) will read Gulliver‘s adventures as a rebuttal of Defoe‘s vision of 
spiritual self-care.  Swift describes Gulliver in near-Weberian terms, as a Protestant 
subject driven by material desires that soothe his mental insecurities.  Gulliver, like the 
subjects in Swift‘s Tale, seems damaged by a sectarian-type overinvestment in mental 
idols. Swift links his dysfunction to English ethical cultures of the court and commerce, 
but only as replicas of sectarian styles to which religion, properly conceived, is the 
remedy.  This reading challenges simple oppositions of Swift and Defoe by highlighting 
the way they employ a similar religious hermeneutic from different points of view; it also 
suggests that Swift‘s critique has nothing to do with modernity as commonly understood.  
Robinson Crusoe and Gulliver’s Travels have been compared often enough as 
iterations of the adventure tale or simply as versions of the emerging novel form itself.  
The texts have not, however, been evaluated together in terms of their explicit aspirations 
as instruments of pious moral improvement.  Crusoe‘s ostensible editor asserts: 
The Story is told with Modesty, with Seriousness, and with a religious Application 
of Events to the Uses to which wise Men always aply them (viz.) to the Instruction 
of others by this Example, and to justify and honor the Wisdom of Providence in 
all the Variety of our Circumstances, let them happen how they will. 
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The Editor believes the thing to be a just History of Fact; neither is there any 
Appearance of Fiction in it: And however thinks, because all such things are 
dispatch’d, that the Improvement of it, as well as the Diversion, as to the 
Instruction of the Reader, will be the same; and as such he thinks, without farther 
Compliment to the World, he does them a great Service in the Publication. 3 
 
Swift‘s second edition, in 1727, adds these claims to his many implicit complaints about 
Defoe.  He exposes Gulliver‘s similar hopes —only to have Gulliver note as well, in the 
prefatory letter to his cousin Sympson, his utter failure to put ―a full Stop put to all 
Abuses and Corruptions‖ (11:6), and to inculcate various public virtues ―and a Thousand 
other Reformations‖ to correct ―every Vice and Folly‖(11:6-7).  It is, then, not so much 
as novels or voyage narratives, but as devotionals that I mean to investigate these texts. 
  
                                                 
3 Daniel Defoe, The Life and Strange Surprising Adventures of Robinson Crusoe (London: W. Taylor, 
1719), iii-iv.  Subsequent references to Robinson Crusoe are to this (the first) edition and are given 
parenthetically.  The text has ETSC number T072264; document number CW113746641 at Eighteenth 
Century Collections Online. 
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Chapter 3:  Robinson Crusoe’s Primitive Church 
Defoe and the Religion of Disenchantment 
Defoe does not submit easily to the usual modern narrative about a religious past 
confronted with a secularizing modernity.  He has often been seen as an ultra-realist, a 
writer whose engagement with commerce or the natural world conditions a kind of brute 
empiricism.4 Yet, as critics note, this supposed central impulse of his fiction, the 
representation of secular factual data, cannot be easily reconciled with his religious 
sensibilities.5  Even those who caution against artificial divisions between the novel‘s 
aspect as Puritan devotional and the ―economic‖ Crusoe have tended to see a conflict 
between the religious message and Defoe‘s narrative of material accumulation; at best, 
they suggest, the text conjures an ideological fantasy—leaving telltale fissures and 
fractures—an imaginary if impossible reconciliation of irreconcilable orders of truth and 
value.6 
 But while critics differ as to the degree Defoe‘s narrative undermines his 
religious intent, they have tended to construe the nature of belief itself similarly: as deep 
inner convictions or immersion in a romance-like lifeworld.  Defoe‘s providentialism has 
                                                 
4 Cynthia Wall, The Prose of Things: Transformations of Description in the Eighteenth Century (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2006), 108-13; Watt, The Rise of the Novel, 96-104. 
5 Influential cases for a religious motif opposed to worldly concerns include J. Paul Hunter, The Reluctant 
Pilgrim: Defoe's Emblematic Method and Quest for Form in Robinson Crusoe (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1966); G.A. Starr, Defoe and Casuistry (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971). 
6 McKeon, Origins, 315-37; John Richetti, "Secular Crusoe: The Reluctant Pilgrim Re-Visited," in 
Eighteenth-Century Genre and Culture: Serious Reflections on Occasional Forms ed. Dennis Todd and 
Cynthia Wall (Cranbury NJ: University of Delaware Press, 2001). 
 137 
been upheld, typically, by construing the narrative‘s worldly encounters in allegorical 
terms, as reflections of more crucial happenings on a spiritual plane. Those who see 
conflicts between the text‘s worldly and spiritual elements agree, at least, that 
(conversion to) belief consists in something like enthrallment to a predetermined 
symbolic arrangement of reality.7   The modes of belief and disbelief are drawn from a 
familiar disenchantment narrative. 
Consequently, one might say that the argument for the modern or economic 
Crusoe emerges less from the strength of his modern impulses than from imputation of a 
fairly insipid religion.  It seems, after all, to be drained of any pragmatic value or 
intellectual depth,  to be reduced to an insistence on typology, narrative conventions or 
divinatory intimations.  Crusoe‘s (and Defoe‘s) providentialism is often construed in 
purely epistemological terms, as little more than the willful desire to attribute all events 
to God‘s overarching wisdom in the best of all possible worlds.8 The disobedience-
redemption arc, when treated as a lapse from immersive belief, offers little to inspire: the 
insistence on Crusoe‘s adventuring as a fall from grace would seem to be, if not flatly 
contradicted by his success on the island, reductive of his religion to one of material wish 
fulfillment9; more charitably, but equally unappealingly, it would seem to confirm a 
                                                 
7 John Richetti, Popular Fiction before Richardson: Narrative Patterns 1700-1739 (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1969); Damrosch, God's Plot.  Richetti argues the novel presents opposing visions of “secular” and 
“religious” ways of being in the world.  Damrosch goes so far as to suggest that Defoe fails to achieve a 
real Puritan consciousness. Richetti also argues, in “Secular Crusoe,” that Defoe cannot “allow Crusoe to 
achieve and enjoy freedom and power without violating the restrictions of a moral and religious ideology 
which defines the individual as less than autonomous.” 
8 Richetti, "Secular Crusoe," 61; Damrosch, God's Plot, 190. 
9 Damrosch, God's Plot, 187; McKeon, Origins, 326-7. 
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religious outlook consisting in a rather vapid representation of heavenly reward or an 
artificial demonstration of Providence‘s magical guidance. 
The strongest proponents of a straightforwardly emic reading of religion in 
Puritan terms have likewise described a remarkably feeble-seeming faith of otherworldly 
irrelevance.  G.A. Starr, for instance, acknowledges a potentially active Puritan 
commitment to self-care of the soul in the world, but declines to specify its concrete 
goals.  Ordinary objects, he notes, were sometimes seen as having ―symbolic 
significance‖ and could be ―spiritualized,‖ but this seems to indicate primarily a 
predilection for typology or premonition-seeking.10  Biographical or worldly events, he 
asserts, figure in the narrative and the Puritan mind chiefly as ―objectifications‖ of a 
spiritual state; he describes scrutiny of God‘s signs mainly in terms of looking for 
personal and deliberate coded messages.11  Hunter, similarly, sees worldly referents 
mainly as reflective of a spiritual state (―ultimately [Crusoe‘s] physical activities become 
a metaphor‖), and reads providence largely as ―divine control.‖12 
The reading here will attempt to find a more serious phenomenological and 
psychological purpose in Defoe‘s fiction—one that unites empirical observation of the 
world with pragmatic self-critique and religious ethics.  I suggest that Defoe‘s text 
describes, in a programmatic fashion, techniques for habituating the psyche to the kinds 
of adverse conditions faced by dissenters in England.  This reading puts pressure on 
critical assumptions that have dominated since Hunter and Starr‘s religious readings by 
                                                 
10 Starr, Defoe and Casuistry, 22-5. 
11 Ibid., 36-8, 80, 90-1, 94. 
12 Hunter, Pilgrim, 189, 53, 56. 
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proposing that Robinson Crusoe is not primarily a travel narrative or about colonial 
spaces, that the island has no special status ideological or otherwise, that capitalism has 
no presence in the narrative as a cultural novelty, that none of Crusoe‘s implements or 
observations testify to modern empiricism, and that commercial objects are accorded no 
new or novel treatment.  In contrast to religious readings, which have long made some of 
these claims, I will also argue that Defoe‘s spirituality has significant practical uses—but 
that to see them we must alter our sense of what counts as early modern religion in the 
text.  
 
Robinson Crusoe and Disposition of Mind 
Readings of Crusoe‘s spiritual narrative obviously differ widely, but its structural 
role in the text has generally been construed along several basic lines.  In one sense, for 
example, Crusoe‘s early failure to repent of his disobedience to his father—his ―original 
sin‖—furnishes a specific example of the more abstract drama of sin and grace; Crusoe‘s 
life serves as a parable on the order of the biblical prodigal son, to whom he directly 
compares himself (230). The narrative thus offers a tangible correlate for a soteriological 
message, a kernel of meaning to be applied to the reader‘s own life.  Crusoe‘s story 
therefore also functions more practically or ideologically as a cautionary tale of the 
wages of greed or disobedience to authority.  One can, as well, point to the spiritual 
narrative as furnishing the underlying moral and structural conventions of a surface-
literal or even secular tale, with latent content that may or may not be meaningful for 
individual readers. 
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In general, then, it is usual to find a gap between Crusoe‘s thoughts and emotions 
as they figure a representative human consciousness and the religious meaning that 
readers could derive.  But the text also affirms that spiritual conditions—in this case, 
failure to repent—also directly are affective states conditioned by worldly experiences, 
rendered here as an experience of shame: 
Shame opposed the best Motions that offered to my Thoughts; and it immediately 
occurr‘d to me how I should be laugh‘d at among the Neighbours, and should be 
asham‘d to see, not my Father and Mother only, but even every Body else; from 
whence I have since often observed, how incongruous and irrational the common 
Temper of Mankind is, especially of Youth, to that Reason which ought to guide 
them in such Cases, viz. That they are not asham‘d to sin, and yet are asham‘d to 
repent (16). 
That is, while shame is a worldly obstacle to a more spiritual path (obedience, contrition), 
and arguably the exterior or allegorical sign of a deeper unrepentant state of the soul or 
failure to accept grace, it also is itself Crusoe‘s religious failing and the condition to 
which spiritual practice is a remedy.  Crusoe‘s affect, his perception of humiliating 
surveillance locates his problem in a psychological disorder:  He experiences piety 
improperly, as an ordinary unconscious desire for approval amid arbitrary social norms; it 
is a submissive work carried out before an unforgiving projected Other.  The text 
therefore recounts Crusoe‘s cognitive interventions to repair this emotional state through 
a more conscious integration of religious imperatives within his worldly encounters.  His 
experiences of grace are, similarly accounts of mental well-being or confidence.  Crusoe 
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is ―exceedingly refresh‘d, and my Spirits lively and cheerful‖; he finds, at times, a ―calm, 
sedate Way of Living‖ and elsewhere can see that ―both my Sorrows and my Joys; my 
very Desires alter‘d, my Affections chang‘d their Gusts, and my Delights were perfectly 
new‖ (111, 197, 132). 
My point here is not the reductive one, that religious feelings are nothing but 
elevated, culturally contingent terms for mental states, or that the narrative is transparent 
to psychoanalytic concepts; rather, I suggest the way Defoe‘s inherited affective-religious 
terminology offers an internally coherent cognitive theory of belief.  The text should 
serve as a caution that neither apparently emotional terms (shame) nor religious concepts 
(providence) can be neutrally extracted from a native religious psychology. 
This, most simply, is to attend to acknowledged elements of spiritual 
autobiography; yet I want to address more fully the text‘s pragmatic goals—to see the 
account more as notes toward a working theory of mental objects and what Crusoe calls 
―disposition[s] of mind‖ than as a set of doctrines, thematics or genre conventions (134).  
Plot events, even in this sensational narrative, may be secondary: Crusoe‘s careful 
account of tasks and encounters arguably functions largely as a record of environmental 
variables underlying the corresponding record of moods—subtle shades of, mainly, 
anxiety and moments of mental relief.13  He is by turns—to compile a non-exhaustive 
cross section of examples: ―terrify‘d in my Mind‖, in ―Agony of Mind‖; ―dreadfully 
frighted‖; in ―Horror of Mind‖; in ―the deepest Gulph of human Misery‖; able to bring ― 
                                                 
13 John Bender has argued that “narrative in its relation to consciousness is the actual subject here: 
accounts of the self are the self.” See Imagining the Penitentiary: Fiction and the Architecture of Mind in 
Eighteenth-Century England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 53.  
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my Mind a little to relish my Condition‖; ―afflicting my self‖; ―surpriz‘d and perfectly 
astonish‘d‖; ―like one dead or stupify‘d‖; ―terrify‘d and dejected‖;‖ under dreadful 
Apprehensions‖;  possessed of ―a certain Stupidity of Soul, without Desire of Good, or 
Conscience of Evil‖; ―surpriz‘d with a Kind of Extasie‖; ―confus‘d‖; ―very sad and 
heavy-hearted.‖14  
The narrative does a certain analytic work with these states, teasing out, for 
example, the differences between a ―meer common flight of joy‖ and a cautious 
―compleat happiness‖ (104, 261).  It also affirms the pervasive power of affect, as when 
Crusoe recounts living for two solid years in ―Uneasinesses‖ (193).  This, if we take it 
seriously, is an unnerving account of helplessness before psychological objects and 
feelings for which one is nevertheless responsible: 
How strange a Chequer Work of Providence is the Life of Man! and by what 
secret differing Springs are the Affections hurry‘d about as differing 
Circumstance present! To Day we love what to Morrow we hate; to Day we seek 
what to Morrow we shun; to Day we desire what to Morrow we fear; nay even 
tremble at the Apprehensions of; this was exemplify‘d in me at this Time in the 
most lively Manner imaginable. (184) 
Crusoe‘s ever-changing circumstances are, at bottom, a shifting array of desires and 
aversions conditioned, but not predictably determined by a world of psychological 
objects.  There are neither good objects nor bad except in the paradoxical sense of 
                                                 
14 See pages: 7; 8; 11; 12; 43; 77; 81; 90; 93; 94; 101; 103; 104; 105; 107. 
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modern psychoanalysis, that the subject can guiltily annihilate their own cause of desire, 
or desire their own annihilation.  As Crusoe formulates the matter:  
There are some secret moving Springs in the Affections, which when they are set 
a going by some Object in view, or be it some Object, though not in view, yet 
rendred present to the Mind by the Power of Imagination, that Motion carries out 
the Soul by its Impetuosity to such violent eager embracings of the Object, that 
the Absence of it is insupportable. (222) 
Even Robinson Crusoe‘s signature object-encounter, with the mysterious footprint in the 
sand, serves more as an opportunity for self reflection than an account of the charged 
possibilities that he may encounter a longed-for companion or a deadly threat.  The object 
of attention here is the emotion itself, ―how many various Shapes affrighted Imagination 
represented Things to me in, how many wild Ideas were found every Moment in my 
Fancy, and what strange unaccountable Whimsies came into my Thoughts‖ (182).   Upon 
reflection, the improbably extreme possibilities for the imagined mysterious stranger—
either best friend or cannibal—surely point to an encounter with the psychological, rather 
than the plot object, as does its ultimate resolution—friend and cannibal. 
 The narrative often treats affect less as a subjective response than an unbidden, 
even objective force and, beyond this, as a quality of the world itself.  Defoe/Crusoe‘s 
phenomenological accounts of mental ―disposition‖ perhaps bear brief comparison to 
Martin Heidegger‘s analysis of same concept in Being and Time, if only to highlight the 
difficulty of finding a ready modern analogue.  Heidegger‘s quasi-poetic, quasi-
theological project furnishes, in the notion of disposition or sensibility (Befindlichkeit), 
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an account of being as a pre-conceptual embedding in the world—one that is, 
nonetheless, disclosed to beings through their sense of attunement to the world, their 
mood.15  The notion of mood not as a content of beings, but as that in which their being 
takes place, offers a provisional shorthand for Crusoe‘s casual but hard-to-conceptualize 
links between self, creation, and affect—the way the merest accidents, natural forces and 
the deepest states of his soul are in continual conversation. 
Heidegger‘s sense of embeddedness as a ―being-toward‖ some potential state also 
speaks to the temporally directed quality of Crusoe‘s self-presentation.16  For the former, 
existence takes place within practical tasks and ultimate goals that provide a horizon of 
meaning.  Crusoe is perhaps most crucially always outside of himself—involved in some 
future project, identified with some state of affairs not in his present—a past sinner, a 
rescued survivor, a future financial success—that also discloses his orientation toward 
providence and the state of his soul. 
One is, however, brought up short with respect to the Heideggerian analogy by 
Crusoe‘s pervasive anxiety—for Heidegger a constitutive element of all being-in-the-
world, but for Crusoe a sign of avoidable spiritual and mental-physical illness.17 His 
                                                 
15See, for example, I.v, ¶ 29-31 in Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward 
Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962).  On the translation of Befindlichkeit, see Richard Sembera, 
Rephrasing Heidegger: A Companion to Being and Time (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2007), 252-
3.  Macquarrie and Robinson use the translation ―state of mind,‖ but Heidegger also glosses his concept as 
―mood‖ (Stimmung) or ―attunement‖ (Gestimmtheit).  On mood and attunement see also Martin Heidegger, 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. William McNeil and Nicholas 
Walker (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1995), 66-9. For a discussion of Heideggerian analyses 
of mood see Thomas Pfau, Romantic Moods: Paranoia, Trauma, and Melancholy, 1790-1840 (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 1-26. 
16 For example, Heidegger, Being and Time, 149-68. 
17Ibid., 179-82.  
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involvement in futurity—―afflicting my self with Fruitless Wishes‖ (127) -- or 
identification with hypothetical selves as ideals or lost opportunities serves, naturally 
enough as a source of misery: 
Here I meditated nothing but my Escape; and what Method I might take to effect 
it, but found no Way that had the least Probability in it: Nothing presented to 
make the Supposition of it rational; for I had no Body to communicate it to, that 
would embark with me; no Fellow-Slave, no Englishman, Irishman, or Scotsman 
there but my self; so that For two Years, tho‘ I often pleased my self with the 
Imagination, yet I never had the least encouraging Prospect of putting it in 
Practice. (21) 
This sort of wishing and hoping and regretting exceeds discrete individual dissatisfaction 
inasmuch as it reveals a quality of improper worldly care, a turning away from 
providence.  Heidegger‘s ontology suggests, in a way resonant in the text, that 
fundamental attunements (toward salvation, for example) change the subject‘s very 
world, as the ground of their being.  But where he supposes an immersion in such moods, 
Defoe offers, in terms more congenial to psychoanalysis, a subject whose rejected 
choices remain operative.   Defoe‘s narrative casts Crusoe‘s existential spreading out into 
potential or incipient selves as a function of renunciation: to invest in one path entails a 
loss or disavowal of others that may be keenly felt.  Most obviously, Crusoe‘s sin equates 
with a habit of repression, the denial of his present in favor of fantasies. The redemption 
plot offers most basically a counter-narrative of deliberate bringing to consciousness of 
this material.  
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Hypothetical Training: If I Had … I Should Have … 
 As in the case of spiritual illness, Crusoe describes grace mainly as a class of 
mental dispositions, perhaps less a positive state of affairs than the receding of anxiety.  
The language of relief pervades the text as the fruit of Crusoe‘s strenuous efforts at 
―Religious Exercise‖ (121). He  reads and studies, prays, marks time, meditates, observes 
holidays, and engages in mental reflection, allowing him, at times, to bring ―my State of 
Life to be much easier in it self than it was at first, and much easier to my Mind, as well 
as to my Body‖ (153). 
Crusoe describes his fears as something to be mastered, rendered only apparent.  
The goal might best be described as a state of equanimity or Stoic ataraxia, in which 
mental objects are deprived of their capacity to disturb:  ―I look‘d now upon the World as 
a Thing remote, which I had nothing to do with, no Expectation from, and indeed no 
Desires about: In a Word, I had nothing indeed to do with it, nor was ever like to have; so 
I thought it look‘d as we may perhaps look upon it hereafter, viz. as a Place I had liv‘d in, 
but was come out of it‖ (151). 
This requires, we see, constant scrutiny of unbalancing emotion, as well as a 
theoretical awareness of the problem.  Such self-control, while a conscious and worldly 
activity, remains in the ambit of religion, since it is the means by which Crusoe is able to 
reconstrue his circumstances as a gift from God, to see ―what a Table was here spread for 
me in a Wilderness, where I saw nothing at first but to perish for Hunger‖ (175).  When 
Crusoe remarks, subsequently, that ―it would have made a Stoick smile to have seen, me 
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and my little Family sit down to Dinner; there was my Majesty the Prince and Lord of the 
whole Island‖ (175) we can hear him boasting not only that the scene could move even a 
Stoic, but also that his mental discipline and ability to re-conceive his desolation might 
garner the Stoic‘s approval.  If Crusoe‘s feelings run to more enthusiastic expressions of 
deliverance and thankfulness, these remain victories of self-control over previously 
unruly and unbidden mental states: 
It was now that I began sensibly to feel how much more happy this Life I now led 
was, with all its miserable Circumstances, than the wicked, cursed, abominable 
Life I led all the past Part of my Days; and now I chang‘d both my Sorrows and 
my Joys; my very Desires alter‘d, my Affections chang‘d their Gusts, and my 
Delights were perfectly new from what they were at my first Coming, or indeed 
for the two Years past. (132) 
In the simplest possible terms, Crusoe re-figures what appears to be a curse into a 
blessing: 
I spent the whole Day in humble and thankful Acknowledgments of the many 
wonderful Mercies which my Solitary Condition was attended with, and without 
which it might have been infinitely more miserable. I gave humble and hearty 
Thanks that God had been pleas‘d to discover to me, even that it was possible I 
might be more happy in this Solitary Condition, than I should have been in a 
Liberty of Society, and in all the Pleasures of the World. (132) 
This progress often has been shorthanded as a ―conversion.‖  True enough, but the 
term—at least in the sense of privileging a key event, driving narrative, or sudden pious 
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enlightenment—doesn‘t really do justice to Crusoe‘s steady devotion to mental training 
techniques.  His refreshed spiritual perspective follows repeated distinct exercises, 
including steady re-application in the face of failure. 
Specifically, and perhaps counter-intuitively, his reform requires deliberate 
application of the same psychic-spiritual habits that drove his discontent and despair: 
rigorous contemplation of hypothetical realities designed to cast his situation in light of 
some alternative:  
It put me upon reflecting, How little repining there would be among Mankind, at 
any Condition of Life, if People would rather compare their Condition with those 
that are worse, in order to be thankful, than be always comparing them with those 
which are better, to assist their Murmurings and Complainings. (198) 
 
I spent whole Hours, I may say whole Days, in representing to my self in the most 
lively Colours, how I must have acted, if I had got nothing out of the Ship. How I 
could not have so much as got any Food, except Fish and Turtles; and that as it 
was long before I found any of them, I must have perish‘d first. That I should 
have liv‘d, if I had not perish‘d, like a meer Savage. That if I had kill‘d a Goat, or 
a Fowl, by any Contrivance, I had no way to flea or open them, or part the Flesh 
from the Skin, and the Bowels, or to cut it up; but must gnaw it with my Teeth, 
and pull it with my Claws like a Beast.(154) 
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These Refections made me very sensible of the Goodness of Providence to me, 
and very thankful for my present Condition, with all its Hardships and 
Misfortunes: And this Part also I cannot but recommend to the Reflection of 
those, who are apt in their Misery to say, Is any Affliction like mine! Let them 
consider, How much worse the Cases of some People are, and their Case might 
have been, if Providence had thought fit. (154) 
Crusoe inverts his obsessive dwelling on counterfactuals, replacing longed-for ideals with 
unrealized fears.  He then commends his experiences to the reader as honed techniques.  
His spiritual exercises include precise parameters for maximizing edifying effect 
(representing ―in the most lively colours‖); they are deliberate and repeated; and they 
imbue the redemption narrative—inevitably a rather predictable arc—with a sense of 
contingency and agency.   
I had another Reflection which assisted me also to comfort my Mind with Hopes; 
and this was, comparing my present Condition with what I had deserv‘d, and had 
therefore Reason to expect from the Hand of Providence. I had liv‘d a dreadful 
Life, perfectly destitute of the Knowledge and Fear of God. I had been well 
instructed by Father and Mother; neither had they been wanting to me, in their 
early Endeavours, to infuse a religious Awe of God into my Mind, a Sense of my 
Duty, and of what the Nature and End of my Being, requir‘d of me. But alas! 
falling early into the Seafaring Life, which of all the Lives is the most destitute of 
the Fear of God, though his Terrors arc always before them; I say, falling early 
into the Seafaring Life, and into Seafaring Company, all that little Sense of 
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Religion which I had entertain‘d, was laugh‘d out of me by my Mess-Mates, by a 
harden‘d despising of Dangers; and the Views of Death, which grew habitual to 
me; by my long Absence from all Manner of Opportunities to converse with any 
thing but what was like my self, or to hear any thing that was good, or tended 
towards it. (154-5) 
Crusoe‘s backslidings, narrative repetitions and revisions, if not calculated to specific 
effect, show Defoe‘s cultural prejudice toward small scale narratives of day-to-day piety, 
a daily struggle to re-center the self amid a number of potentials.  The narrative here 
equates faith itself with a willingness to study a variety of dire alternatives in the service 
of the present: ―we never see the true State of our Condition, till it is illustrated to us by 
its Contraries; nor know how to value what we enjoy, but by the want of it‖ (164). 
 
Being-Toward Being Eaten 
As dogma or a bare proposition, Crusoe‘s recognition of ―how easy it was for the 
Providence of God to make the most miserable Condition Mankind could be in worse‖ is 
a crude foundation for faith (164).  At best, it suggests redemption through fearful 
discipline or a defensive rationalization of belief in the face of evil.  At worst, it may 
resemble the modern injunction toward so-called positive thinking; or, it risks (as 
Anglican critics indeed charged) a convenient and callously narrow notion of 
Providence—in which the horrible deaths of Crusoe‘s fellow sailors, for example, serve 
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neatly as proof of God‘s benevolent concern for Crusoe.18  Despite the puerile sensibility 
such a faith might suggest, modern estimations of the novel have often implied the 
presence of exactly this perspective. 
 But seen as religious exercises simulating an individual‘s interface with the world, 
Crusoe‘s frightening hypotheticals take on a different cast.  More than simply conjure 
dire alternatives—against which his situation can be regarded in an attitude of 
thankfulness—Crusoe describes a process of acclimating himself to radical changes in 
circumstance.  This means, in part, cultivating healthy reactions to the unexpected.  More 
importantly, though, the text suggests that casting himself forward into imaginary 
permutations of disaster helps Crusoe master corresponding traumatic implications for his 
place in creation—what Crusoe calls the ―nature and end of my being‖ (155).  He must 
learn to see himself not only as shipwrecked, but as shipwreckable: a being for whom 
shipwreck reflects on or figures his human potential, limits and dignity—a being for 
whom, alternatively, slavery or cannibalism are existential, not merely circumstantial, 
possibilities.  Crusoe‘s anxiety over particular events often seems a shield against the 
more generalized anxiety of threats to his sense of being and the world‘s symbolic 
constitution. Thus Crusoe, in the passage above, locates his early Fall not only in sinful 
activity, but also in a forgetting of the true limits of his being.  His Puritan upbringing 
offered no less than the humbling perspective provided by terrors of the sea: the Real 
                                                 
18 There are certainly grounds for this reading: “Thanks to God who had so happily and comfortably 
provided for me in my desolate Condition; and that of two Ships Companies who were now cast away upon 
this part of the World, not one Life should be spar‟d but mine: I learn‟d here again to observe, that it is very 
rare that the Providence of God casts us into any Condition of Life so low, or any Misery so great, but we 
may see something or other to be thankful for; and may see others in worse Circumstances than our own” 
(221). 
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always hides a further possibility.  The Christian (or Stoic) lesson must be to give up on 
the idea of security. 
Crusoe‘s view here, quite clearly I think, amounts to a firm repudiation of the 
positivist notion of empirical observation often attributed to Defoe and alleged to sit 
uncomfortably with his religious sensibility.  Defoe rejects any simple concept of an 
underlying bedrock ―real‖ in favor of the kind of pragmatism we find in Swift: reality is 
here simply that which God continues to make manifest, and Defoe‘s whole spiritual 
outlook rests on the premise that it is never exhausted by human knowledge.  This 
conceptual scheme implies something like a Lacanian Real rather than empirical reality, 
though one might also reference Heidegger‘s sense of truth as an unconcealing.19  The 
human relation to the world is not, to put it another way, epistemological at all, since it is 
really defined by the psychic stance one takes toward what can only be a provisional limit 
of knowing.  
Crusoe‘s spiritual contemplation amounts to metaphysical work or a re-creation of 
the subject; his hypothetical thought objects help stabilize a self identified less with 
former projects of desire and more with his actual surroundings.  He engages in a kind of 
fort-da game with himself, making repeated mental forays along provisional alternate 
paths until he is bound up with or spread across more relevant or realistic possibilities.20 
His reform of desires appears in the subtle shift in his guilt: from a self-pitying 
                                                 
19 Heidegger‟s use of the phenomenological category of “the world” as opposed to philosophically loaded 
concepts like “reality” also speaks to the critique Lacan makes with his concept of the Real. 
20 Freud‟s well-known fort-da example of soothing anxiety, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, concerns a 
child repeatedly playing out a toy on a length of thread and reeling it back to virtually rehearse and master 
the here/gone dynamic of his mother‟s absence; Peter Gay, ed. The Freud Reader (New York: W.W. 
Norton,1989), 599-601. 
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identification with a path he should have chosen, at the expense of his present, to 
recognition of the need to expand, not narrow, his sense of possibilities.  
This process deliberately limits the possibility of specious Panglossian belief.  
Crusoe, in fact, explicitly anticipates and critiques the posture of defensive apologetics 
and disciplined obedience.  He can never simply believe that everything is for the best, 
since real respect for providence means renouncing attachments to inevitably temporary 
conditions, the provisionally accepted object world, and their inducements to a false 
sense of psychic security.   Having achieved a certain acceptance of fate, he further 
declares that ―it was possible for me to be more happy in this forsaken Solitary 
Condition, than it was probable I should ever have been in any other Particular State in 
the World; and with this Thought I was going to give Thanks to God for bringing me to 
this Place‖ (133).  But he quickly recants: ―I know not what it was, but something 
shock‘d my Mind at that Thought, and I durst not speak the Words: How canst thou be 
such a Hypocrite‖ (133).  Crusoe does not mistake faith for a would-be totalizing 
narrative that demands repression of his reservations.  Instead, he maintains a conscious 
awareness of real conditions and their limits, a stance opposed to his former habit of 
idealizing certain states of affairs. He therefore rejects the psychic character of the 
zealous convert, who overcompensates for persistent doubt by clinging neurotically to his 
newfound piety.  
Crusoe‘s discovery of the footprint offers an exemplary instance of his repeated 
dynamic of reform.  There he is as much concerned with his reaction, which threatens 
collapse of his mental equilibrium, as he is with the thing itself: ―My Fear banish‘d all 
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my religious Hope; all that former Confidence in God which was founded upon such 
wonderful Experience as I had had of his Goodness, now vanished‖ (184).  Crusoe 
distinguishes between the disturbing object and his ontological anxiety, between 
localized fear and the sense that he has been cast altogether from the world of meaning 
secured by his recent assumptions about Providence: ―Fear of Danger is ten thousand 
Times more terrifying than Danger it self, when apparent to the Eyes; and we find the 
Burthen of Anxiety greater by much, than the Evil which we are anxious about  …  I had 
not that Relief in this Trouble from the Resignation I used to practise, that I hop‘d to 
have. I look‘d, I thought, like Saul, who complain‘d not only that the Philistines were 
upon him; but that God had forsaken him‖ (188).  His subsequent reflections suggest, 
again, that desire—or, rather, his longing for what he thinks and understands as 
desirable—is his chief obstacle.   
During his long isolation, he observes, he naturally came to regard the prospect of 
fellow man as ―the greatest Blessing that Heaven it self, next to the supreme Blessing of 
Salvation, could bestow‖ (185).   Now, however, his fears blight the possibility.  The 
encounter destabilizes because it forces a real confrontation with a merely idealized 
future.  Having worked to acclimate himself to the psychic reality of solitude he still risks 
and experiences unwitting attachment to this new set of assumptions.  Under pressure of 
being actualized, the prospect of a visitor threatens a more traumatic horizon of 
expectations—one that retrospectively (so to speak) alters his accustomed cognitive map 
of future-directed life activity, his hopes and plans—changing his desire to anxiety. 
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In answer to this new trauma, Crusoe toys with an unsubtle acknowledgement that 
he exists, in any case, at God‘s sufferance; he falls into a fatalism that substitutes passive 
submission for real mental self-possession.  But this dogmatic formulation of God‘s 
power retains a theoretical unhelpfulness for ―Hours, Days; nay, I may say, Weeks and 
Months‖ of backsliding and anxiety (186).  Only when Crusoe marshals his mental 
composure and begins to ―think sedately‖ does he re-master his sense of saving grace and 
rebuild his sense of objects of desire (189).  The real spiritual solution is a rather 
pedestrian reflection resulting in reasoned observations: that the island is likely to 
encounter some inevitable number of incursions; that the interlopers, by all available 
empirical evidence, seem uninterested in staying.  With a realistic view of his actual 
danger, Crusoe finds real relief when he then begins the practical exercise of building his 
fortifications, a process of participation in a formerly unthinkable reality that cannot be 
distinguished from the preceding spiritual inner dialogue. 
 
A Great Many Things: Reconfiguring and Repetition 
One might say Crusoe‘s moral progress occurs less through events than through 
psychological objects—comprising new spiritual eco-systems that he strives to identify 
and master.  His devotional exercises carry into his technical innovating—―the 
mechanick Exercises which my Necessities put me upon applying my self to‖—as a 
regimen of investing himself the here-and-now (170).  Crusoe, who finally becomes, for 
example, ―a very good Carpenter‖ has his technical mastery rewarded with a new 
potential identity, one signifying a deep and earned connection with a particular physical 
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domain (170).  Arriving, too, at ―an unexpected Perfection in my Earthen Ware‖ Crusoe 
reports a kind of grace-through-competence, sliding into the mode of spiritual self-
analysis: 
I think I was never more vain of my own Performance, or more joyful for any 
thing I found out, than for my being able to make a Tobacco-Pipe. And tho‘ it was 
a very ugly clumsy thing, when it was done, and only burnt red like other Earthen 
Ware, yet as it was hard and firm, and would draw the Smoke, I was exceedingly 
comforted with it. (170) 
Crusoe‘s time on the island has, of course, long been seen in terms of his relations with 
objects and technologies.  For good reason, that analysis has focused on commodity 
objects he trades, salvages and finally creates as he re-builds a society in miniature.  Yet 
these elements of capital, empire, or empirical description, or of modernity, as they are 
generally seen, can also be described as part of a radical spiritual re-purposing and 
reconfiguration of things, a disengagement from the world of goods that dominates in so 
much critical work. 
Such goods are impressively re-thought throughout the novel.  Crusoe gives a 
detailed account of the items he ships from place to place prior to his travail on the island.  
But the global network is, of course, ruptured in a minor way by Crusoe‘s shipwreck; his 
removal from circulation is marked by the erasure of exchange value, the often-noted 
uselessness of his money.  In Crusoe‘s obsessive accounting, as it continues after the 
shipwreck, there is at least a scintilla of parody on the order of Thoreau‘s penurious 
tabulation of the cost of building materials for his cabin on Walden Pond.  Crusoe‘s 
 157 
scrounging of capital‘s flotsam offers an image as prophetic of the modern economy‘s 
refugees, recyclers and waste as it is of the self-starting entrepreneur.  If Crusoe is 
capital‘s dawn in property accumulation, then he is also its twilight in the Bangladeshi 
shipbreaker.  Crusoe, disconnected as he is, engaged in salvage and survival, re-composes 
units of materiel liberated from approved channels of production.   
The island itself, certainly—as John Bender has argued—furnishes an image of 
isolation and encapsulation; it is a crucible.21  And yet, precisely as a space withdrawn or 
concealed, it offers at least the possibility for a re-purposing and innovating of 
technological society.  It is, after all, a place where a chest and boards can become a 
―kind of hut‖; a ―sail and some poles‖ become a tent; ship masts become a raft, pieces of 
cable help comprise a fence, iron crowbars make a pick axe, neckcloths serve as a sieve, 
and so forth. 
 The obvious objection here is that Crusoe, given this potential freedom, quickly 
busies himself re-creating a bourgeois fantasy of life in England.  A great innovator, he is 
in at least one sense, extraordinarily uncreative; the prison is of his own making, because 
he uses only what already exists in his head.  The narrow parameters of his familiar-
fantasy world are given in the not-quite-ironic designations of his new home: his caves 
and tents and gardens become ―cellars,‖  ―kitchens,‖ a ―country house,‖ a ―country seat,‖ 
a ―castle‖ (69, 86, 168, 179, 182).  This is a testament to his iron will and 
resourcefulness,  but it also raises the question of whether the few technologies he 
salvages from the wreck—bits of sail, iron bars—already contain the DNA of 
                                                 
21 Bender, Imagining the Penitentiary, 56-61. 
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commercial culture, much as the caveman‘s bone tool, in the famous cut in Stanley 
Kubrick‘s 2001: A Space Odyssey, inevitably becomes the spacecraft.   
  But rather than simply give up reading for Crusoe‘s creative potential, we might 
note that the text itself points to Crusoe‘s repetition of established social practice as a 
problem, or something that holds meaning, at least, against a background of other 
unrealized possibilities.  The issue is central, especially, to his period of sin and failure, 
which are characterized precisely in terms of a repetition compulsion, which we might 
take in its full psychoanalytic sense and as a diagnosis of the culture‘s role in Crusoe‘s 
spiritual side.  Having defied his father and risked a great deal to, ultimately, try his hand 
as a plantation owner in Brazil, Crusoe finds himself, under less pleasant circumstances, 
doing exactly what he sought to avoid: 
But alas! for me to do wrong that never did right, was no great Wonder: I had no 
Remedy but to go on; I was gotten into an Employment quite remote to my 
Genius, and directly country to the Life I delighted in, and for which I forsook my 
Father‘s House, and broke thro‘ all his good Advice; nay, I was coming into the 
very Middle Station, or upper Degree of low Life, which my Father advised me to 
before; and which if I resolved to go on with, I might as well ha‘ staid at Home, 
and never have fatigu‘d my self in the World as I had done; and I used often to 
say to my self, I could ha‘ done this as well in England among my Friends, as ha‘ 
gone 5000 Miles off to do it among Strangers and Salvages in a Wilderness, and 
at such a Distance, as never to hear from any Part of the World that had the least 
Knowledge of me. (39-40) 
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This realization leads him to make the further (fatal) observation that his condition 
resembles nothing so much as being stranded on a desert island: 
In this manner I used to look upon my Condition with the utmost Regret. I had no 
body to converse with but now and then this Neighbour; no Work to be done, but 
by the Labour of my Hands; and I used to say, I liv‘d just like a Man cast away 
upon some desolate Island, that had no body there but himself. But how just has it 
been, and how should all Men reflect, that when they compare their present 
Conditions with others that are worse, Heaven may oblige them to make the 
Exchange, and be convinc‘d of their former Felicity by their Experience: I say, 
how just has it been, that the truly solitary Life I reflected on in an Island of meer 
Desolation should be my Lot, who had so often unjustly compar‘d it with the Life 
which I then led, in which had I continued, I had in all Probability been exceeding 
prosperous and rich. (40) 
Crusoe recounts these reversals to show his signature errors—habits of regret and 
attachment—and the lessons learned.  But his insights, too, are implicated in the 
dialectics of his desire.  He glimpses the emptiness of the dissatisfaction that led him to 
Brazil—but only by, in a simple reversal, idealizing England; cast on the island, he 
regrets his former discontent—by comparing his lot to a fantasy about success in Brazil. 
Crusoe diagnoses his sin in disobeying his father as ―not being satisfy‘d with the 
Station wherein God and Nature has plac‘d‖ him (230).  But his upward mobility, if it is 
that, hardly suggests a destabilizing or violation of his father‘s social vision.  Instead, 
even at the level of fantasy, Crusoe reliably duplicates his father‘s England.  His ever-
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elusive ideals here (prosperity and ease, society and friends, security and feelings of 
felicity) are all internal to, even definitive of, the father‘s own principles.  Instead of a 
transgression against social or economic norms, Crusoe‘s discontent reflects a sense of 
inadequacy instilled at his point of origin.  Repeatedly, he surrounds himself with 
familiar objects of desire whose perfection, however, always lies elsewhere.  Only 
through spiritual exercises aimed at cultivating equanimity does he cease projecting or 
deferring a sense of self away from his present and onto his abstractly idealized 
semblance. Crusoe‘s ultimate reconciliation to his island fate is a recognition that he is, 
after all, best suited—at the levels of desire and competence—to exactly those tasks that 
his father commended to him, and indeed that he is fit for little else. 
The point here is that Crusoe and his father differ less in kind than in degree. The 
latter‘s advocacy of bourgeois prosperity does not offer a meaningful alternative to the 
temptations of capital.   His ideological references to Classical moderation and a three-
estate social model offer at best a patina of tradition compatible with his own commercial 
past, with no clear religious critique.  His wish to see Crusoe made a lawyer is consistent 
with a second-generation consolidation of cultural capital in the era—a continuation, that 
is, of his own entrepreneurial journey; his son‘s adventuring offers no departure into the 
economic future but a too exact repetition of the family‘s economic past.  Crusoe 
proposes the antithesis of modern economic thinking, substituting a symbolic gamble 
with death and fortune for the trans-generational investment of his father‘s primitive 
accumulation.  
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We know, too, that Crusoe‘s father acquired his wealth by leaving his native 
Germany to engage in foreign trade, as Crusoe plans.  Tellingly, Crusoe, who can only 
account for his ambitions as vague wanderlust, makes his crucial first departure by sea 
from Hull, just where his father landed, seemingly unconsciously, ―being one Day at 
Hull, where I went casually, and without any Purpose of making an Elopement that time‖ 
(6).  But beyond the narrow Freudian reading of submerged family drama, the text posits 
(in terms more congenial to Lacan) Crusoe‘s stubborn lack in social terms: as an over-
identification with the material signifiers of his father‘s milieu.  From the Oedipal reading 
that arguably underlies accounts of the capitalist-economic Crusoe (he wants to ―outdo‖ 
his father, thus threatening traditional structures) one can salvage the actual 
psychoanalytic insight that what Oedipus desires is the desire of the Other: to outdo his 
father is only to become the ne plus ultra of, precisely, his father.  Implicitly, Crusoe‘s 
materialistic streak manifests a greed that is actually at the core of his father‘s petite 
bourgeois soul.  This is to upset the common juxtaposition of Crusoe‘s supposedly 
boundless will-to-power with his father‘s restraint; in shrewd practical terms, it is the 
father who seeks to extend his acquisitive will even beyond death.  Crusoe‘s flight 
plausibly suggests a refusal to be the instrument of his father‘s dead hand—though his 
guilty complex of repetition and self-sabotage suggests, as he directly asserts, a spiritual 
problem rather than a critical repudiation.   
At the same time, the real distinction between Crusoe and father rests in the 
latter‘s insistence on worldly activities not only as libidinal imperatives, but also as 
boundaries calculated to maximize prosperity without risk, and—concomitantly —to 
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secure conditions favorable to self-discipline.  His advice, while nominally proposing a 
sort of stasis and class identity, mainly concerns the equanimity Crusoe learns to 
associate with spiritual health.  Those in ―the middle state‖ are not exposed to ―the 
Miseries and Hardships, the Labour and Sufferings, of the mechanic Part of Mankind, 
and not embarrass‘d with the Pride, Luxury, Ambition, and Envy of the upper Part of 
Mankind‖; their ―happiness‖ consists in, besides avoiding material afflictions of labor, 
want and calamity, ―Vertues‖ and ―Enjoyments‖ and freedom from ―so many Distempers 
and Uneasinesses either of Body or Mind;‖ they are not ―harrast with perplex‘d 
Circumstances, which rob the Soul of Peace, and the Body of Rest; not enrag‘d with the 
Passion of Envy, or secret burning Lust of Ambition for great things; but in easy 
Circumstances sliding gently thro‘ the World, and sensibly tasting the Sweets of living, 
without the bitter, feeling that they are happy, and learning by every Day‘s Experience to 
know it more sensibly‖ (3-4).  His goal is a life conducive to states free of anxiety, in 
circumstances that do not tempt to behaviors further provocative of sin, desire and 
disturbance.  Crusoe‘s father ties his native material culture to techniques for conscious 
mastery of surroundings—they are a means, not, as Crusoe experiences them, libidinal 
ends in themselves. 
Surprisingly little has been made of this rationale for his strictures.  Readings of 
the father‘s desire tend to fall into two broad categories, neither much interested in its 
actual content or merit.  It has been seen, first, as divine or paternal Law itself, making a 
certain formal arbitrariness more or less the point:  Crusoe‘s rebellion represents 
disobedience/sin as such; his redemption amounts to an allegorical disciplining into 
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(problematic, as I have suggested) faith in providence whatever the apparent 
circumstances.  Alternatively, the advice has been seen in light of Defoe‘s political 
imaginary, the father figuring pious or traditional resistance to, or an alibi for, capitalist 
or imperialist appetites—a conflict sublated by a notional spiritualization of Crusoe‘s 
desires on an island, insulated from real exchange.22 
But the rhetoric of spiritual exercise and equanimity locates Crusoe‘s problem in 
desire itself, not in real departure from his father‘s ideals or in simple disobedience. His 
repeated re-assembling of England shows pursuit of something very like his father‘s 
vision, yet without willingness to compromise (or spiritually reform) his desire through 
real work, inevitable failures, and partial success.  The father‘s model, in contrast, 
excludes gratuitous objects (causes) of desire and anxiety; he eschews cultural idols and 
situations provocative of self-doubt in favor of a cultivated, conscious mastering of self 
into a limited environment.  Crusoe‘s attempt on the island to ―master my Despondency‖ 
through double-entry bookkeeping, the account of his blessings and troubles, offers the 
perfect image of the life intended for him at home, in which techniques for prudent 
exercise of one‘s calling serve, spiritually, to refine object choices in line with actual 
options (76).  This is not, in other words, a degraded and capitalist version of a Calvinist 
toting-up of heavenly accounts (itself something of a caricature).  What could, certainly, 
be a dead commercial practice is here a rational exercise with the spiritual end of 
challenging ideological assumptions: Crusoe undertakes a blunt cost-benefit analysis of 
his material situation, one that tutors him away from fantasy or unproductive 
                                                 
22 See the readings offered in McKeon, Origins; Watt, The Rise of the Novel. 
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idealizations of imagined alternatives.  In theory, his father‘s guidance contains the 
possibility of doing the same through continual concrete activity.  In England, as on the 
island, he should simply have mastered the situation in all its shortcomings.  
Influential readings of Crusoe have been guided, at least in part, by the apparent 
difficulty of reconciling Crusoe‘s island successes with his recognition that he never 
should have disobeyed his father (his apparent materialism must be sanitized, or his 
spirituality seen to be compromised).  But there is no need to second-guess Crusoe‘s 
claims of redemption, just as we can take the father‘s advice at face value: the real issue 
is one of management, of the spiritual self realized in real activity, a convergence of 
object practice and state of soul—and not, as in Oedipal crisis, deferred onto a projected 
state of full satisfaction.  Crusoe‘s decision to set sail ―in the habit of a gentleman‖ (17) 
rather than a sailor illustrates the point.  The incident contrasts mere outward signs of 
success with the actual aptitude of a vocation; the corollary, of course, is that spiritual-
mental serenity follows from conditions of practical knowledge (a belief easily 
vulgarized, both by and about Puritan thought into the idea that material rewards follow a 
state of grace). We might thus better understand Crusoe‘s references to social ―station‖ in 
the sense of a zone of competence where the letter and the spirit of the law converge, 
rather than an indication of hierarchy.  This is not a narrative about being who you aren‘t 
supposed to be (a modern reading), it is a narrative about doing what you don‘t know 
how to do (a Protestant conversion narrative). 
Discussions of capitalist acquisition therefore lead us astray from the real issue of 
good governance: Crusoe only shows impulses long ingrained in the bourgeios mentality; 
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his deviation consists in pursuing them beyond the space where they are mastered into 
profit, faith and expertise. His island sojourn belatedly instances corrective activity from 
the ground up.23 This entails, though, the (needless, from his father‘s point of view) hard 
work of managing realms in which he has little to no control or authority. His reiterations 
of English symbolic culture on the island—that is, his predisposition to middle class 
success—suggest exactly the reason he should have stayed home.  
 
Internal Exile: How Like a King I Din’d Too All Alone 
To come to Robinson Crusoe for a critique or tribute to capitalist modernity or to 
witness the shock of its newness is to arrive too late.  Crusoe might, conceivably, present 
Weber‘s neurotically driven Puritan-capitalist type; but more in evidence is a Puritan 
corrective to unfettered cultural desire.  For Crusoe‘s father, commerce‘s prudent 
managerial techniques offer a pious antidote to idolatrous forms of social struggle that 
produce unease and incompetence.  Crusoe, true, evinces a potential fetishism of 
commercial forms; his father‘s specific voicing of spiritual pragmatism through business 
might be a generation late, being directed at aristocrats and adventurers, whose emotional 
commitments include imperatives like honor or envy.  But this is to admit, as well, that 
capital‘s more corrosive features are already suffused in the psychological constitution of 
the family, in the objects they identify themselves through.  Their expression, 
furthermore, remains susceptible to technical and psychological mastery not necessarily 
                                                 
23 Note, too, that in retrospect Crusoe avers that Brazil might have afforded him a state of grace as well as 
extreme prosperity, had he been willing to continue in the endeavors in which he was most knowledgeable: 
there is nothing unique about the island in this regard, and no difficulty aligning the spiritual with 
commodity exchange. 
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at odds with circuits of labor and value.  In a larger sense, the text points to the 
limitations of reading early modern capitalism abstractly, in terms of commodity 
exchange, and not socially, inclusive of cultural capital, biological limits and inheritance, 
financial risk and technical instruments—all things that Crusoe and father seek to 
manage. 
 As an alternative approach, Tom Paulin recently has reminded critics of the text‘s 
interest in religious politics, as opposed to the crises of modernity.  He points, for 
example, to the long neglected correspondence between the dates of Crusoe‘s exile 
(1659-1687) and the restored Stuart reign (1660-1688)—a fact that argues for an allegory 
more pointed than the usual religious readings.  He argues that the island offers a detailed 
set of analogies or allegories of the trauma experienced by the dissenting community in 
their own segregation and exile within England.24 
But the novel‘s devotional concerns imply a more material and pragmatic interest 
in the psychological and civic challenges of alienation from official culture: beyond 
comparing dissent to island exile or displacing trauma or ―survivor‘s guilt,‖ the novel 
charts the active reform required during internal isolation from acknowledged authority.  
Crusoe‘s re-creation of English culture models the creation of a parallel dissenting 
society.  He shows, as well, the need to master the self in adverse conditions of legal non-
existence.  The island in this sense depicts a spiritual community within England‘s own 
space, offers a map of the unofficial church as something like an overlapping ghost image 
or a co-existing plane of England‘s symbolic realities. 
                                                 
24 Tom Paulin, Crusoe's Secret: The Aesthetics of Dissent (London: Faber, 2005), 80-104. 
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Crusoe‘s description of the island, in effect, re-enacts a basic task of the 
Reformation: to re-think civic and ecclesiastical polity and establish a legitimate 
Protestant community independent of pre-existing structures.  Defoe poses questions of 
ideal governance in the same terms as early reformers—by positing a hypothetical return 
to the conditions of the primitive church so as to justify devotional  and social structure 
from first principles, having—in a kind of Cartesian or, better, Baconian mental 
reduction—eliminated prejudicial extant forms.  In the novel this is also a problem of 
self-governance.  Crusoe must master the self in new conditions—form a new identity 
and also avoid resentment, fear and neurotic hypocrisy; he shows how to assimilate 
trauma and retain a sense of blessedness by refusing to make idols of the past or hoped-
for futures.  
 What might appear as distant isolation from capitalist exchange appears more 
fully as domestic exile from the nation‘s community of social exchange.  Crusoe, to put it 
perhaps too crudely, is cast off from the ship of state—yet in a position to exploit it 
materially, to re-compose needful elements even as he is no longer part of its living 
process.  He is a self-sufficient individual only in the Puritan sense of being complete 
given the necessary guidance of his Bible.  Likewise, the allegedly imperialist 
connotations of Crusoe‘s various observations that speak more directly to a defensive 
posture about political reality in England: 
This was all my own … I was King and Lord of all this Country indefeasibly, and 
had a Right of Possession; and if I could convey it, I might have it in Inheritance, 
as compleatly as any Lord of a Mannor in England. (117) 
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I had nothing to covet; for I had all that I was now capable of enjoying: I was 
Lord of the whole Mannor; or if I pleas‘d, I might call my self King, or Emperor 
over the whole Country which I had Possession of. There were no Rivals. I had no 
Competitor, none to dispute Sovereignty or Command with me. (151) 
The attitude is one of spiritual nobility, describing the Puritan sense of a self-sufficient 
godly minority co-existing with the state church.  
 
The (Really) Primitive Church  
 The best evidence of textual interest in nonconformist polity lies in Crusoe‘s 
relations with Friday.  Their meeting seems, certainly, to speak to colonial-cultural 
encounters; yet its main elements strike closer to home as a different kind of object 
relationship.  Crusoe approaches Friday most conspicuously as a fellow potential 
religious dissenter—a victim of paganism but, more crucially, of Roman-style priestcraft.  
Crusoe, having obtained a description of Friday‘s mountain-dwelling God, Benamuckee, 
makes further inquiry: 
I ask‘d him if ever he went thither [to the mountain], to speak to him; he said no, 
they never went that were young Men; none went thither but the old Men, who he 
call‘d their Oowocakee, that is, as I made him explain it to me, their Religious, or 
Clergy, and that they went to say O,(so he called saying Prayers) and then came 
back, and told them what Benamuckee said: By this I observ‘d, That there is 
Priestcraft,even amongst the most blinded ignorant Pagans in the World; and the 
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Policy of making a secret Religion, in order to preserve the Veneration of the 
People to the Clergy, is not only to be found in the Roman, but perhaps among all 
Religions in the World, even among the most brutish and barbarous Savages. 
 
I endeavour‘d to clear up this Fraud, to my Man Friday,and told him, that the 
Pretence of their old Men going up the Mountains, to say O to their God 
Benamuckee,was a Cheat. (257) 
Faced with pagan idolatry and cannibalism Crusoe responds: That‘s terrible, you have 
priests? The encounter‘s ideological terms concern Friday‘s position vis à vis, essentially, 
the state church, the real entity that Crusoe directs him to abjure.  Crusoe‘s construction 
of the problem—―there is Priestcraft, even amongst the most blinded ignorant Pagans in 
the World‖—clarifies his priorities.  Crusoe‘s own position as, presumably, religious 
dissenter, further qualifies any reading of his role as generic representative of Christianity 
faced with the non-Western subject: the union of the two in worship signifies, chiefly, the 
formation of an English Protestant conventicle, opposed not to paganism, but to 
episcopacy.   
Crusoe therefore takes up the role of lay-priest, a position conspicuously in line 
with his newly earned vocations as tailor, carpenter, baker, farmer, boatwright, potter … 
and with the tenets of a more radical Protestantism.  Defoe‘s cultural Puritanism treats 
religion as a practical skill, teachable within the available priesthood of believers‘ 
epistemological community.  Tellingly, Crusoe follows Friday‘s religious training with a 
parallel set of technical mysteries: ―I let him into the Mystery, for such it was to him, of 
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Gunpowder, and Bullet, and taught him how to shoot: I gave him a Knife, which he was 
wonderfully delighted with‖ (263).  Engaging with religion means engaging with the 
world. 
In general, Crusoe authorizes his priestly duties through the open availability of 
scripture.  In the Presbyterian spirit, his instruction provokes a deeper reading that arises 
from Friday‘s corrective queries: 
I always apply‘d my self in Reading the Scripture, to let him know, as well as I 
could, the Meaning of what I read; and he again, by his serious Enquiries, and 
Questionings, made me, as I said before,a much better Scholar in the Scripture 
Knowledge, than I should ever have been by my own private meer Reading. 
Another thing I cannot refrain from observing here also from Experience, in this 
retir‘d Part of my Life, viz.How infinite and inexpressible a Blessing it is, that the 
Knowledge of God, and of the Doctrine of Salvation by Christ Jesus,is so plainly 
laid down in the Word of God; so easy to be receiv‘d and understood: That as the 
bare reading the Scripture made me capable of understanding enough of my Duty 
(262). 
Where his confidence in the communally discoverable intent of scripture flags amid 
obscure points of doctrine (―I was but a young Doctor and ill enough quallified for a 
Casuist‖), he affirms the need for affective belief, that ―nothing but divine Revelation can 
form the Knowledge of Jesus Christ,and of a Redemption purchas‘d for us‖ (259).  In the 
end, Friday‘s conversion instances, more than effacement of his paganism, the creation 
from first principles of a church of equals—one that replicates, rather than is annexed to, 
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the godly community in England: ―The Savage was now a good Christian, a much better 
than I ….we had here the Word of God to read, and no farther off from his Spirit to 
instruct, than if we had been in England‖ (261). 
 It is critical here that the text refuses to posit Friday‘s native religion as some 
wholly consuming or perfectly integrated belief system.  The fractured religious politics 
known to Defoe furnish an account of belief inclusive of resistance and doubt, both 
Crusoe‘s and Friday‘s, and the possibility of conscious mutual correction and continuing 
reform as they rebuild object relations.  As Defoe recounts the dissenting community‘s 
tasks in England, so Crusoe and Friday‘s godly community exists within the sphere of a 
greater, more powerful culture among the islands:  For Crusoe, that means contending 
with the cannibal nation whose practices he so abhors—yet without lapsing into a 
resistance that resembles his own version of state church idolatry or enacting damaging 
resentment of a dominant culture.  His temptation to judge and, if possible, kill these 
enemies risks his hard-earned mental composure, and Defoe presents his work to quell 
his urges in language that links submission to Providence to calmness and non-
interference:  
I began with cooler and calmer Thoughts to consider what it was I was going to 
engage in. What Authority, or Call I had, to pretend to be Judge and Executioner 
upon these Men as Criminals, whom Heaven had thought fit for so many Ages to 
suffer unpunish‘d, to go on, and to be as it were, the Executioners of his 
Judgments one upon another. How far these People were Offenders against me, 
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and what Right I had to engage in the Quarrel of that Blood, which they shed 
promiscuously one upon another. (202) 
Crusoe grounds his restraint in the parallel structure of the cannibals‘ and his own 
respective kingdoms; the prerogatives of governance and, accordingly, enactment of 
God‘s judgment, follow the lines of symbolic, not territorial, nation states defined by 
their religious norms.  
As to the Crimes they were guilty of towards one another, I had nothing to do 
with them; they were National, and I ought to leave them to the Justice of God, 
who is the Governour of Nations, and knows how by National Punishments to 
make a just Retribution for National Offences; and to bring publick Judgments 
upon those who offend in a publick Manner, by such Ways as best pleases him. 
(204) 
Although geographically linked, Crusoe is not part of their nation—a view reminiscent of 
repudiation of de facto membership in the established church in favor of an internal self-
determining community.   
The notion of separate national or church spheres might be voiced a political or 
ecclesiastical principle, but Crusoe addresses it as a psychic problem endured by 
England‘s Puritans.  As a godly minority, he risks self-destructive attitudes of hatred or 
superiority toward the dominant culture; to condemn the cannibals risks, implicitly, yet 
another spiritual lapse into over-identifying with his ideal, refusing to accept reality in all 
its adversity.   
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Crusoe is greatly troubled by his reaction to the cannibals and by its compulsive 
element; he is troubled, too, by God‘s apparent injustice in condemning those he has 
failed to enlighten with Christian scripture (―why it has pleas‘d God to hide … saving 
Knowledge from so many Millions of Souls‖ [248]).  He is repulsed by taboo behavior, 
yet he reacts emotionally to—resists—the apparently arbitrary and irrational Law that 
condemns.   
But we should not be misled by Crusoe‘s humane concern for cannibals faced 
with God‘s severe and inscrutable judgment.  It is Crusoe who is forced, in the encounter 
with the apparently free or ignorant cannibals (who are, of course, unbothered by all of 
this) to experience his own Law in its fundamental arbitrariness—who experiences his 
own norms as a capricious and contingent set of demands whose upholding is a serious 
burden and a compulsion. 
  Crusoe cites a scriptural solution, grounds for intellectually dismissing his internal 
struggle and leaving judgment to God. The text, Romans 2:12-16 contains Paul‘s 
somewhat ambiguous assertion that those not given the Law can nonetheless be judged 
by the Law as contained in their own hearts and consciences. (Glossed by Crusoe, ―if 
these Creatures were all sentenc‘d to Absence from himself, it was on account of sinning 
against that Light which, as the Scripture says, was a Law to themselves, and by such 
Rules as their Consciences would acknowledge to be just, tho‘ the Foundation was not 
discover‘d to us‖ [249]).  But the context again makes Crusoe, not cannibals, the real 
subject; the reference necessarily identifies Crusoe with the Jews (original Christians) 
who, in Paul‘s account, are sure of their salvation, yet skeptical of the gentiles‘purity.  
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The real subject here, naturally, is not the gentiles at all, but the Jews‘ legalistic self-
aggrandizement and their ill-concealed dislike of those who seem to do without it.  The 
biblical text offers a parallel account of resentment of the other‘s perceived pleasure, their 
freedom from the demands of one‘s own beliefs—the haunting fear that somebody, 




Chapter 4:  Gulliver’s Travels as Anglican Critique 
From Robinson Crusoe to Gulliver’s Travels  
To see the problem with Defoe‘s text from Swift‘s vantage, one need look no 
further than (once again) Crusoe‘s description of his solitary dining, a moment of 
physical and spiritual ease in the midst of his tribulations: 
It would have made a Stoick smile to have seen, me and my little Family sit down 
to Dinner; there was my Majesty the Prince and Lord of the whole Island; I had 
the Lives of all my Subjects at my absolute Command. I could hang, draw, give 
Liberty, and take it away, and no Rebels among all my Subjects.  Then to see how 
like a King I din‘d too all alone, attended by my Servants, Poll [a parrot], as if he 
had been my Favourite, was the only Person permitted to talk to me. My Dog who 
was now grown very old and crazy, and had found no Species to multiply his 
Kind upon, sat always at my Right Hand, and two Cats, one on one Side the 
Table, and one on the other, expecting now and then a Bit from my Hand, as a 
Mark of special Favour. (175) 
Seen in parallax, from Swift‘s Anglican point of view, this Mad Hatter‘s gathering could 
only confirm schism from common prayer as a solipsistic deviation from the correctives 
of common sense.  Defoe‘s fantasy—as I have argued— of the godly community's self-
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sufficiency, risks this appearance quite willingly, secure in the guidance of scripture and 
the basic mutual attunement of isolated members (in the Pauline sense) of the church 
body.  Crusoe habitually thwarts any potential interference in his small technological 
world, fashioning a perimeter of exclusion zones and booby traps with himself as the sole 
(self) authorized user of the system.  By his own admission, his innovations 
accommodate his inner fears and desires, complementing a pervasive paranoia with a 
confident willingness to embrace his own deviations from the norm, including his 
outlandish appearance: 
Had any one in England been to meet such a Man as I was, it must either have 
frighted them, or rais‘d a great deal of Laughter; and as I frequently stood still to 
look at my self, I could not but smile at the Notion of my travelling through 
Yorkshire with such an Equipage, and in such a Dress: Be pleas‘d to take a Scetch 
of my Figure as follows, I had a great high shapeless Cap, made of a Goat‘s Skin, 
with a Flap hanging down behind, as well to keep the Sun from me, as to shoot 
the Rain off from running into my Neck. … I had a short Jacket of Goat-Skin, the 
Skirts coming down to about the middle of my Thighs; and a Pair of open-knee‘d 
Breeches of the same, the Breeches were made of the Skin of an old He-goat, 
whose Hair hung down such a Length on either Side, that like Pantaloons it 
reach‘d to the middle of my Legs; Stockings and Shoes I had none, but had made 
me a Pair of some-things, I scarce know what to call them, like Buskins to flap 
over my Legs, and lace on either Side like Spatter-dashes; but of a most barbarous 
Shape, as indeed were all the rest of my Cloaths.  (176) 
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His dress, despite the self-reflexive humor, cannot but conjure Puritan vestments in all 
their senses for Swift.  Crusoe‘s garb physically recalls Jack‘s ruined coat; his attitude, a 
cheery contrast to Jack‘s resentful gloom, nonetheless displays stereotypically Puritan 
indifference to conventions and the tribal self-regard that provoked their neighbors.  
Defoe‘s admiration for the virtues and edifying power of simplicity reflects a sensibility 
that also grounded dissent‘s vestimental austerity.  Few would deny that Crusoe‘s 
problem-solving in extreme conditions, seen here in his clothing, provides much of the 
text‘s narrative pleasure.  But the prospect of total self-sufficiency—long linked by critics 
to middle-class ideology—could easily be seen as the solipsistic self-aggrandizement of a 
schismatic. 
Crusoe‘s tendency toward the isolation that enables departure from convention, a 
warning sign from Swift‘s point of view, appears early in the text.  Crusoe is enjoined not 
to leave home, but his point of origin has little substance in any case: his roots in 
England, as the son of an immigrant, are shallow; his family name is recently altered 
from the original Kreutznaer; there is little concrete description of home; and little is 
promised beyond the rewards of commerce and the social ties of business.  Gulliver, on 
the other hand, hails from ―a small Estate in Nottinghamshire‖ (11:19)—and  the faux 
publisher‘s note assures us  that this is ―where his Father dwelt, yet I have heard him say, 
his Family came from Oxfordshire; to confirm which, I have observed in the Church-
Yard at Banbury, in that County, several Tombs and Monuments of the Gullivers (11:9).  
The background is not so far from Swift‘s autobiographical claim that ―the family of the 
Swifts was antient in Yorkshire‖ (5:187). Gulliver‘s time as a castaway, then, can be read 
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as a departure from his rightful familial place in the bosom of the national church and its 
trappings.  Crusoe‘s island, seen from Swift‘s perspective, offers a perfect metaphor for a 
nonconformist bubble-like reduction of reality, whether that of the provincial yokel or the 
rootless merchant. 
That sense of a closed world, in which all of God‘s signs point to oneself, 
pervades Crusoe‘s religious reckonings; his flirtations with discerning God‘s direct 
interventions surely struck Swift as pure fantasy, something closer to incantation than 
religion: 
But after I saw Barley grow there, in a Climate which I know was not proper for 
Corn, and especially that I knew not how it came there, it startl‘d me strangely, 
and I began to suggest, that God had miraculously caus‘d this Grain to grow 
without any Help of Seed sown, and that it was directly purely for my Sustenance, 
on that wild miserable Place. (91) 
Crusoe‘s eventual position is not so crude: He quickly takes a more naturalistic view and 
realizes that he unwittingly dropped barley seeds himself, then regrets seeing the two 
perspectives as mutually exclusive. I have argued that, for Defoe, providence is a 
complex signifier; but unsympathetic readers naturally picked up on the pitfalls—not 
absent from Defoe‘s text—of construing the metaphysical, manifest in relations with the 
object world, from the individual‘s standpoint.   Charles Gildon‘s attack on Defoe in The 
Life and Strange Surprizing Adventures of Mr. D---- de F--, of London (1719) gives voice 
to precisely the mainstream Anglican critique one imagines from others, including Swift: 
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I cannot pass in Silence his Coining of Providences; that is, of his making 
Providence raise a Storm, cast away some Ships, and damage many more, meerly 
to fright him from going to Sea.  If this be not a bold Impiety, I know not what is, 
and an Impiety for which I can see very little ground; for why should he imagine 
that the Storm was sent to hinder him from going to Sea, more than any other that 
were in it, and suffer‘d more by it?1 
 
What you call Religion, is only to mis-lead the Minds of men to reject the 
Dictates of reason, and embrace in its Room a meer Superstitious Fear of I know 
not what Instinct from unbodied Spirits, when you impiously prophane the very 




With little patience for Defoe‘s tendency to turn experience into fodder for developing a 
spiritual habitus, Gildon sees only a narcissistic theodicy. 
Gildon condemns, as well, the political consequences of Defoe‘s vision of 
providence.  Crusoe‘s godly community logically becomes a legal one, as he assumes the 
role of a governor who metes out legal punishments: ―So if I had hang‘d them all, I had 
been much in the right, and should have been justifiable both by the Laws of God and 
Man.‖  Gildon responds: ―The contrary of which Assertion is directly true, viz. That if 
you had hang‘d them all, you had been guilty of down-right Murther by all the Laws of 
                                                 
1 Charles Gildon, The Life and Strange Surprizing Adventures of Mr. D---- De F--, of London 
(London:1719), 8-9. 
2 Ibid., 33. 
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God and Man; for pray, sweet Sir, what Authority had Robinson Crusoe so much as to 
fine, or inflict any Punishment upon any man?‖3 What for modern critics may suggest a 
generally English colonial impulse, Gildon sees as a specific religious disorder.  Defoe‘s 
imaginary City on a Hill tempts him to neglect realistic restraint in his fiction, revealing 
the enthusiast‘s basic megalomaniac fantasy. To see Crusoe as an avatar of the nation‘s 
innermost imperial compulsions is to neglect the way contemporary readers like Gildon 
could revile Crusoe‘s enterprise as a direct repudiation of England‘s institutions.  
 Gildon‘s critique has often been characterized as an epistemological one, directed 
at ―false realism,‖ or what McKeon calls a ―naive empiricism‖ that credulously grants 
authority to individual witnesses employing a factual style.4 And Gildon does, famously, 
rebuke Defoe for factual inconsistencies. Crusoe, for example, strips naked to swim to the 
wrecked ship, but later fills his pockets with biscuits; Defoe forgets that Crusoe salvaged 
linen and wool for clothes.  But Gildon actually shows little interest in historicity as such.  
He even claims he could accept ―improbabilities, and sometimes impossibilities,‖ were 
he not moved, as we see, to prevent ―impieties and superstition.‖5  Most plausibly, Gildon 
offers an Anglican critique of nonconformist failure to test certainties of all kinds against 
the state community —quite apart from the question of an underlying real.  Defoe‘s 
                                                 
3 Ibid., 36. 
4Hunter, "Gulliver's Travels and the Novel," 68. ―[Gildon‘s] attack is on the false realism in Defoe, just as 
in Gulliver‘s travels the thrust is to demonstrate what the realism and pseudo-facticity of contemporary 
travel accounts and fictional narratives come to at last.‖ Hunter acknowledges associations with dissent, but 
characterizes these as part and parcel of a ―modern‖ mode of narrative.   McKeon, Origins, 315-16.  For a 
more general discussion see John Bender, "Enlightenment Fiction and the Scientific Hypothesis," 
Representations 61(1998).  See also Kate Loverman, Reading Fictions, 1660-1740: Deception in English 
Literary and Political Culture (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008), 140-45. 
5 Gildon, The Life and Strange Surprizing Adventures, 1-2. 
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implausibilities serve, in Gildon‘s essay, chiefly as evidence of a religious character 
defect: an enthusiast tendency to unreflecting confabulation.  The thrust of Gildon‘s 
argument is not that Defoe is unrealistic; it is that he is a liar. 
 Similarly, Swift‘s parody, in Gulliver‘s account, of the travel genre‘s journalistic 
style has been taken as a jab at conventions that seem to naively accept language as a 
transparent medium.  But Swift, like Gildon and John Eachard (as I noted in chapter two, 
above), sees signifiers in their social-constructive, and not merely mimetic, capacity.  
One of Eachard‘s likely targets, condemned for preaching in local dialects, John Flavell 
(1630?-1691), a Presbyterian minister in Dartmouth, Devon, links liturgical debate to the 
nautical prose Swift mocks in Part II of the Travels.6  Flavell, who was ejected from his 
pulpit in 1662, was best known for devotional works on the meditative value of 
vocational experience, especially seafaring.  His published works included, for example, 
A New Compass for Seamen (1664), Husbandry Spiritualized (1669), The Seaman's 
Companion (1676), Sea Deliverances (c.1679), and Navigation Spiritualized (1682).  The 
last of these demonstrates the offending mixture of local expertise and enthusiast piety; 
Eachard asks rhetorically, by way of an analogy for ―spiritual concernments‖: 
How watchfull and quick sighted are Sea-men, to prevent Dangers? If the Wind 
die away, and then fresh up Sourtherly; or if they see the Sky hezy, they provide 
for a Storm: If by the Prospective-Glass they ken a Pirate at the greatest distance, 
they clear the Gun-room, prepare for fight, and bear up, if able to deal with him; if 
not, they keep close by the Wind, make all the Sail they can, and bear away. If 
                                                 
6 Hunter, Pilgrim. 
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they suppose themselves by their reckoning near Land, how often do they sound? 
And if upon a Coast with which they are unacquainted, how careful are they to get 
a Pilot that knows and is acquainted with it?7 
This is a clear enough violation of Eachard‘s call to avoid ministering in obscure 
professional argot.   
Flavell‘s work shows the ease with which Swift could associate detail-laden or 
vocational prose with low church cultural deviation.  Those at the literal or metaphorical 
edges of society, the realm of the plebian specialist, suggest for him a kind of de facto 
enthusiast— exactly as Defoe finds the sea voyage a natural metaphor for an edifying 
journey in dissent.  Indeed, Flavell‘s life and writing furnish plentiful parallels to Defoe‘s 
experiences as projected into Crusoe: After the Act of Uniformity, Flavell continued 
preaching in private and taught at a dissenting academy until the Five Mile Act forced 
him, in 1665, to keep his distance from Dartmouth.  In a miniature island exile, away 
from incorporated townships, he occasionally preached on the Saltstone, a rock edifice in 
Salcombe harbor ―accessible only at low water during spring tides.‖8  Flavell returned to 
Dartmouth after the declaration of indulgence, but fled again, under pressure of 
persecution, to London in 1682.9  Before undertaking that voyage by sea, Flavell reported 
a prophetic dream about a great storm.  His ship, allegedly, experienced a ―dreadful 
                                                 
7 John Flavell, Navigation Spiritualized, fourth ed. (London1698), 19. 
8 James William Kelly, "Flavell, John (Bap. 1630, D. 1691)," in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
(Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008 ). 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/view/article/9678, accessed 22 June 2010]  See also 
Arthur Warne, Church and Society in Eighteenth-Century Devon (New York: Augustus Kelley, 1969), 80; 
John Flavell, The Whole Works of John Flavell, vol. I (London1701), 1-7. 
9 Kelly, "Flavell, John (Bap. 1630, D. 1691)." 
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Tempest, insomuch that, betwixt One and Two in the morning, the Master and Seamen 
concluded, That, unless God changed the Wind, there was no hope of life.‖10  Flavell 
undertook to beseech God with prayer, ―committing himself and his Company to the 
Mercy of God. ...  No sooner was Prayer ended, but one came down from the Deck, 
crying, Deliverance! ―11 The biographical note in Flavell‘s collected works records, 
appropriately, that ―He was not only a Zealous Preacher in the Pulpit, but a Sincere 
Christian in his Closet, Frequent in Self-Examination, as well as in pressing it upon 
others; being afraid, lest while he Preach‘d to others, he himself should be a Cast-
away.‖12 
The same concern with social and affective context of language that guided 
critique of Flavell appears in the Travels.  Questions of common understanding, more 
than verisimilitude, lie at the heart of Gulliver‘s letter to his cousin Sympson in the 
prefatory matter, which denounces linguistic novelty in London in the same terms other 
conformists criticized newfangled  liturgical innovation and Flavell‘s nautical empiricist 
prose.  Defending against alleged complaints on the part of ―Sea Yahoos‖ about the 
accuracy of his ―Sea-Language,‖ Gulliver notes that ―Sea-Yahoos are apt, like Land ones, 
to become new fangled in their Words; which the latter change every Year. … When any 
Yahoo comes from London out of Curiosity to visit me at mine own House, we neither of 
us are able to deliver our Conceptions in a Manner intelligible to the other‖ (11:7).   
Swift‘s imaginative sympathy in this passage actually lies, partly, with Defoe, against the 
                                                 
10 Flavell, Whole Works, 3. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 4. 
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Gildon-like Sea Yahoos; if Defoe is guilty of newfangledness, pedantic quibbling by 
other subcultural experts hardly improves the situation.  Accuracy is quite beside the 
point when the problem is one of institutional decay.  The relevant danger is the moral 
one that Gulliver identifies as his chief concern: the lapse into vices of ―Lying, Shuffling 
Deceiving and Equivocating‖ (11:8). 
 
Idols of the Marketplace: The Grub Street Liturgy    
Elsewhere, Swift‘s warnings about deforming what we might today call the 
symbolic order equate linguistic innovation with more obviously material signifiers of 
authority and desire.  Remarks in the Tatler (September 28, 1710) closely parallel 
Gulliver‘s remarks to Sympson, with connections drawn between ordinances of common 
prayer, new prose styles and material culture.  Swift‘s speaker echoes Eachard‘s fear of 
degrading the linguistic and material boundaries of the church‘s interpretive community 
by criticizing young clergymen‘s use of neologisms: 
Then in their Sermons they use all the Modern Terms of Art, Sham, Banter, Mob, 
Bubble, Bully, Cutting, Shuffling, and Palming: All which, and many more of the 
like Stamp, as I have heard them often in the Pulpit from such young Sophisters, 
so I have read them in some of those Sermons that have made most Noise of late. 
The Design, it seems, is to avoid the dreadful Imputation of Pedantry; to shew us, 
that they know the Town, understand Men and Manners, and have not been 
poring upon old unfashionable Books in the University (2:177). 
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Swift moves, though, from Eachard‘s concern with provincial centers of dissent to 
London‘s urban culture.  The article also takes on Grub Street writing in the same terms 
of cultural-liturgical innovation.  The hegemonic ―unfashionable books‖ that embarrass 
young clergy contrast directly with the new books by disreputable hack writers:  
I cannot but observe to you, that till of late Years a Grub-Street Book was always 
bound in Sheep-skin, with suitable Print and Paper; the Price never above a 
Shilling, and taken off wholly by common Tradesmen, or Country Pedlars; But 
now they appear in all Sizes and Shapes, and in all Places: They are handed 
about from Lapfuls in every Coffee-house to Persons of Quality, are shewn in 
Westminster-Hall and the Court of Requests. You may see them gilt, and in Royal 
Paper, of five or six Hundred Pages, and rated accordingly. I would engage to 
furnish you with a Catalogue of English Books published within the compass of 
seven Years past, which at the first Hand would cost you a Hundred Pounds, 
wherein you shall not be able to find ten Lines together of common Grammar or 
common Sense (2:174). 
Not only do undeserving writers have undue influence, but their work gains traction by 
being arrayed in material vestments of authority and edification.  Like Roman-style 
Catholicism, the market channels desire through a self-organizing network of fashionable 
idols.  
For Swift, the symptoms of modernity—exemplified by the literary marketplace, 
and commercial culture generally—mimic the symptoms of nonconformity.  Anglican 
regulation of symbolic authority ideally meant a national psychic and epistemological 
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community to correct schismatic and compulsive desires.  The market merely propagates 
them; its premium on variety and novelty furnishes the same unsettling assemblage of 
artificial cultural components as religious innovation.  These are not secular “things,” but 
new ideals and idols, versions of what Swift already saw as desiring machines, nodes in a 
complex web of enjoyment. 
The Tale offers Swift‟s most striking examples of the perceived danger in 
detaching the cultural organ, as it were, from the natural or social body. The mythical 
Aeolist sect, for example, physically redirect the flow of bodily energies with their use of 
objects: 
It was an Invention ascribed to Æolus himself, from whom this Sect is 
denominated; and who in Honour of their Founder's Memory have to this Day 
preserved great Numbers of those Barrels, whereof they fix one in each of their 
Temples, first beating out the Top. Into this Barrel, upon Solemn Days, the Priest 
enters; where, having before duly prepared himself by the methods already 
described, a secret Funnel is also conveyed from his Posteriors to the Bottom of 
the Barrel, which admits new Supplies of Inspiration from a Northern Chink or 
Cranny (1:98). 
By analogy, the market alters the distribution of power across the social body, and 
threatens to put even the hack writer in charge of the assemblages of cultural authority. 
The social mechanism, Swift suggests, can be reconfigured so quickly that 
common cultural reference points can disappear irrevocably.  This potential loss of 
meaning arises most obviously, in the Tale, in the dedication to Prince Posterity, which 
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asks whether new writing can even survive beyond its immediate, local context, being 
―sunk in the Abyss of Things‖ (1:19). 
A look at the editorial notes for a modern edition of the Tale confirms Swift‘s 
darkest fears; the reader‘s perceived deficiency lies not only in the religious allegory 
itself (in this respect, the editorial interventions mirror those of Curll and Wotten, in 
explaining basic Reformation history), but in the specific allegorical details drawn from 
contemporary London.13  Martin and his brothers ―eat at Locket’s, loytered at Will’s,‖ 
they drink at the Rose—all details important to understanding the brothers and their 
moral progress (1:43).  Religious allegory, of course, typically draws on stable types and 
figures—the ship of state, the body of the nation, the prodigal son; but the hack Tale-
Teller employs a modern mode that furnishes meaning using fleeting and contingent 
institutions that also manufacture subjects with perverse desires.  Swift‘s parable affirms 
the strict equivalence between the decay of Anglican cultural style through religious 
innovation and the innovations of the market economy, which render today‘s symbolic 
order, quite literally, yesterday‘s news.
 
 Robinson Crusoe’s spiritual narrative grafts the 
traditional onto more modern forms in the latest prose, but this is no descent into secular 
ways of knowing; both Defoe and Swift recognize, in new technologies and techniques, 
the building blocks of the conventicle. 
 
On the Testimony of Conscience: Gulliver and Styles of Cultural Faith 
                                                 
13 Angus Ross and David Wooley, ed. Jonathan Swift: Major Works (New York: Oxford University 
Press,2003), 96, 626. 
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Defoe‘s thought experiment in Crusoe rejects the need for a state church to 
regulate new spiritual ecologies like those described by Swift‘s Tale-Teller.  He affirms 
the possibility of self-reform in England‘s modernizing spaces: Crusoe overcomes the 
libidinal temptations of dominant cultures, both innovating and traditional, and new 
experiences by incorporating technology and empirical inquiry into solitary spiritual 
exercises.  A return to the primitive church, he suggests, is always within reach of the 
committed individual.   
The Travels are more skeptical of the individual‘s ability to self-diagnose spiritual 
illness.14  Gulliver‘s moral compass seems increasingly off, and as his adventures become 
more outlandish, his access to common reality diminishes.  That skepticism toward self-
sufficiency informs Swift‘s bias toward the established church, as a corrective to the 
mental idols of schismatic communities—idols that Defoe, conversely, locates largely in 
majority culture.  As re-figured in Gulliver, Defoe‘s hypothetical island most naturally 
suggests an image of failure to countenance large portions of reality—whether through 
neurotic denial, local fixations or actual Petri-dish-like isolation.  Crusoe is complete unto 
himself wherever he goes; Gulliver is typically cut off from all reason.   
Swift‘s diagnosis of sectarian-style pathologies includes, obviously, aspects of 
commercial culture.  Yet it extends as well, to other English institutions, even traditional 
ones, that lay claim to governing the nation.  Swift‘s sermon On the Testimony of 
Conscience (1708) contains a synopsis of his views on dominant cultural styles, 
                                                 
14 This is by no means to suggest that Crusoe, in the scheme I have argued for, represents anything like the 
modern individual or Cartesian subject; from Swift‟s point of view, individuality indicates, chiefly, the 
schismatic; Defoe assumes the guidance of scripture and the presence of investments in the outside world. 
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considered as ethical and libidinal structures, including: a not-yet residual aristocratic-
courtly culture associated with a Catholic past and ideals of property and honor; a 
freethinking and dissenting culture of critical inquiry and private belief; and an emergent 
Whig culture of commerce.   
Typically, Swift understands ethics in terms of psychic-spiritual orientations 
toward civic virtues as embodied in public culture.  The sermon maps a familiar ethical 
terrain, largely divided between solipsistic enthusiast punctiliousness and knavish 
Catholic-style performance; it also extends this psychic-spiritual hermeneutic to embrace 
less overtly sectarian trends in English governance, including presumptively modern 
developments.   
The sermon offers a useful preview of the psychological critiques that lie at the 
heart of Gulliver’s Travels.  Gulliver presents an English subject exposed to variant 
available governing styles with certain psychic-sectarian inflections. Given much the 
same spiritual hermeneutic as Defoe, Swift‘s text shows Gulliver‘s failure, absent the 
state church, to locate an Archimedean point of neutrality from which to reform his 
desires away from anti-social and self-defeating behaviors. 
The sermon, in one instance, questions civic duty as defined by ruling class codes 
of personal honor.  The principles of honor, Swift observes, furnish objective 
ideals/public norms and rewards suited to ―the style of military men; of persons with 
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titles; and of others who pretend to birth and quality.‖15  Yet this aristocratic ethic 
remains narrow in scope:  
No man of honour, as that word is usually understood, did ever pretend that his 
honour obliged him to be chaste or temperate; to pay his creditors; to be useful to 
his country; to do good to mankind; to endeavour to be wise, or learned; to regard 
his word, his promise, or his oath; or if he hath any of these virtues, they were 
never learned in the catechism of honour; which contains but two precepts, the 
punctual payment of debts contracted at play, and the right understanding the 
several degrees of an affront, in order to revenge it by the death of an adversary.16 
Further, honor, as defined socially, derives solely from public reputation—it is, in the 
Tale’s terms, situated exclusively in vestimental appearance.  Should one stand to gain 
the appearance of honor, even ―by the falsest and vilest action,‖ it would be rational to do 
so.17  Swift associates honor with courtly privilege and pagan custom rather than directly 
with Catholicism—but Bernard Mandeville‘s comparable 1732 attack on honor, An 
Enquiry Into the Origin of Honour, confirms the roots of Swift‘s fairly common anti-
aristocratic critique.  Mandeville directly blames popery for the aristocratic ethos, for 
―blending rites seemingly sacred with the emblems of vainglory, which made all of them 
an eternal mixture of pomp and superstition.‖18 
                                                 
15 Temple Scott, ed. The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift, D.D., vol. IV (London: George Bell,1897), 123. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 124. 
18 Bernard Mandeville, An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour, and the Usefulness of Christianity in War 
(London:1732), 47. 
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Swift compares codes of public-vestimental reputation to an equally flawed 
deference to subjective (religious) convictions.  He includes both zealous dissenters and 
freethinking metaphysical speculators among the followers of ―private conscience.‖  He 
argues, though, that all such non-traditionalists abuse the notion of conscience, which, as 
distinct from mere desire, applies only to verifiable public ideals; a private conscience is 
a contradiction in terms.19 In a Christian culture, he argues, conscience is ―our director 
only in those actions which Scripture and reason plainly tell us to be good or evil.‖20  For 
Swift, this scheme necessarily directs conscience only at duty as confirmed by the state 
church:  
In cases too difficult or doubtful for us to comprehend or determine, there 
conscience is not concerned; because it cannot advise in what it doth not 
understand, nor decide where it is itself in doubt: but, by God's great mercy, those 
difficult points are never of absolute necessity to our salvation. There is likewise 
another evil, that men often say, a thing is against their conscience, when really it 
is not. For instance: Ask any of those who differ from the worship established, 
why they do not come to church? They will say, they dislike the ceremonies, the 
prayers, the habits, and the like, and therefore it goes against their conscience: But 
they are mistaken, their teacher hath put those words into their mouths; for a 
man's conscience can go no higher than his knowledge; and therefore until he has 
thoroughly examined by Scripture, and the practice of the ancient church, whether 
                                                 
19 Conscience here serves as a bit of a psychological term of art: it does not designate, as in some ordinary 
usage, any qualitative feeling of duty or a confirming sense of virtue. Instead it serves to distinguish 
between potentially perverse demands of the nonconformist superego, and the Anglican ego-ideal. 
20 Scott, ed. The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift, D.D., 121. 
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those points are blameable or no, his conscience cannot possibly direct him to 
condemn them.21 
This is a cavalier dismissal, obviously, of dissenting ecclesiology and, by extension, 
ethics.  But the argument is consistent with the assumption that matters susceptible to 
dispute are, by definition, matters of indifference to be settled in good faith, for the sake 
of order, by an established church.  The practical alternative Swift sees as proliferating 
schism destructive of very idea of the church.  More importantly, the theological 
alternative appears as belief in (or disputes about) a God who operates mechanically, 
denying salvation on the basis of obscure legalisms or difficult points of metaphysics. 
(Or, in the case of freethinkers, a religion that has abdicated its function of moderate 
social binding, encouraging fashionable absolute truths, scientific or otherwise)  From 
Swift‘s spiritual point of view, as we have seen, these schemes only devolve into 
intolerance and hypocritical performance.22 
Again, Mandeville confirms Swift‘s hegemonic perspective, attacking low church 
moralists as intolerant hypocrites; he, too, balances his critique of honor with an attack on 
                                                 
21 Ibid. 
22 For Swift, as invoked by dissenter and freethinker ―liberty of conscience‖ is necessarily disingenuous 
and hypocritical. Truly private mental reservations make no demand on the public sphere and remain 
unobjectionable; if they disturb church and state, they presumably arise from a dangerous and self-
contradictory certainty that established policy is metaphysically/‖really‖ wrong—a position that cannot 
ultimately abide difference: ―‗Liberty of Conscience‘ … properly speaking, is no more than a liberty of 
knowing our own thoughts; which liberty no one can take from us. But those words have obtained quite 
different meanings: Liberty of conscience is now-a-days not only understood to be the liberty of believing 
what men please, but also of endeavouring to propagate the belief as much as they can, and to overthrow 
the faith which the laws have already established, to be rewarded by the public for those wicked 
endeavours: And this is the liberty of conscience which the fanatics are now openly in the face of the world 
endeavouring at with their utmost application. At the same time it cannot but be observed, that those very 
persons, who under pretence of a public spirit and tenderness towards their Christian brethren, are so 
zealous for such a liberty of conscience as this, are of all others the least tender to those who differ from 
them in the smallest point relating to government.‖ (121). 
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personal religious morality—particularly as formulated by societies for the reformation of 
manners, which he equates with Puritan prurience and hypocrisy.  Swift‘s own estimation 
of such groups, in spite of his own reforming efforts, was that they had ―dwindled into 
factious Clubs, and grown a Trade to enrich little knavish Informers of the meanest Rank, 
such as common Constables, and broken Shop-keepers‖ (2:57).23 
Both writers link the discarded ethical abstractions—conscience and honor—to 
specific emotional and material cultures of governance.  There are notes of Weber in their 
association of dissent with commercial interests: specifically, in the equation of a 
mercantile culture of bourgeois politeness—the coffee house and a sanitized public 
sphere—with a meaner Puritan ethic that suits capitalist acquisition, one of temperance, 
opportunism and resentment of patrician license.  Conversely, they critique honor as an 
ethic evolved in defense of material privilege, marking chiefly aggression toward threats 
to status and property.  Swift differentiates between two real and spiritual economies 
evolved around psychological objects: one defined by petit-bourgeois vices of envy, 
thrift, and melancholy—not coincidentally strategies of coping with the lost object; 
another by stereotypical aristocratic defensiveness—in effect, a castration complex 
defined by the constant threat of losing one‘s social place.  Both cases reveal the costs of 
sectarian-style object relations in major residual and emergent institutions: middle class 
struggle and ossified privilege are recognizable iterations of sectarian error.   
                                                 
23 On this point I have consulted Richard Cook, "Mandeville's Modest Defense of Public Stews," in 
Mandeville Studies: New Explorations in the Art and Thought of Dr. Bernard Mandeville (1670-1733), ed. 
Irwin Primer (The Hague: Kluwer Academinc Publishers, 1975); Shelley Burtt, Virtue Transformed: 
Political Argument in England, 1688-1740 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 39-63. 
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As an existing alternative to these dated modes, Swift notes the ethic of civic 
culture he calls ―Moral Honesty‖: the principles of behavior adopted by many ―who 
appear very indifferent as to religion, and yet have the repute of being just and fair in 
their dealings; and these are generally known by the character of good moral men.‖ As 
Swift summarizes: 
For example: You trust a moral man with your money in the way of trade; you 
trust another with the defence of your cause at law, and perhaps they both deal 
justly with you. Why? Not from any regard they have for justice, but because their 
fortune depends upon their credit, and a stain of open public dishonesty must be 
to their disadvantage. 24 
The marketplace, in other words, can reconcile individual desire and public good.  It is 
Mandeville, of course, who is best known for this claim that in a modern economy 
conflicts between a vice-provoking market and traditional virtue are only apparent: his 
model is a clear structural resolution to what he, too, saw as problematic modes of 
imposing social imperatives through public symbols and personal discipline.  This most 
modern solution is simply to set desire free.   
Swift naturally refuses to regard enlightened self interest as a moral quality, and 
refuses the notion that capital can reconcile individual desire with a providentially 
ordered state.25  He sees—in the shift to social utility over ethical self-culture—only a 
proliferation of desires along unpredictable material paths, with no consideration of the 
                                                 
24 Scott, ed. The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift, D.D., 122. 
25 Ibid., 123. 
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manner of ethical integration; indeed the question of ethics, as an experience of duty 
apart from one‘s libido is entirely to the side.  To follow the implications of Swift‘s 
typical stance: enlightened self-interest merely substitutes the market‘s blind 
reconfigurings for the blind arbitrariness of aristocratic hierarchy or the perverse 
researches of enthusiast metaphysics.  Worse, Mandeville‘s utilitarian formulation risks a 
more complete withdrawal of symbolic authority; rather than let symbolic authority and 
desires proliferate randomly-schismatically, Mandeville hints at a subject subsumed into 
the market‘s amoral automatic machinery.26 
Swift consistently equates legitimate social institutions with a healthy Anglican 
technology of the self. Against Mandeville, he insists on, rather than denies, the gap 
between the subject and social imperatives.  Against the absolute ideals furnished by 
aristocrats and nonconformists, religion as such affirms the subject‘s ethical duty as 
conscious integration of mutually agreeable and provisional social forms, established by 
the church, held to inculcate ethical norms and not embody absolute ideals.  Under the 
auspices of grace, the subject‘s cultural faith can be experienced through the spirit rather 
than the letter of the Law.   
 Swift‘s psychic map of England differs little from Defoe‘s.  Like Crusoe‘s father, 
he condemns the mental idols of aristocrats and social climbers; he sees the mercantile 
mind prone to obsessive-compulsive disorders, as Crusoe‘s early discontent 
demonstrates; he, too, affirms real Protestantism as an ethical freedom from these desires.  
                                                 
26 Mandeville‟s secular scheme offers a formula for “real belief” in modern terms of fully immersive faith: 
not only do objects of desire proliferate of their own logic, as in stereotypical Catholicism, with authority 
following in their wake, but the subject is here construed as directly identified, through profit, with the 
proliferating logic itself. 
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Swift insists, though, that a Crusoe or a Gulliver—a middle class figure critical of 
existing structures—cannot, without the aid of the established church, divide his desires 
from those of the institutions he critiques. 
Set out explicitly, including references to ethical styles of governance, liturgical 
cultures, class position and—in my analogy, Lacanian registers of psychic cognition—

















Here (from left to right) the dominant aristocratic-Catholic and plebian-dissenting styles 
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configurations of duty and object practice.  This major axis, given greater explication in 
the Tale, is supplemented here:  The modern solution to this cultural conflict, as 
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desires around supposedly objectively justified technocratic projects.  The traditional 
Anglican claim for reform represents (in the bottom quadrant), not a resolution, but rather 
an insistence on the distance between public duty and the subject in the call of real, not 
private, conscience: the Anglican formula, in other words, for edification and resistance 
to immoderate identification with duty or vestimental identity.  
  Gulliver‘s first voyage sets the stage for an expanded investigation of these 
psychic possibilities for (self) governance—one that progresses from one configuration to 
another in distinct allegorical locations as well as in Gulliver‘s continuous mental 
development.  In short, I will trace a development from the aristocratic ethos of Lilliput 
to its collapse into subjective desire in Brobdingnag to an encounter with the technocratic 
Real in Laputa. 
 
The Courtly Object and the Middle Class Thing 
Gulliver, as has been noted, is at his best in Lilliput: there his virtues—refusal to 
destroy Blefuscu and the Big-Endians; willingness to act as an ambassador of peace; 
discernment concerning Lilliputian morality—shine most brightly.27  His middle-class 
bona fides serve to set off the court‘s corruptions.  There is a catch here, however—in 
that Gulliver is his best self only insofar as he has the court‘s regard.  He requires their 
symbolic sanction.  Lilliput‘s emperor is distinguished by his towering height (―taller by 
almost the Breadth of my Nail‖ [11:30]) over his subjects, and Gulliver‘s size designates 
                                                 
27 Allan Bloom, "An Outline of Gulliver's Travels," in Gulliver's Travels, ed. Robert A. Greenberg (New 
York: Norton, 1970), 301. 
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him here as partaking of the same symbolic power.  He is not only physically powerful, 
morally big or subjectively confident, but is also integrated into, embodies, Lilliput‘s 
symbols of authority (11:30).  Along these lines, the emperor grants Gulliver various 
honors and accolades (11:44, 53) which the latter is only too happy to enjoy, despite his 
skeptical descriptions of Walpolean favor-seeking in the court.  The emperor‘s own 
absurdly long title (11:43) confirms Lilliput‘s mode of conferring authority, and Gulliver 
is willing to identify with it to the point of recognizing the emperor as his own (―our 
Emperor‖ [11:54]).  He is, in every sense, an outsized member of Lilliput‘s culture, as 
opposed to simply a well-endowed (―my Breeches were at that Time in so ill a Condition, 
they afforded some Opportunities for Laughter and Admiration‖ [11:42]) interloper. 
 Gulliver‘s socially constructed stature is confirmed by his outsized fall from favor 
after a banal series of courtly intrigues, jealousy and gossip that effectively reduce him to 
the status of non-person.  Swift‘s resentments toward capricious patrons, on display here, 
are probably overdetermined: by a general skepticism of the court, by Whig abuse of 
patronage, by his frustrations regarding advancement in the church.  But Swift gives this 
failure of virtue a sociological, not personal or political analysis.  The incidents, seen in 
light of Swift‘s religious-psychic analytics, and the sermon on conscience, point to a 
psychic danger in identifying civic virtue with aristocratic vestimental signifiers. Swift 
shows the psychological effects of this corrupt authority structure on situated class types.  
Flimnap‘s jealousy and the other courtier-politician‘s intrigues are a corrupting influence, 
but they also are encouraged by the court‘s power structure of leaping and creeping for 
accolades; their character flaws mark them, in fact, as the system‘s ideal users.  
 200 
Gulliver‘s experience may be compared to Crusoe‘s exile from the visible church and 
political community.  He is suddenly and arbitrarily denied official symbolic recognition, 
rendering him legally non-existent and unprotected: he is condemned in secret ―without 
the formal Proofs required by the strict Letter of the Law‖ (11:71). 
The episode expresses the precarious position of the non-elite when vestimental 
signifiers of authority native to (ideally) an aristocracy of public-spirited virtue are 
corrupted into arbitrarily dispensed favors. Gulliver encounters, arguably, the symbolic 
culture produced by an imperfect marriage of parliamentary politics and the networks of 
landed privilege—the weight, that is, of corrupted tradition and the vulgarities of 
temporary popularity.   
 The subsequent voyage to Brobingnag therefore ought not to be read as an 
independent episode that contrasts Gulliver‘s physical-moral expansiveness in Lilliput 
with his actual and moral littleness in Brobdingnag.  Instead, we can see an extended 
exploration of the psychic reality conditioned by the alienation from symbolic authority 
Gulliver suffers in Lilliput.   
The contours of his abjection in Brobdingnag can be quickly laid out: Gulliver is 
associated with a series of animals and low-status persons.  Upon arriving he is not 
conveyed directly to court, but detours through the hands of a peasant farmer and a little 
girl and is reduced to a sideshow curiosity, a child‘s toy and, at court, a sexual object. 
Gulliver‘s deteriorating sense of self suggests the series of object comparisons as his 
inability to find his likeness within the established order. 
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  Gulliver‘s humiliation allows Swift to explore inner psychological terrain even as 
his fable takes on a pointed class critique.  The question here is not Gulliver‘s character 
or that of humanity generally, but the spirit of aspirant social classes. Weber‘s play on the 
―spirit‖ of capitalism serves here as a fairly accurate measure of the era‘s own analytic: as 
a psychologically motivating drive cognized within a religious framework and also 
conditioned by prevailing material circumstances. 
At the depth of his humiliations, he recounts a battle with the kitchen clerk‘s 
monkey (11:121-3)—another blow to his pride to which he responds, rather late, with a 
defensive account, to the king, of his bravery. 
This I delivered in a firm Tone, like a Person who was jealous lest his Courage 
should be called in Question.  However, my Speech produced nothing else beside 
a loud Laughter; which all the Respect due to his Majesty from those about him 
could not make them contain.  This made me reflect, how vain an Attempt it is for 
a Man to endeavour doing himself Honour among those who are out of all Degree 
of Equality or Comparison with him.  And yet I have seen the Moral of my own 
Behaviour very frequent in England since my Return; where a little contemptible 
Varlet, without the least Title to Birth, Person, Wit, or common Sense, shall 
presume to look with Importance, and put himself upon a Foot with the greatest 
Persons of the Kingdom (11:124). 
This is a painful self-negation and a powerful insight: It begins as a feeble attempt to re-
assert himself, with an inkling of his own defensiveness.  Gulliver then collapses 
completely, identifying himself with class-jumping upstarts in England in the most 
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humiliating terms.  Before simply reading the censure of ―contemptible Varlets‖ as 
ventriloquism of Swift‘s conservative ideology, we ought to take in the self-reflexive 
mode in which it is uttered.  Gulliver‘s self-contempt, his willingness to supply his own 
humiliating designation suggests a problematic identification with his social superiors 
(oppressors) from whose point of view the critique is leveled—yet one that also 
accurately diagnoses his driving motive as middle-class envy and resentment, the desire 
to occupy the same symbolic space as the ―greatest persons of the kingdom.‖ 
 The Brobdingnagian odyssey chronicles, in effect, Gulliver‘s attempts to regain 
the regard that he lost in Lilliput—or, more accurately, reveals his preexisting 
dependence on the courtly object of desire.  The passage above continues with Gulliver‘s 
account of ―every day furnishing the court with some ridiculous story.‖  That 
circumstance owes to constant surveillance by his nurse-minder Glumdalclitch who ―was 
arch enough to inform the Queen whenever I committed any folly that she thought would 
be diverting to her majesty‖ (11:124).  This omnipresent courtly gaze presents the quest 
for recognition as, inevitably, a paranoid experience of self-critique as well as unfair 
persecution; the Brobdingnagian king‘s aura as wise ruler cannot be divorced from his 
role as a relentlessly shaming Lacanian Big Other.  The court drama merely externalizes 
Gulliver‘s subjective wish for power as a complex of self-loathing grounded in both 
admiration and resentment.   
Gulliver‘s supposed principles in Lilliput derive, then, less from his merits (as 
would befit a critique of injustices done to capable servants, like Swift, by their social 
betters), than from his master‘s sanction.  His high-mindedness flows from an inflated 
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self-regard conditioned by approval from the very symbolic authorities he critiques.28   
One could venture, as well, the hypothesis that the capricious Lilliputian emperor and 
sensible Brobdingnagian king merely present two sides of Gulliver‘s splitting of the all-
powerful (courtly) Other into its constituent libidinal elements.  When Gulliver is secure 
in a state of basic enjoyment, he can denounce the alienating aspects of a system whose 
approval he nonetheless craves. When Gulliver is forced into separation but unable to 
locate an alternative identity, the England he criticized appears once again as the 
benevolent source of sense.   
The shift in satiric mode between the first two voyages can be read as a function 
of these flawed forms of cultural faith.  In Lilliput, Gulliver‘s emotional security 
underwrites, paradoxically, an awareness of power‘s more ridiculous aspects; likewise 
the critique of England occurs through direct analogies with Lilliput, as by one 
consciously disenchanted.  In Brobdingnag, where he desperately seeks authority‘s 
sanction, Gulliver stubbornly idealizes England, unable to question any longer the system 
with which he best identifies.  The critique follows, in this case, from the reader‘s 
awareness of flaws that Gulliver dishonestly represses.  Both satirical modes function, 
finally, through the contortions in reality produced by Gulliver‘s false consciousness: 
first, as the disdain of a ―beautiful soul‖ who cannot acknowledge his participation in the 
                                                 
28 The king and court are, more strictly, imaginary objects onto which Gulliver transfers his desire; to the 
extent “there is no Big Other,” they are less the system of cultural imperatives than his fantasy of where 
they repose.  In this sense Gulliver‟s own standards exceed those of his chosen master.  He plays to the 
symbolic king beyond the actually existing one. The psychological logic is that of the subject whose fetish-
object helps him achieve heroic tasks only to be revealed as a fraud—leaving him to realize that “it was 
him all along.” 
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society he claims to abhor; second, as the intrusive reality that drives the complacent 
ideologue into defensiveness. 
One can perhaps confirm the durability of the spiritual-psychic analytic for the 
eighteenth century by the fit between Swift‘s critiques of Gulliver/England and the modes 
of satire distinguished by Henry Fielding in the preface to Joseph Andrews (1742).  
Fielding locates the source of ―the Ridiculous‖ in ―Affectation‖—in which he subtly 
discerns ―two Causes; Vanity, or Hypocrisy: For as Vanity puts us on affecting false 
Characters, in order to purchase Applause; so Hypocrisy sets us on an Endeavour to 
avoid Censure by concealing our Vices under an Appearance of their opposite Virtues.‖29  
His analysis of socially constructed affect perfectly captures the distinction between 
Gulliver‘s partly commendable behavior in Part I and his desperate obsequiousness in 
Part II: ―Affectation doth not imply an absolute Negation of those Qualities which are 
affected: and therefore, tho‘, when it proceeds from Hypocrisy, it be nearly allied to 
Deceit; yet when it comes from Vanity only, it partakes of the Nature of Ostentation.‖30  
It is common to object to Gulliver‘s behavior in Brobdingnag—but aren‘t Gulliver‘s 
misguided responses to his shame in Part II more evocative of a moral drive, in a 
motivational sense, than anything in Part I? 
Fielding‘s analyses, and Gulliver‘s shifts, offer slight variations on Swift‘s basic 
Catholic-Puritan psychological types.  Part I presents Gulliver as a (Catholic or 
aristocratic-style) knave whose vain loyalty to protocol pushes him to oppositional 
                                                 
29 Henry Fielding, The History of the Adventures of Joseph Andrews, ed. Adam Potkay (New York: 
Pearson Longman, 2008), 7-8. 
30 Ibid., 8. 
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critique; Part II recasts the self-righteous hypocrite as self-doubting compulsive fabulist.  
These are not discrete new types, but structurally predictable modulations or logical 
moments in the same fluid system. More colloquially, one might see the knave‘s subtle 
shift from scheming-cynical courtier to earnest Malvolio figure (or a male Goody Two-
Shoes); the hypocrite, under pressure of disillusionment, passes from sanctimonious prig 
to miserable apologist.31 
The unity of Gulliver‘s various poses, the way they reveal mere variations on 
fundamental libidinal investments, suggests a bleak view of social reform.  Improvements 
in governance would require a wholesale material- psychological project, a new set of 
identities and desires. Gulliver‘s ambivalence toward traditional authority is obviously 
quite close to Swift‘s; yet Swift portrays the flight from tradition as a class-bound, middle 
class naivety, reminiscent of Puritan reaction to Catholicism.  Gulliver is cast out like 
Crusoe—but instead of confidently creating a new order, he remains dishonestly linked to 
the old one.  He falls prey to the dangers Defoe, too, identifies with respect to the would-
be reformer confronted with hegemonic power: envy, resentment, narcissism, aggression. 
In effect, Swift‘s limited political imagination—his inability to picture a 
reconfigured desiring system of the kind that would transform the social order— 
produces a kind of plausible tautology justifying the status quo: a plebian, whose 
                                                 
31 Or, one could say that Swift distinguishes, in two cases, between the psychologies of a system‟s user-
exploiter and its apologist (a path from unbelieving belief to believing disbelief).  The first case describes, 
for example, the way a political insider paying cynical lip service to virtues like bipartisanship can fossilize 
into a pundit who piously deplores its absence from a system that merely exploits the concept (like the 
Washington Post’s David Broder).  The latter case may be exemplified by the contortions of such faux 
moderates when compelled to defend the extreme position they really espouse when their ideology is 
subject to real-world challenge (like the New York Times’ David Brooks).  
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contingent libidinal position necessarily leaves him psychically damaged by attempts to 
rise, merely seems to confirm his essential plebian character.32 Swift‘s vision of social 
reform remains confined to that typified by the jealous, upwardly mobile Puritan. 
 
Technocratic Innovation: It’s Actual, But Not Factual; Everything is Artifactual 
Swift‘s narrative, like Defoe‘s, highlights everyday objects as the subject‘s point 
of investment in governing institutions.  In Lilliput, Gulliver is characterized by an array 
of personal effects that signify comfort, competence and utility: his watch, spyglass, 
spectacles, pistols and sword, and snuffbox. He employs the most promising know-how 
of a rising class.  But Swift exposes this technical autonomy as fraud by describing 
Gulliver‘s more basic passivity.  In brute material terms, Gulliver is reduced to an infant 
whose needs are met with absolute dependability.  His food, in improbable quantities, is 
automatically and regularly supplied; after an initial embarrassment, his bodily waste is 
discretely whisked away by others, requiring no efforts of his own.  Under these 
conditions of total, if largely unacknowledged reliance, the Brobdingnagians propose, 
perhaps not wholly unreasonably, the possibility of slowly starving Gulliver to death. 
                                                 
32 Swift‘s views suggest an alternative genealogy of the modern conservative tradition as supposedly 
derived from thinkers including Swift.  Swift offers a more radical analysis than is generally admitted.  His 
implicit position, that real social reform (apart from that promised by the church) demands a cultural 
revolution of desire, is closer to Deleuze or Marcuse: the difference lies, of course, in the estimation of 
practical success.  Edmund Burke, by this standard, voices a reactionary collapse into outright endorsement 
of tradition for its own sake: a neurotic attachment at odds with Swift‘s religious sensibility.  Swift‘s logic 
here is that of the aristocrat who deplores the autodidact or nouveau riche’s vulgar social climbing as 
evidence of his innate lower class status; but Swift‘s insistence on a critique of desire permits him to 
suggest as well that the vulgarian merely embodies the most essential part of the aristocrat. 
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In Brobdingnag, Gulliver‘s gold and weaponry, as opposed to more benign 
objects, feature most immediately.  The items mark his castrated sense of self as he 
attempts to reassert his power through these signifiers of potency.  His impotence drives 
him, as well, to items that serve him as signifiers of taste, accomplishment and 
inducements to royal appreciation: He improvises a means of playing the spinet with  
padded sticks; he fashions, from the queen‘s giant hairs, a set of cane-chairs and a ―neat 
little purse‖: ―I made a present of them to her Majesty, who kept them in her cabinet, and 
used to shew them for curiosities‖(11:125-6).  He finally abandons appeasement to more 
directly prove his worth—by revealing to the king the secret of gunpowder,  a scene that 
recalls Crusoe‘s revelations to Friday, but for the king‘s horrified reaction (11:134). 
Swift points to the social climber‘s potential to transfer energies from useful 
activity to aping his betters to violent self-assertion.  Gunpowder here represents less an 
element of techno-modernity than a tool of middle class resentment: it is Gulliver‘s 
degraded cultural faith externalized. 
The action in Brobdingnag helps explain Swift‘s seemingly arbitrary distinction 
between benign ―improvement of agriculture and all the mechanical arts‖[111] and 
useless or dangerous technological ―projecting.‖—a distinction that rests not in the 
technical differences, but in psychic modes of investment.  In this regard, Gulliver‘s 
drawing-room implements of subservience and vulgar pretence relate more closely to 
gunpowder than more obviously (to the modern mind) correlated technologies of 
mechanical improvement for which Swift seems, unaccountably, to make room. 
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Gulliver‘s first two voyages explore governance organized around 1) a public 
symbolic hierarchy (of honors and titles), and 2) subjective (Whig-dissenting) fetishism 
of commercial and nationalist forms.  But Swift was aware, as the sermon on Testimony 
of Conscience articulates, of claims to renew Protestant culture in firmer ground: in 
metaphysical or scriptural certainties, the market‘s self-correcting wisdom, or study of 
the natural world by experts.  The voyage to Laputa takes on the last of these strategies—
but only to expose it as a reiteration of familiar spiritual error.   
If Lilliput and Brobdingnag, in the Lacanian analogy, exemplify social faith 
organized excessively around the Symbolic and the Imaginary, then Laputa depicts the 
attempt to ground it in the Real—in metaphysics or nature that are experienced as beyond 
manipulation by the Symbolic Order, in areas requiring expert interpretation and inquiry, 
beyond the realm of ordinary consensus and into the particular.  It would be easy to 
conclude that Swift fears a materialist disenchantment of the world that locates truth in an 
underlying bedrock reality of facts.  But his interest lies entirely in the status of new 
truths as thought objects, in the way they influence people as objects of social faith.  For 
Swift, even the objects of science remain social objects; the Real, in this view (as in 
Lacan‘s) remains merely that aspect of psychic reality experienced as external or still-
resistant to ordinary conventions of speaking and thinking.  He does not approach modern 
philosophy‘s discoveries as a new way of knowing some ultimate reality, but as a new 
subspecies of social objects, foisted on the public with a familiar rhetoric of zealous 
certainty. From the material-psychic perspective of Swift‘s Protestantism, claims for 
science merely concern the authority to define objects of public belief.  In an ideal form, 
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of course, science proposes only provisional objects of observation; Swift‘s responds—
justifiably or not—to the psychic problems of what he saw as a more arrogant subculture 
of certainty, quite apart from questions regarding the actual implications of science or 
metaphysics as a challenge to religious truth. 
Defoe takes much the same position: Crusoe‘s supposedly modern empirical 
investigations never produce certainties about a fully knowable secular reality; they offer 
instead a means to constantly expand the psychological space in which Crusoe dwells, 
signaled by means of an expanding domain of objects he has grasped.  He tests his 
perceptions against that which remains resistant to his mastery.  His self-reform includes 
salutary use of observation, vocational practice, and revelations tied to scripture.  Rather 
than contacting a determinate reality, then, Crusoe engages in repeated mental journeying 
into an inexhaustible Providence.  Defoe allows this consciousness-raising to take place 
within the individual, subject to renewed investigation and the correction of the available 
laity.33   
Swift‘s critique of this mode, therefore, does not respond to some offending 
secular positivism, but—in entirely traditional terms—to Defoe‘s Puritan tendency to 
accept a much diminished hermeneutic community away from the church and into the 
realm of individual conscience.  There is no sufficient corrective, in his view, for a 
subject like Crusoe to be sure he has exceeded his own imagination and libidinal idols.  
The critique of projectors merely extends this analysis to identify modern philosophy‘s 
                                                 
33 It is worth noting that Crusoe always struggles to interpret his more mystical visions and revelations, and 
is open to a continuum of explanation from delirium to serendipitous mental event to divine inspiration.  
There is every sense that he would be open to corrective interpretation and little evidence of claims to 
unmediated access to God. 
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objects as the fantasy products of a minority.  Swift simply refuses, in other words, to see 
the established bodies of expert research as legitimate epistemological community.   
The Academy of Lagado, unsurprisingly, presents a strict analogue for the 
proliferation of schismatic symbolic orders Swift describes in Bedlam in the Tale, in the 
Continent‘s monastic communities, and in the marketplace.  The academy resembles an 
asylum, overseen by a warden and divided into over 500 rooms, each with a miniscule 
solipsistic projecting community (11:179).  From this perspective, Swift describes the 
professor ―employed in a Project for improving speculative knowledge by practical and 
mechanical Operations‖ (11:182)—a description that carries the same meaning as 
mechanical operations of sectarian belief in the Tale—as does the ―innovation‖ that 
characterizes the projectors generally (1:177).  The project is a kind of Turing machine 
for generating/simulating knowledge by randomly manipulating wooden dies marked 
with linguistic signs; it is a perfect image for a blindly self-expanding signifying system 
deprived of any conscious, edifying order.  Like the Academy itself, or the market, the 
machine produces a randomly mutating symbolic order that can never underwrite a 
coherent co-conscious society. 
The machine‘s schizophrenic and autonomous work, supposedly, furnishes 
knowledge directly and automatically, without the ―laborious‖ process of learning and 
mastery of arts and sciences (11:182).34  It bypasses subjectivity altogether, leaving no 
space of conscious awareness between its symbolic idols and the self.  Swift depicts the 
                                                 
34 Schizophrenic, that is, in Deleuze and Guattari‟s sense of desiring-production among cultural objects in a 
discontinuous or aleatory fashion.  Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia (New York: Viking Press, 1977). 
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ultimate senseless liturgical order, one deprived even of the ethically striving subject.  
Where Defoe‘s Protestant subject learns to interact humbly and flexibly with the objects 
of his world, Swift‘s ideal Protestant subject exists ethically through conscious awareness 
of the gap between self and vestimental order—responding through humility, skepticism, 
self-reform, and acceptance of grace; the machine offers, in a new mode, the (impossibly) 
fully-inscribed sectarian or the amoral honest businessman of the sermon on conscience. 
Swift‘s Lagado, in this sense, resists incorporation into modern historiography.  
Swift never sees ―science‖ as furnishing modernity‘s world of unified space-time 
coordinates of realist agreement because it is a mechanism rather than a belief.  The 
notion of modernity‘s imagined community in these terms, as described by Benedict 
Anderson and embraced by theorists of eighteenth-century literature, runs directly 
counter to what Swift describes as modernity‘s proliferation of individual psychotic 
sects.35  Swift approaches the new science, that is, as a familiar mode of belief, not a new 
mode of knowledge.  As an ―epistemic shift,‖ in fact, it seems barely to register. 
Swift‘s thinking thus allows for both inductive thought and the correctives of the 
sensory world.  Described in these terms, Swift is a proponent of science.  The real issue 
                                                 
35 Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.Swift‘s vision 
of modernity derives directly from accounts of enthusiasm that also resist incorporation into a narrative of 
religious-political division that stand as secular unity‘s opposite.  Rather than merely equate enthusiasm 
with interpretive friction and political discord, for example, Meric Causabon offers a surprising argument 
that enthusiasm leads to an undesirable religious peace, a collection of religious monads strictly orthogonal 
to one another.  He argues that, among the ancients, ―There were as many Religions almost as men; for 
every man‘s religion was his phansy; and they had most credit and authority that could best invent, and 
make best shew. Among so many religions, there were no controversies, but very good agreement and 
concord; because no reason used either to examine, or to disprove. There was no talk among men, but of 
dreams, revelations, and apparitions: and they that could so easily phansy God in whatsoever they did 
phansy, had no reason to mistrust or to question the relations of others, though never so strange.‖ 
Casaubon, Treatise Concerning Enthusiasme. 
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is whether that sensory data has been cognized by a full corrective community into 
authorized social signifiers—objects of utility, God‘s signs, or cultural imperatives.  Yet 
at the same time Swift simply refuses to see the new science as a genuinely communal 
project of mutual correction; he is unable to extend to an institution like the Royal 
Society an authorized role co-terminal or cooperative with existing governing bodies, 
including the church.  Swift could imagine a priesthood of believers, up to a point 
(conveniently equating the interests of the subject with those of his lord)—but not a 
priesthood of scientists.  Before equating Swift‘s critique of modern philosophy with one 
of modern science and then of modernity, we need to draw a distinction between 
pragmatic inductive method and the theoretical nominalism that posits a fully speakable 
underlying reality. 
Conclusion: On “Epistemological Crisis” 
 
Isn‘t Swift‘s real problem with the ―modern‖ more or less that he simply didn‘t 
believe in it?  In Swift‘s writing, claims for progress and novelty are generally treated as 
an affectation, a vain and empty claim, a pretense.  Critics like Orwell may have been 
hasty to condemn Swift for wholesale failure to understand science.36  But wasn‘t Orwell 
right on a deeper level, that ―reason‖ for Swift, really does mean nothing more than 
―common sense‖—as the realm of full mutual investigation into inevitably psychological 
objects—, and that, without this, science, as he saw it, was nothing new? From a spiritual 
point of view, the modern generally simply replicated sectarian liturgical cultures, 
                                                 
36 Frank Boyle, Swift as Nemesis: Modernity and Its Satirist (Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press, 2000), xiii. 
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offering a dangerous proliferation of new objects of social faith, demanding a ―real‖ 
belief in arbitrary idols rather than mutual assent to a provisional common judgment.  
Swift differs from both progressive and conservative critics of modernity who see a 
regime of instrumental materialism or naïve social engineering.  His is a more quietist 
reactionary mode, which situates the new as the ―new‖—merely a presumptuous 
unwitting repetition of the past.   
A dominant view situates Swift at a moment of ―epistemological crisis,‖ in which 
empirical ways of knowing —what Ian Watt described as confidence that ―truth can be 
discovered by the individual through his senses‖—associated with a modern regime 
threaten to deprive both Christian belief and traditional authority of their basis in divinely 
revealed truths.37 According to this view, naturalistic explanations displace religion, 
making its claims superfluous, empty of content except as pious glosses on phenomena 
more convincingly described in material terms.38  Yet this framing also limits the defense 
of religion to a kind of willful ignorance, in which numinous truths are preserved by the 
expedient of not looking into them too closely.39 To cast Swift as a defender of this 
version of faith leaves him, rather weakly, as a proponent of a fragile credulity in the 
enchanted world of God‘s immanence, a vague fideism, or belief in ―the ineffable,‖ or 
eternal or human truths associated with poetic language and the like.  
But this narrative, of Swift mounting a painfully earnest obscurantist defense 
against a fully cognized, inevitably secular episteme, seems incomplete, from the point of 
                                                 
37 Watt, The Rise of the Novel. 
38 McKeon, Origins, 87. 
39 Ibid., 83. 
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view of objects as reference points for subjectivity.  It poorly describes Swift‘s most 
relevant religious rhetoric, which remains impatient with epistemology and, in its tone, 
less anxious about disbelief than an irritated rehearsal of well-worn truths to Christians of 
dubious character who should know better.40  At times, certainly, Swift offers arguably 
weak, if common, defenses of mystery as ―incomprehensible and above reason.‖41  Yet 
these conventions go hand-in-hand with a tendency to regard mysteries and sacraments 
chiefly in their symbolic capacity, as part of a habitus linked to practical piety and 
salvation.  Swift‘s defense of Protestant culture hinges less on leaving the foundations of 
faith undisturbed so much as recognizing them as points of social binding whose 
destruction results not from their exposure as implausible or historically dubious, but 
from their reduction to objects of metaphysical certainty and ―real‖ contention that inhibit 
reform.  Rawson has described Swift‘s tendency to see religion as ―pragmatic principle[s] 
of cohesion‖ that ―curb‖ wayward desires.42 And while he does not generally go so far as 
to write off Swiftian piety as a mere political expedient or useful fiction for inculcating 
virtue in the vulgar, he comes close. Others have not hesitated to level that charge. 
But Swift‘s emphasis on religion‘s social function also need not appear as an 
irreligious bent, epistemological double-dealing or intellectual cop out.  It is consistent, 
as I have argued, with an analytic of the spiritual capacity of social artifacts, as 
potentially nurturing dispositions of conscious reform opposed to zealous inner certainty.  
                                                 
40 Where atheism figures in Swift‟s texts, for example, it is chiefly a sign of social breakdown—a 
temptation to the vulgar, rather than plausibly refutation or threat to belief. 
41 Landa find this evidence of anti-intellectualism in "Swift, the Mysteries, and Deism," Studies in English 
24(1944). 
42 Rawson, "Character of Swift's Satire," 47. 
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For religious theorists concerned not only with belief, but also with spiritual character, 
the expectation of belief grounded in sense evidence or historic certainty (as opposed to 
social or symbolic authority), did not threaten faith with a secular futurity so much as it 
exemplified a familiar enthusiast/Catholic spiritual pathology.  Consequently, Swift 
rebukes freethinkers like Toland and Collins not for proto-secularism, but for neglecting 
faith as a social practice.  Collins displays, Swift assumes, an obvious ignorance when he 
posits a Christianity founded in the Real, on a series of mechanically linked metaphysical 
claims, the loss of any one of which might undo the whole system as if it were a Rube 
Goldberg device: a logical proof, a magical machine, or a series of natural causes. Here 
he ventriloquizes the freethinker to expose this narrowly mechanical vision of faith: 
The Priests dispute every Point in the Christian Religion, as well as almost every 
Text in the Bible; and the force of my Argument lies here, that whatever Point is 
disputed by one or two Divines, however condemned by the church, not only that 
particular Point, but the whole Article to which it relates, may lawfully be 
received or rejected by any Free Thinker (4:35) 
No less than the Catholic ritualist or the predestinarian, freethinkers mistake faith for firm 
knowledge of a kind of machinery; their researches to ground cultural authority in the 
Real resemble the desire to see salvation manufactured by sacramental machinery, 
legalistic prohibitions or what Swift called ―abstruse points of predestination, election 
and the like.‖   
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Frank Boyle, then,  is surely right to discern Swift‘s association of ―the Roman 
Church‘s fraudulent doctrine of transubstantiation‖ with ―modern intellectual systems.‖43  
Both, in Swift‘s view, vulgarize faith: ―Before the mystery was defined materially—that 
is, in terms of a physical switching of substances [bread and wine to body and blood]—
the scriptural event was available to the faithful in any number of modes of 
understanding.  Once it was reduced to a specific sequence of material occurrences, it 
became the material of worldly arguments and religious schisms. … From Swift‘s 
perspective the argument is a rational absurdity because it is premised on the reduction of 
a transcendent religious event to a mechanical operation.‖44  But Boyle identifies Swift‘s 
foe here as secular modernity itself, in its ―terrifying reduction of the human intellect … 
to make all modes of human experience submit to a materialist discourse‖45; however the 
danger is not (modern) materialism eclipsing ―transcendent‖ mystery as the stuff of 
religious knowledge; it is uncritical psychological belief in an absolute eclipsing edifying 
accommodation of a social article of faith.  Boyle is forced here to equate Catholicism 
with a secularizing dialectic of Enlightenment—a materialism--that Swift supposedly 
discerns in Duns Scotus; but Swift does not concern himself here with a problem of 
creeping disenchantment.  His critique of the Roman Eucharist as a kind of secular 
material machinery is the very same Reformation critique, in a more modern register, that 
identified Roman ritual as a kind of mystical magic.  Both critiques, whether in 
emphasizing superstitious thinking or automatic-mechanical sequence, speak to the 
                                                 
43 Boyle, Swift as Nemesis, 100. 
44 Ibid., 114-15. 
45 Ibid., 115. 
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psychic costs of belief in the register of the Real.  The final eclipse of early modern 
Protestantism, itself constructed around warnings against this mode of faith, is not by 
secularity, but by modern religion.
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Chapter 5:  Reading the Spiritual City: Dissenting Hermeneutics and 
Governance in Defoe’s A Journal of the Plague Year 
Beyond Crusoe 
 Daniel Defoe‟s A Journal of the Plague Year (1722), which purports to be a first-
hand account of the 1665 plague by the Londoner “H.F.,” offers harrowing reading made 
all the more impressive by the inclusion of archival documents—including, for example, 
reproductions of demographic records, the Lord Mayor‟s quarantine decree, and 
advertising for quack medicines.  These graphic elements seem to capture the emergent 
modern city as a place of scientific abstraction, rationalized and bureaucratic governance 
and aggressive commodification.  Unsurprisingly, the Journal has recently been 
assimilated to narratives about the rise of the modern, secular state and, implicitly, the 
eclipse of religion.    
 This chapter will argue instead that the Journal reproduces documents from 
popular science, government and popular print culture to show their limitations for 
representing a city in crisis, whether during the plague of 1665, or during the 1720s.  
Defoe takes these documents up in an act fostering a kind of critical cultural literacy, to 
argue that none of these textual forms, taken alone, can represent London‟s many 
interdependent communities.  Instead, Defoe‟s assemblage, tied together by his fictional 
observer, constitutes an archive of public speaking that aims to present London as a 
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unified living and interpreting community modeled on a Protestant (Puritan) ekklesia, 
rather than as a set of dead norms or letters.  The Journal invites the reader to engage in a 
characteristically Puritan mode of reading and history writing, one that employs 
potentialities for writing scientific history within a spiritual framework.  As such it 
complements Robinson Crusoe as an approach to reforming subjectivity amid 
modernizing culture.  At the same time, it shows an affinity with Swift‟s Travels by 
arguing for a more transformative, integrative view of society as a whole than Crusoe 
shows us. 
 Defoe‟s response to plague suggests that, for him, technologically savvy 
governance is best exemplified by an engaged laity in a comprehensive and locally 
determined church; he extends this model to show London‟s potential as just such a civic 
and spiritual body.  Rather than simply provide a religious sanction for modern 
authorities or epistemologies, then, Defoe‟s theo-political thought, I want to suggest, 
represents an altogether different regime, in which civic activities are understood as 
spiritual exercises of self-governance within a specific sense of the unity of church and 
state.   
 
Regulating the Soul  
 Foucault‟s Discipline and Punish (1975) surely suggested for critics The 
Journal’s compatibility with narratives about an epistemic shift between traditional ways 
of knowing and the proto-technical apparatuses of the modern state.  There Foucault finds 
a “compact model” of the panoptic state‟s spatial and bureaucratic disciplinary 
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apparatuses in seventeenth-century plague measures, “the penetration of regulation into 
even the smallest details of everyday life through the mediation of a complete hierarchy 
that assured the capillary functioning of power.”1   John Bender‟s Imagining the 
Penitentiary (1987) extends that model, and finds the Journal articulating the conceptual 
matrix of those modern authorities by naturalizing, in realist imaginative prose, an 
apparently neutral discourse of documentary evidence amenable to urban regulation.2  
Along these lines, critics have continued to mine the Journal for evidence of a shift from 
traditional ways of knowing and speaking to modern forms of command and control and 
their associated technologies.3  
 Defoe‟s textual and generic choices have likewise been described in terms of this 
broad social narrative, in that interpolations drawn from science and bureaucracy have 
been taken as Defoe‟s attempts to lend veracity to his narrative, to increase the “realism” 
of his faux journal.  This realism has been understood both in terms of the modern novel 
and as Defoe‟s attempt to present the public with a modern work of history.4  As scholars 
                                                 
1 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: 
Vintage, 1979), 198. 
2 Bender, Imagining the Penitentiary, 63-84. Bender‟s account analyzes the text‟s reality effect and its 
contingent potential to underwrite new forms of governance,—as opposed to the more common and simpler 
claim that Defoe is a proto-empiricist who employs modern methods of historiography and representation 
concerning factual data. 
3 George Drake notes that “The Journal documents the history of spatial practices during the plague, and 
those practices reflect in turn the rise of capitalism and innovations in state control.”George A. Drake, "The 
Dialectics of inside and Outside: Dominated and Appropriated Space in Defoe's Historical Fictions," 
Eighteenth-Century Fiction 14, no. 2 (2002): 136.  Paula McDowell sees Defoe as a conscious advocate of 
“a new, print-oriented modernity associated with the collection and reproduction of accurate statistics and 
true report.”Paula McDowell, "Defoe and the Contagion of the Oral: Modeling Media Shift in a Journal of 
the Plague Year," PMLA 121, no. 1 (2006): 89. See also, along these lines, Nicholas Seager, "Lies, Damned 
Lies, and Statistics: Epistemology and Fiction in Defoe's a Journal of the Plague Year," The Modern 
Language Review 103(2008). 
4 For an argument that Defoe‟s numerical tabulations of the dead contribute to narrative plausibility see G. 
Gabrielle Starr, "Objects, Imaginings, and Facts: Going Beyond Genre in Behn and Defoe," Eighteenth-
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acknowledge, the conventions of both novel and history writing were, at the time of 
Defoe‟s writing, fluid and interchangeable.  Nevertheless the work retains the status of a 
problem text: a proto-novel in which Defoe, who drew directly on numerous sources, 
invented almost nothing, and an eyewitness history written by a fictional persona.5 
 Certainly, Defoe‟s interest in regulating London‟s population according to 
insights drawn from science and medicine suggests the institutional accoutrements of 
modern city governance.  The London Bills of Mortality, the official records of plague 
deaths, which Defoe interpolates into his narrative, would seem, for example, to 
epitomize a statistical and probabilistic perspective based on empirical observation.  
Accordingly, readings of Defoe that closely adhere to narratives of incipient modernity 
tend to diminish the more traditional elements of the text, especially Defoe‟s earnest 
engagement with providential readings of the plague, its meaning to H.F and to the city at 
large.  Implicitly, in such readings, his religious concerns are ignored as external to the 
technological-institutional innovations he embraces or reflects; as a corollary, it is 
presumed that features of Defoe‟s landscape are easily categorized, according to current 
divisions of knowledge, as belonging to a traditional past or a modern future.  By same 
                                                                                                                                                 
Century Fiction 16, no. 4 (2004).  On the Journal’s generic status and history writing, especially with 
respect to Defoe‟s use of primary sources, see Watson Nicholson, The Historical Sources of Defoe's 
Journal of the Plague Year (Boston: The Stratford Company, 1919); F. Bastian, "Defoe's Journal of the 
Plague Year," The Review of English Studies 16, no. 62 (1965); Robert Mayer, "The Reception of a Journal 
of the Plague Year and the Nexus of Fiction and History in the Novel," ELH 57, no. 3 (1990).    
5 H.F. has been identified, at least loosely, with Defoe‟s uncle, Henry Foe. 
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token, readings that highlight Defoe‟s Puritan literary heritage in the Journal have little to 
say about its more pragmatic concerns.6 
     But the whole tenor of Defoe‟s text suggests that it needs to be read otherwise, 
in ways that escape the modern tendency to split the material from the spiritual.  If 
anything, the ease with which Defoe shifts between these realms creates a sense of 
London‟s spiritual ecology, as I have called it,—in which matters of public health, 
“science” and medicine, and government policy occupy the same conceptual space as 
problems of grace and spiritual development.  Indeed, as a self-conscious historiography, 
the Journal demonstrates that cultural artifacts dating from the era of the plague (and 
1722), were in fact available for appropriation by any number of divergent discourses—
none of which may be easily categorized as modern or traditional.  There is nothing, for 
example, self-evidently modern about the church-generated demographic records Defoe 
deploys—unless we understand them anachronistically—nor is it clear why they should 
convey “realism” if, as subtler readings have noted, the very notion of realism or neutral 
nominalism is an ideological effect to which Defoe‟s text contributes.7 
 Minimally, splitting Defoe‟s spiritual concerns from questions about governance 
risks stripping the Journal of any coherent rhetorical purpose—the same sort of problem 
we have encountered in secularizing readings of Robinson Crusoe, and in ideological 
diagnostics of Swift.  More than this, such readings shift the rationale and functions of 
good governance away from the milieu in which Defoe would have conceived them. The 
                                                 
6 See, for example Hunter, Pilgrim; Everett Zimmerman, "H.F.'S Meditations: A Journal of the Plague 
Year," PMLA 87, no. 2 (1972). 
7 Again, see Bender, Imagining the Penitentiary. 
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notion of spiritual exercises or technologies, which has guided this discussion of the 
confluence of liturgical cultures and proto-modern institutions, offers the possibility of 
re-conceiving Defoe‟s text and ideas about civic practice in terms that might have been 
more familiar to him.  We can see, that is, a pragmatic approach to cultivating mental 
dispositions and mapping (in the active sense of offering a strategic guide) relations 
between social actors and institutions.  In this sense, Defoe‟s Puritan heritage comprises 
more than a set of conventions, and more than a set of beliefs pertaining to matters 
epistemological and soteriological; it represents a cognitive system that binds public 
structures of governance as well as private behavior.  The Journal, in other words, 
models governance as a spiritual exercise; and in critiquing various responses to plague it 
models, in miniature, the kind of thinking it demands.      
 Defoe would have had ample opportunity to absorb a basic set of prejudices about 
the interdependence of civic and spiritual life.  Paula Backscheider‟s biography 
emphasizes Defoe‟s early nonconformist religious training in terms of “habits of mind” 
inculcated during his time as a student at Charles Morton‟s Newington Green Academy.8  
Morton‟s rigorous curriculum stressed the importance of free inquiry in diverse subjects 
as well as spiritual development, and Morton‟s own writings speak to the deep 
connection drawn between Protestant tenets, personal disposition, and the social 
environment.  Virtue was certainly to issue in public spiritedness, but Morton‟s doctrine 
likewise held that accepting grace depended in large part on available social institutions. 
                                                 
8 Paula Backscheider, Daniel Defoe: His Life (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 14-
21. 
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 Morton‟s The Spirit of Man (1693), for example, schematizes Morton‟s 
understanding of the influence of the social and institutional environment on the 
individual spirit.  This exegetical text makes a case for the existence of a noumenal soul, 
embedded or “informed” in the brute physical body—but having expression via the 
Spirit, understood as a mediating seat of dispositions subject to bodily passions, but also 
to correction through active habituation:   
1. The Faculties of the Soul, (as Understanding, Will, Sensitive Appetite or 
Passions) are all Ingredients as the Substrate Matter of this Spirit in Man; But the 
Modification of them is from the other Causes. Souls in themselves are all Equal; 
but the Spirits are vastly Different one from another. And this is from the 
particulars that follow, and in a chief manner from   2. The Temperament of the 
Body, which is (more or less) Different in every Individual Man.  The Soul 
Receives no power from the Body; But in Exerting its own proper powers, is 
helped or hindred by the Bodys good or ill Temperament.9 
 
Acquired Habits do much Alter the Genius or Spirit, from what it would be, if 
men were left to their Pure Naturals. These Habits arise partly, (1) From 
Instruction & Rules: so Intellectual & Moral Habits (whether good or evil· are 
formed much according to the Information men meet with, especially in their 
younger dayes. … 2. From Pattern. Example, and Converse, with People, make 
deeper impression then Rules, and have a very great influence in forming the 
                                                 
9 Charles Morton, The Spirit of Man (Boston1692), 19-21. 
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Genius· especially of Youth, when they are stepping from Boy to Man, and are 
taking upon them to chuse their own way.10 
Consequently, the state of the soul depends upon discipline and training, but also upon 
the social environment: 
Thus Prosperity, Wealth, Honour, Health, friends &c. do commonly enlarge the 
mind of a man; and make him bold and brisk: Whereas the contrary Poverty, 
Disgrace, Sickness, &c. do usually Contract and Emasculate the Spirit.11  
A poor spirit, while not in itself good or evil, may be sanctified or unsanctified by faith.   
In the latter case, it is the common good that suffers: 
This Spirit is a Saddled Ass, ready to be Rid at pleasure; and is most mischievous 
in a Church, where are Diotrephian Spirits [those affecting preeminence], and 
Ruinous to a State, where Tyranny would be playing pranks. Such are men Born 
to be Slaves, for whose Unreasonable Yielding, their Posterity will have cause to 
Curse them.12 
To the extent that Defoe internalized this model, for him the realms of soul and state 
would have mirrored one another; he would have seen neglect of one to have, for entirely 
practical reasons, a deleterious effect on the other.  Morton‟s writing constructs a 
pragmatic sanction for applying a dissenting hermeneutic to the world at large: the 
responsibility for self-inquiry extends equally to inspecting social conditions, while social 
                                                 
10Ibid., 21-22. 
11 Ibid., 25.  
12Ibid., 66. 
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conditions—particularly those involving a danger of tyranny or impoverishment—
become the indices of the health of a community of souls.     
 The equivalence suggested here is readily apparent in Defoe‟s Due Preparations 
for the Plague, as well for Soul as Body (1722), which is split into a section of medical 
and legislative responses to plague, and a second part comprising dialogues on spiritual 
preparation for death; but this work has not been seen as unified in this sense.13  I will 
turn to Defoe‟s better known Journal in hopes of modeling an inquiry that gives 
prominence to social processes of cognition as they arise out of Defoe‟s religious 
environment.  It will, I hope, become apparent that it is possible to locate a deep religious 
logic in Defoe‟s work—one that transcends his use of genres that seem, to modern 
sensibilities, incompatible.  I begin by placing Defoe in the context of alternative 
discourses by tracing his own meta-discursive strategy in the Journal.  From there it will 
be possible to relate his critique to an underlying dissenting vision that is applied to broad 
social institutions.  
 
Competing Discourses in the Journal 
 Defoe‟s text presents—even at a visual level—the co-existence of important but 
potentially irreconcilable world-views inhering in discursive strategies native to the 
proto-scientific community, state authorities, popular culture, and religious sects.   A 
discussion of the historical background of the Journal’s production will serve to 
illuminate Defoe‟s referents. 
                                                 
13Daniel Defoe, Due Preparations for the Plague, as Well for Soul as Body (London1722).  
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In 1720, news of plague in Marseilles reached England, causing a minor panic 
and public discussion of what measures might be taken to prevent infection, and what to 
do in the event of an outbreak.  The French epidemic occasioned a flurry of religious 
tracts, medical treatises, and firsthand reports.  Characteristically, Defoe had numerous 
ideas about prevention, the civic mechanisms for enacting his ideas, and the religious 
import of the epidemic.  In 1722 he produced the Due Preparations.  Just a month later, 
he published A Journal of the Plague Year.  The Journal incorporates Due Preparations‟ 
policy advice on plague prevention into H.F.‟s first-person account (with the somewhat 
disheartening conclusion that “the best Physick against the Plague is to run away from 
it”) and its religious dialogue into H.F.‟s running commentaries on providence.   
 Defoe‟s intervention was a timely and pragmatic one, addressing not only 
immediate fears of plague, but, implicitly, problems of London‟s administration by 
competing and overlapping civil and ecclesiastical authorities.  Explosive growth had 
long been attended by potential for health problems, civil unrest, and religious conflict.14  
The City and its adjoining territories were thus a microcosm of possibilities for 
experiments in governance, and plague represented their severest test. 
 In spite—or perhaps because of—its origins in an opportunistic publishing frenzy 
surrounding the public crisis, the Journal shows a profound ambivalence about popular 
print culture and the variety of information available to the public.  Seemingly aware of 
its own status as a potentially troubling mixture of reporting and fiction, the Journal 
                                                 
14 For background on London‟s growth and civil administration see Valerie Pearl, London and the 
Outbreak of the Puritan Revolution; City Government and National Politics, 1625-43 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1961), 9-44. 
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suggests parallels between the rumor-mongering and commercial exploitation 
surrounding the plague of 1665 and the print culture of 1722.  At one point, H.F.—on 
pages that enthusiastically reproduce and exploit the attention-seeking typefaces and 
sensationalist titles of quack doctors who claim to treat the plague—complains about the 
“flourishes” and “spacious titles” and “Capital Letters” of the physicians.15  H.F. 
explicitly describes the influence of printed material on public apprehensions: 
Whether this unhappy Temper was originally raised by the Follies of some People who 
got Money by it; that is to say, by printing Predictions, and Prognostications I know not; 
but certain it is, Book‘s frighted them terribly; such as Lily’s Almanack, Gadbury’s 
Alogical Predictions; Poor Robin’s Almanack and the like; also several pretended 
religious Books; one entituled, Come out of her my People, least you be partaker of her 
Plagues ; another call'd, Fair Warning; another, Britains Remembrances, and many such; 
all, or most Part of which, foretold directly or covertly the Ruin of the City (25) 
Indeed, H.F.‟s initial reaction to the plague involves a careful scrutiny of factual sources 
in an attempt to determine whether the reports of illness are accurate, and what sources 
are credible.  By examining the limitations of popular print literature, Defoe points to 
public discourses that seem to offer truth, but are not adequate to the social situation they 
purport to represent. 
 The Journal begins, then, with the plague figured not as a crisis of health, or even 
spirit, but one of information:  “It was in the Beginning of September, 1664, that I, 
                                                 
15 Daniel Defoe, A Journal of the Plague Year (London: E. Nutt; J. Roberts; A. Dodd; and J. Graves, 
1722). Subsequent references are to this edition and are given parenthetically.  The text has ETSC number 
T070342 and document number CW107092774 at Eighteenth Century Collections Online.  I have referred 
to the text as the “Journal” throughout. 
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among the Rest of my Neighbors, heard in ordinary Discourse, that the Plague was 
return‟d again in Holland.”   To this opening, which evokes the situation of 1720, is 
added,  
We had no such thing as printed News-Papers in those days, to spread Rumours 
and Reports of Things; and to improve them by the invention of Men, as I have 
lived to see practis‘d since.  But such things as these were gather‘d from the 
Letters of Merchants, and others, who corresponded abroad, and from them was 
handed about by Word of Mouth only; so that things did not spread instantly over 
the whole Nation, as they do now. (1-2). 16  
The Journal establishes the explosion of print in the early years of the eighteenth century 
as a distinguishing feature of the era in which the work is published, one that serves to set 
it apart from the culture of 1665—but also one that makes analogies between unreliable 
rumors and dubious printed material.  Besides the sheer volume of popular printed matter 
engendered in the era and possibly covering up truths necessary to the public, H.F.‟s 
suspicion regarding, and delight in reproducing, graphic elements also evokes 
developments in typography and the profitability of commercial advertising.17  At the 
same time, direct reproduction of documents was a common practice in history-writing at 
                                                 
16 See also McDowell‟s reading of this passage.  Given the explicit critique of print sources, from the 
governmental to the fraudulently pious to the commercially-minded, McDowell‟s binary association of 
print culture with a modern factual mode favored by Defoe over a deficient oral tradition as part his “effort 
to rewrite the chaotic past of a not-yet-modern civic bureaucracy in the new idealized image of a civic 
order based on the gathering and dissemination of printed news” strikes me as problematic. 
17 James Raven, "The Book Trades," in Books and Their Readers in Eighteenth-Century England: New 
Essays, ed. Isabel Rivers (New York: Leicester University Press, 2001). 
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the time—one Defoe had engaged with his earlier histories.18  Indeed, one of Defoe‟s 
chief sources for the Journal was A Collection of Very Valuable and Scarce Pieces 
Relating to the Last Plague in the Year 1665, a compendium of primary-source 
documents printed in 1721 by J. Roberts.19   
 Amid this flurry of information, Defoe invests his narrator with a degree of 
epistemological suspicion that bears more critical investigation.  For H.F., the “ordinary 
discourse” of the commercially minded public sphere can only be read as a dubious sign, 
rather than information—sufficiently so that H.F. arguably likens uncertain knowledge to 
the “spread” of disease—the meaning of which is likewise mysterious.20 
 As an alternative, H.F. turns to governmental, juridical rhetoric as a possible 
source of knowledge, but finds it also problematic in its application to the whole of 
society.  Frustrated with popular reports, subsequently described as “rumours,” H.F. 
contrasts them with the state‟s knowledge of the threat: “But it seems the Government 
had a true Account of it [the plague], and several Counsels were held about Ways to 
prevent its coming over; but all was kept very private.  Hence it was, that this Rumour 
died off again, and People began to forget it, as a thing we were very little concern'd in, 
and that we hoped was not true” (2).  The possibility for knowledge exists—but only in 
                                                 
18 Paula R. Backscheider, Daniel Defoe: Ambition and Innovation (Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 1986), 71;98. 
19 Bastian, "Defoe's Journal of the Plague Year." 
20 In one interesting moment, H.F. describes a confrontation between a woman and a physician whose 
printed advertisement she feels has misled her.  While the doctor‟s printed bills purport to offer free help to 
the poor regarding plague, in person he requires payment, his advice being that they should purchase his 
medicine: “Alas, Sir! says she, that is a Snare laid for the Poor then; for you give them your Advice for 
nothing, that is to say, you advise them gratis, to buy your Physick for their Money.”  Defoe notes the 
creation, by modern advertising, of a treacherous public sphere in which printed promises are granted a 
narrow, quasi-contractual meaning even as they play on the sphere of private, everyday expectations. 
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the private and, to the ordinary citizen, inaccessible realm of official discourse.  
Assimilating the public, textual face of this bureaucratic idiom to his pseudo-memoir, 
Defoe faithfully reproduces the Orders Conceived and Published by the Lord Mayor and 
Aldermen of the City of London Concerning the Infection of the Plague, 1665.21  But 
Defoe undercuts this official and documentary history of events with his exposé of the 
brutality and futility of enforcing quarantines.  The Journal, after some equivocation, 
bluntly concludes that these health measures are unlikely to be effective, since many 
plague victims are asymptomatic carriers, indistinguishable from the healthy.  Defoe‟s 
approach points to a suspicion of the monologic authority implied by juridical discourse, 
one grounded in the controversy surrounding the government‟s response to the plague 
scare of 1720.  Defoe‟s use of the Orders transposes to 1665 his more immediate 
intervention in intense debate over the application of governmental powers, particularly 
the use of military force against a civilian population. 
 In January of 1721, the government passed a bill establishing strict quarantines, 
restrictions on trade, and provisions for maintaining civil order in the event of plague.  
Certain provisions of the act, widely perceived as draconian, allowed for capital 
punishment for quarantine violators, the restriction of commerce, and isolation of 
infected areas.  A second act, authorizing the king to halt trade with infected areas and 
providing for huge fines for violators, drew the ire of merchants and consolidated 
criticism of the first act, which culminated in the City of London‟s petition for a repeal of 
                                                 
21 Bastian speculates that Defoe simply gave a copy of the Orders, which were included in the Roberts 
collection, to his printer—who, following Roberts, added the names of the officials and the date, which 
were not included in the original 1665 printing.  Of course Roberts was one of Defoe‟s publishers—so the 
connection may have been closer still; but the type at least appears to have been re-set for the Journal.   
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the most severe clauses.22  Defoe defended the bill‟s trade restrictions in Applebee’s 
Journal in July of 1721.23  The Journal of the Plague Year, however, strongly criticizes 
the kinds of policies authorized by the more severe provisions; Defoe‟s willingness to 
support the government did not extend to summary execution of fleeing detainees, or to 
isolating infected cities and towns with trenches and gunfire.
24
   
 Defoe‟s elevation of local rights and sensibilities stands in contrast to the rhetoric 
employed by the government‟s strongest advocate at the time.  Although the 
objectionable quarantine bill clauses were rescinded in 1722, the government defended its 
position with a propaganda campaign waged by proxy.  The Whig clergyman and future 
Bishop of London, Edmund Gibson, who was well rewarded for his efforts, anonymously 
authored a pamphlet, widely distributed across the country at government expense, 
designed to show the reasonableness of the act and call for public calm.25  The Causes of 
the Discontents in Relation to the Plague and the Provisions against it, Fairly Stated and 
Considered (1721) complains of the “Misrepresentations of Facts, and Misconstructions 
of the Designs, as well as Actions, of our Superiors” that were leveled against the clauses 
by critics.26  Gibson admits that any measures undertaken in the dire circumstances of 
infection are destined to be unpopular (“The Hand that administers Help and performs the 
                                                 
22 Charles F. Mullett, "The English Plague Scare of 1720-23," Osiris 2(1936): 486-91. 
23 William Lee, Daniel Defoe: His Life and Recently Discovered Writings, vol. 2 (London: John Camden 
Hotten, 1869), 407-10. 
24 Maximillian Novak makes the case for Defoe‟s opposition to the three clauses in Maximillian E. Novak, 
"Defoe and the Disordered City," PMLA 92, no. 2 (1977). 
25Norman Sykes, Edmund Gibson, Bishop of London, 1669-1748: A Study in Politics and Religion in the 
Eighteenth Century (London: Oxford University Press, 1926), 80-81. 
26 Edmund Gibson, The Causes of the Discontents, in Relation to the Plague, and the Provisions against It, 
Fairly Stated and Consider’d (London:1721). 
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Operation, will be thought cruel, tho‟ it be never so evident, that nothing but Cruelty 
stands between us and Death.”), but points out the necessity of the measures: 
Where the Disease is desperate, the Remedy must be so too; and to dwell upon 
Rights and Liberties, and the Ease and Convenience of Mankind, in case of a 
sudden Invasion, or the Plague hanging over our Heads, is as wild a Way of 
Reasoning, as if under a malignant Fever we should insist upon being dealt with 
in all respects like Men in perfect Health.27   
Here Gibson deploys the language of military threat to the body politic (“a case of sudden 
Invasion”) to investigate the remedy for a medical crisis, interpreting the problem in 
terms of state sovereignty.  He rejects other kinds of narrative as inadequate, dismissing 
religious understanding of plague as “the immediate Hand of God, and therefore not to be 
resisted.”28  The narrowly providential paradigm, by virtue of its Puritan inflection, 
offends Gibson‟s Anglican sensibility and is incompatible with administration of a 
modern government apparatus. 
 Conversely, Gibson uses illness itself (“reasoning as if under a malignant fever”) 
as a metaphor for a nation that fails gladly to submit to the salutary and reasonable 
ministrations of the government.  In this regard, we can see the plague not merely as a 
potential threat, but as a master trope for civil disorder generally, and the basis for 
thought experiments regarding the proper place and limits of civil authority.  Defoe‟s 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 2. 
28 Ibid., 13. 
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text, read as one such philosophical investigation, is therefore in line with contemporary 
models.   
Interestingly, Gibson reproduces (“because I will be very sure, while I am 
accusing others of Misrepresentation, to stand clear of the same Charge”) the three 
offending clauses of the Provisions against the plague.  It is reasonable to regard 
Gibson‟s excerpts as a model for Defoe‟s inclusion of the Lord Mayor‟s Orders, and to 
consider the Journal as a work recognizable as a rejoinder to Gibson and his manner of 
thinking.  Whatever Defoe‟s hopes regarding the pragmatics of plague prevention, he 
would have regarded an entry like Gibson‟s as politically charged in ways that 
transcended the immediate crisis. 
 The sticking points of the plague controversy involved larger debates in which 
Defoe had long taken an active part.  Gibson, in his tract, is particularly anxious to rebut 
those who liken the severe plague measures to those taken in France, implying the 
provisions sounded more suitable for a country with an absolutist “Arbitrary 
Government.”  Behind the insinuation that the government had adopted a “French 
scheme” was the impression that the authorized use of the military amounted to, as 
Gibson puts it by way of ridicule, “a Dragoon planted at every one‟s Door.”29  The threat 
of military action against civilians and Gibson‟s defense of government power by raising 
the specter of invasion recall the political environment that sparked Defoe‟s 1717 
opposition to a standing army.  Noting in an editorial piece that fears of a Jacobite 
invasion were being exploited to buttress support for the army, Defoe attacked the 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 6. 
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“Nurseries of Red Coats bred up in Foreign Pay, always ready at Command, to be called 
Home for any Drudgery that a King, who knows not Joseph, may have for them to do.”30 
 While critics have remarked on Defoe‟s critique of government measures, others 
emphasize his partial defense, or note that he often applauds the Lord Mayor and officials 
generally in the Journal.31  I would suggest that the more moderate 1665 Lord Mayor‟s 
Orders, inserted as a stand-in for the offending 1721 act and as a riposte to Gibson, offer 
a more positive model of government conceived in terms of local interests, rather than a 
remote and centrist authority.  At the same time, Defoe‟s critical ruminations on the 
Orders’ efficacy warn against state power in the abstract, while reflecting approval of the 
City‟s petition against the severe measures of 1721.   
 Gibson‟s mission, bringing his authority as an Anglican bishop to bear on behalf 
of civil administration, equally suggests the overlapping domains of knowledge and 
authority made especially problematic during a time of crisis, when a unified or at least 
comprehensive vision was called for. 32  The difficulty had been evident during plague 
since Archbishop Laud forbade sermons in infected areas during Lent.  Laud was 
criticized for religious innovation for this violation of tradition, which he defended in 
1637 as a “matter of state, as well as of religion.”  His accusers, that is, were able to 
                                                 
30Geoffrey M. Sill, Defoe and the Idea of Fiction 1713-1719 (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 
1983), 133-5. 
31 Novak negotiates Defoe‟s contradictory views by exploring his complex attitudes toward the salutary 
potential of civil unrest.  The populist potential he finds in Defoe (with reference to Christopher Hill‟s 
work) is particularly relevant here.  Again, see Maximillian E. Novak, "Defoe and the Disordered City.”  
Schonhorn sees Defoe as moderating or evading any serious criticism of officialdom in favor of a 
celebration of moderation and tolerance Manuel Schonhorn, "Defoe's Journal of the Plague Year: 
Topography and Intention," Review of English Studies 19, no. 76 (1968).. 
32 Gibson‟s DNB biographer notes, if only to reject it, the bishop‟s reputation as “Walpole‟s Pope.” 
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attack a reasonable civic precaution from the domain of religion, even as Laud was able 
to employ a medical-civic authority for a conveniently anti-Puritan result.33 Defoe‟s 
Journal, seen in these contexts, goes beyond questions of epistemology to acknowledge 
variant rhetorics that, while not necessarily inaccurate, serve a particular constituencies 
and political ends.  It is therefore unsurprising that, to his suspicion regarding public 
speech and official communication, Defoe adds the problem of interpreting signs 
presented under the aegis of political science or archival documentation as well as that of 
religion. His textual ventriloquism reaches for a more complete and local community of 
knowledge, represented particularly by London. 
 
The London Bills of Mortality 
 The fault lines in public discourses that purport to capture the experience of the 
plague are especially visible in Defoe‟s interpolations of London‟s Bills of Mortality—
the weekly register of births, causes of death, and burials collected by each of London‟s 
parish clerks.  The merchant John Graunt famously published, in 1662, a cumulative table 
of vital statistics based on the Bills and accompanied by a series of inductive 
“observations.”34 His “Natural History,” written in the style of Sir Francis Bacon or  
                                                 
33 William Laud, A Speech Concerning Innovations in the Church The English Experience (New York: 
DaCapo Press, 1971). 
34 For a history of the parish clerks and the Bills of Mortality, see Reginald H. Adams, The Parish Clerks 
of London: A History of the Worshipful Company of Parish Clerks of London (Chichester: Phillimore and 
Co., 1971), 48-70.  Bastian notes, “The Bills, as published each week, consisted of single sheets showing, 
on one side, the total number of deaths in the whole area broken down according to their causes, and on the 
other, the total number of deaths, withn each parish.  At the end of the Plague Year a compilation of these 
was published by John Bell, under the title of Britain’s Remembrancer. It has generally been assumed that 
it was a reprint of this, in 1720, that Defoe used.  However, since as early as 1712 he had published one of 
the 1665 Bills in his Review… it seems that he must have had the earlier compilation.” Bastian, "Defoe's 
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While the inclusion of the Bills have been taken as Defoe‟s attempt to lend an air 
of facticity to his narrative, Defoe‟s text has a more critical role, playing directly on the 
tension between varying concepts of truth and knowledge as figured variously by 
overlapping religious systems, cultural elites, and technocratic government.  It has been 
common to take the Bills, too easily equated with Graunt‟s proto-statistical presentation 
of them, as inherently representative of an aspiring empiricism set against a past of 
traditional knowledge.  But such framing ignores the uses of such texts, the many 
discursive realms in which the data itself became truthful or meaningful to different 
readers—a central investigation of Defoe‟s text.  In fact, the significance of the records 
throughout the text, far from being confined to questions of science and accuracy, 
depends entirely on the community of readers, which is conceived in a thoroughly 
religious mode. 
 The Bills, it must be recalled, are part of a record keeping tradition firmly 
grounded in religious purpose—from medieval accounts of alms, wills and the like to 
Reformation-era tracking of the religious polity.  Parish clerks were universally charged 
                                                                                                                                                 
Journal of the Plague Year," 161.  The collection of 1665 plague writings published by Roberts also 
contains a collection of data from the bills entitled Reflections on the Weekly Bills of Mortality which does 
not indicate an author; it does not appear to be one of the versions authored by Graunt.  Neither the Bell nor 
the Roberts collection can have been Defoe‟s sole source, however, since neither includes the statistics 
related to infant mortality or causes of death other than plague that are included in Defoe‟s Journal.  The 
Graunt collection, which was republished in several editions appears the most likely source for this 
material.  Defoe had certainly made some cursory statistical study of the Bills, at least in their weekly 
published version, as early as 1697, since his Essay Upon Projects of that year contains, in a proposal for a 
pension office, a reference to the recorded proportion of deaths between men and women and children. 
35 Ian Hacking, The Emergence of Probability, 1995 ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
1975), 102-10. 
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with keeping formal records of christenings, weddings and funerals in the Tudor era—a 
duty that merely extended longstanding secretarial and ecclesiastical functions.  London 
reports related to plague begin as early as 1532, with the weekly form of the Bills 
including causes of death traceable to 1592.36  There is, in other words, no easy 
distinction between record keeping as it served the parish as a civic-territorial unit and as 
an ecclesiastical one. 
 H.F.‟s usual mode of referencing and reproducing the Bills in the Journal 
involves, reasonably enough, a simple tallying of the dead for the purpose of gauging the 
severity, location and future of plague in the city.  For example: 
The usual Number of Burials within the Bills of Mortality for a Week, was from 
about 240 or thereabouts, to 300. The last was esteem'd a pretty high Bill; but 
after this we found the Bills successively increasing. … This last Bill was really 
frightful, being a higher Number than had been known to have been buried in one 
Week, since the preceeding Visitation of 1656. (5) 
 
Now there died four within the City, one in Wood-street, one in Fenchurch street, 
and two in Crooked-lane; Southwark was entirely free, having not one yet died on 
that Side of the Water. (8) 
 
I liv'd without Aldgate about mid-way between Aldgate Church and White-
Chappel-Bars, on the left Hand or North-side of the Street; and as the Distemper 
                                                 
36 Adams, Parish Clerks, 1-10;48-51.Adams seems to rely on Bell‟s account, in London’s Remembrancer, 
that he could find no earlier records in the Company of Parish Clerk‟s Hall.  
 239 
had not reach'd to that Side of the City, our Neighbourhood continued very easy: 
But at the other End of the Town, their Consternation was very great; and the 
richer sort of People, especially the Nobility and Gentry, from the Westpart of the 
City throng'd out of Town, with their Families and Servants in an unusual 
Manner; and this was more particularly seen in White-Chapel. (8) 
It has generally been assumed that H.F.‟s use of the Bills ties him to a probabilistic, 
bureaucratic mode of knowledge and decision-making.  The proof of this incipient 
mechanistic modernity has been located in Graunt‟s statistical tables, which are seen as 
the Bill‟s evolution into a fully modern, secular form.  But, in fact, Graunt himself 
identifies H.F.‟s style of interpretation as directly opposed to his proto-scientific project.  
Further, Graunt‟s innovations were, in their original context, an expression of a religious 
sensibility quite at odds with the future he supposedly prefigures.  Far from employing 
modern probability, H.F (who remains in London against his better judgment in order to 
protect his business interests) consults the Bills in the time-honored manner of elite 
readers who possess a basic numerical literacy but have little interest in observational 
science.  Graunt describes them with a certain disdain in the Preface to his Observations:  
Most of them who constantly took in the weekly Bills of Mortality, made little 
other use of them, then to look at the foot, how the Burials increased, or 
decreased; And, among the Casualties, what had happened rare, and extraordinary 
in the week currant: so as they might take the same as a Text to talk upon, in the 
next Company; and withal, in the Plague-time, how the Sickness increased, or 
decreased, that so the Rich might judge of the necessity of their removal, and 
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Trades-men might conjecture what doings they were like to have in their 
respective dealings.37 
Graunt‟s remarks on this unimaginative mode of reading suggest the coincidence of self-
interested interpretation with narrow neglect of available data, better applied, as he 
suggests, to “other, and greater uses” to “present the World with some real fruit.”38  His 
sophisticated pattern-seeking and public policy conclusions contrast sharply with mere 
accounting of the dead.   
 H.F.‟s ill-concealed concern for the financial bottom line thus puts him in league 
with readers who misuse church reports to evade social and spiritual obligations; the 
Journal offers unflattering descriptions of the rich abandoning servants and of H.F.‟s 
refusal to heed God‟s warnings of danger.  That egotism comes at a practical cost.  Like 
Graunt, H.F. shows a merchant‟s confident facility to read and calculate from the 
tables—but his simpler conclusions offer no more comfort than the searching for portents 
with which he began:   
This [increase in recorded deaths] alarm‘d us all again, and terrible 
Apprehensions were among the People, especially the Weather being now 
chang‘d and growing warm … However, the next week there seemed to be some 
Hopes again, the Bills were low, the Number of Dead in all was but 388 (6)  
The numbers present the public with nothing more than one more omen, like the weather, 
and serve chiefly to fuel already rampant speculation: 
                                                 
37 John Graunt, Natural and Political Observations, Mentioned in a Following Index, and Made Upon the 
Bills of Mortality (London1662), 1. 
38 Ibid., 1-2. 
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These Things [dire quasi-religious predictions] terrified the People to the last 
Degree; and especially when two or three Times, as I have mentioned already, 
they found one or two in the Bills, dead of the Plague at St. Giles. (26)  
In such inclusions, then, Defoe depicts class-bound intellectual habits that limit both good 
science and healthy religion.  The elite construe God‟s signs in numerical data, but only 
at the expense of the community and any felt need to further analyze information for the 
common good.  Popular culture, on the other hand, regards the Bills more as public 
providential signs, but without a guiding religious or educated authority.  The Journal, a 
spiritual autobiography that also voices Defoe‟s pragmatic advice on plague, leaves 
H.F.‟s reading of the Bills in an uncomfortable middle ground between natural 
philosophy and augury.  
 For Graunt, a devout Puritan, good science offered a pious and complete 
numerical model of society “as a set of correspondences uniting man, God and nature.”39 
Defoe would have appreciated this perspective and Graunt‟s methodology, drawn from 
accounting and double-entry bookkeeping and applied to a moral empirically-grounded 
public policy.  Yet, Defoe also voices doubt about political arithmetic‟s potential to fully 
represent reality.  In addition to H.F.‟s elite reading, he discerns a possible affinity 
between statistics and the narrow, instrumental discourse of state apparatuses.
 40
  Thus the 
                                                 
39 Philip Kreager, "New Light on Graunt," Population Studies 42, no. 1 (1988). 
40 “Petty was a man who wanted to put statistics in the service of the state.  He made plain their 
significance for enumerating potential soldiers and for collecting taxes.  He had made himself rich by this 
knowledge by exploiting the defeated Irish, and he thereby saw the real importance of collecting statistics 
to test a wide range of hypotheses.” Hacking, The Emergence of Probability, 105.  See also Peter Buck, 
"Seventeenth-Century Political Arithmetic: Civil Strife and Vital Statistics," Isis 68, no. 1 (1977): 80-
81.:“From the 1660s on, an increasing number of civil servants were drawn into the Royal Society, 
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Due Preparations offer a direct critique of the Bills in their capacity as medical 
statistics—neither because they are inherently secular, nor because they are insufficiently 
accurate (“factual,” in the modern sense), but because they only incompletely represent 
the truth about the community: 
Were the diseases and Casualties of which People frequently die in this populous 
City rightly given into the Bills of Mortality, many would be set down of other 
Distempers, than as we find them: Instead of Hang’d themselves (being 
Distracted) and Cut their own Throats (being Distracted) it would be said, Hang’d 
themselves (being in Despair) and Cut their own Throats (being in dreadful 
trouble of Mind).41 
Arbitrary medical categories alone, Defoe suggests, fail to link cause of death and 
contributing mental state (“distraction”) understood in its spiritual aspect.  A full 
accounting of mortality would connect to social/spiritual as well as physical morbidity.   
 Rather than diminish these remarks as a religious gloss on material reality, we can 
see that Defoe reasonably points to the social dimension of inner states of mind in 
religious subjects, and to environing conditions as they influence the cultural order 
typically maintained by a religious habitus.  That is, like his mentor Gibson, Defoe 
connects governance with spiritual habits of mind, reading failures of public policy in 
                                                                                                                                                 
attracted by a sense of sharing common intellectual orientations with its scientist members.  These men 
were the principle architects of a steady expansion and strengthening of the British state‟s central 
administration, and in the work of John Graunt and [William] Petty they found an enormously appealing 
approach to the problems of government.  Political arithmetic provided the intellectual underpinnings for 
their conviction that the bases of stable and effective rule were not to be laid simply by limiting or 
redistributing political power but required instead increased administrative efficiency and therefore an 
expanded role for practical knowledge” 
 
41 Defoe, Due Preparations, 130-1. 
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moral terms, and likewise identifying the practical effects of flawed moral agency on the 
polity.  This capacity to posit a coincidence of material and spiritual reality naturally 
involves scrutinizing discourse biased in any one direction; we can perhaps confirm 
Defoe‟s critique of proto-bureaucratic knowledge as part of that vision by turning to his 
critique of crudely providential readings as neglecting available empirical evidence. 
 
The Bills as Providential Signs 
 The same kind of paratextual material Defoe uses to invoke multiple linguistic-
literary communities shows the Bills‟ legibility within a popular religious constituency.  
The 1662 edition of Graunt‟s Observations begins with a dedication to Sir Robert Moray, 
President of the Royal Society, and has a restrained graphic design to match its scientific 
aspirations.  Graunt carefully situates his work as part of a new Baconian project, apart 
from the readers he associates with the weekly printed Bills.  Yet another framing of the 
information can be seen in two collections of the Bills assembled by John Bell for the 
Company of Parish Clerks, and published in 1665: London’s Remembrancer and 
London’s Dreadful Visitation.42 Graunt‟s project likely influenced both (the former 
includes a number of “observations”), which were intended to preserve information as 
well as defend the clerks‟ methodology.43  Bell supplements this civic purpose, however, 
with a religious one, signaled by a remarkable title page design used in both publications.  
                                                 
42 The former assembles data from the weekly Bills from a variety of plague years throughout the century, 
including 1664-5; the second collects weekly Bills for 1664-5.  Both were printed by Elinor Cotes, printer 
to the Company.  
43 Bell directly addresses critics of the Bills in the Remembrancer and affirms Graunt‟s observations about 
missing records.  The collection is obviously an entry in a discussion about the Bills‟ utility—in which 
Graunt, despite his few criticisms, figures as a strong advocate. 
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A headstone-shaped border, featuring skeletons and burial tools, a winged timepiece and 
the words “memento mori” evokes the late medieval macabre and ars moriendi 
traditions:  The images of bodily death recall humanity‟s material nature in light of its 
religious responsibility to seek contrition. 44  A printer‟s notice in the Dreadful Visitation 
insists that the assembled materials, essentially a list of parish names keyed to numerical 
death totals, will “assist thy Meditation” and entreats the reader to “consider [God‟s] 
Mercy to Thee and Mee, that we are in the Land of the Living, to work out our salvation 
with Fear and Trembling.”45  
While the number of dead is sobering, the presentation of these dry records as a 
spiritual aid shows the distance between modern divisions of knowledge and the flux of 
discourses that Defoe addresses.  Bell‟s overtly religious perspective gets the same 
scrutiny as the Bills‟ reductive quantitative story-telling: In London’s Remembrancer, 
Bell, who also acknowledges “causes natural,” interprets the plague as God‟s wrath.  He 
takes this providential language into the political realm, construing the epidemic as divine 
retribution for Charles I‟s execution—a point he makes by quoting Bishop Lancelot 
Andrewes: 
May not then this Nation justly expect God‘s greatest judgments to fall on the 
people of it, for shedding the blood of their lawful Soveraign? … And because 
Murther of all Sins is the most heinous in the sight of the Almighty, but especially 
                                                 
44 Paul Binski, Medieval Death: Ritual and Representation (London: British Museum Press, 1996), 134. 
45 Adams seems to regard the printer‟s notice as Bell‟s own—and in commending the records to posterity 
they do recall his remarks in the Remembrancer.  However, there seems no reason to exclude Cotes as the 
possible author. 
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the Murthering of Kings and Nobles, therefore God punisheth it with one of his 
severest punishments, I mean with the Plague.46 
 If Defoe used the Bell compilation as a primary source, as is generally supposed,47 he 
could hardly have overlooked this aspect of the work, and would certainly have felt the 
danger of yielding national story/history to these anti-Puritan rhetorics.  He is not above 
providing a direct counter-narrative to interpretations of this sort—but is notably more 
circumspect in characterizing God‟s will: 
It must not be forgot here, that the City and Suburbs were prodigiously full of 
People, at the time of this Visitation, I mean, at the time that it began; for tho' I 
have liv'd to see a farther Encrease, and mighty Throngs of People settling in 
London,more than ever, yet we had always a Notion, that the Numbers of People, 
which the Wars being over, the Armies disbanded, and the Royal Family and the 
Monarchy being restor'd, had flock'd to London, to settle into Business; or to 
depend upon, and attend the Court for Rewards of Services, Preferments, and the 
like,was such, that the Town was computed to have in it above a hundred 
thousand people more than ever it held before; nay, some took upon them to say, 
it had twice as many, because all the ruin'd Families of the royal Party, flock'd 
hither: All the old Soldiers set up Trades here, and abundance of Families settled 
here; again, the Court brought with them a great Flux of Pride, and new Fashions; 
All People were grown gay and luxurious; and the Joy of the Restoration had 
                                                 
46 John Bell, London's Remembrancer (E. Cotes, 1665). 
47 Bastian, "Defoe's Journal of the Plague Year."; Nicholson, The Historical Sources of Defoe's Journal of 
the Plague Year; Zimmerman, "H.F.'S Meditations: A Journal of the Plague Year." 
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brought a vast many Families to London.  I often thought, that as Jerusalem was 
besieg'd by the Romans, when the Jews were assembled together, to celebrate the 
Passover, by which means, an incredible Number of People were surpriz'd there, 
who would otherwise have been in other Countries: So the Plague entred 
London,when an incredible Increase of People had happened occasionally, by the 
particular Circumstances above-nam'd: As this Conflux of the People, to a 
youthful and gay Court, made a great Trade in the City, especially in every thing 
that belong'd to Fashion and Finery. (22) 
Defoe deftly changes the object of God‟s putative judgment from revolutionary regicide 
to the dissolute Restoration court, characterized by prideful luxury and given Biblical 
weight by parallel with the First Jewish-Roman War.  (Defoe seems here to follow the 
medieval tradition that the Roman general Vespasian represents God‟s justice, inflicted 
on unrepentant Jews for killing Christ; the anti-Semitic logic is counterintuitive).  At the 
same time, he does not, like Bell or more naïve religionists, bluntly read natural 
phenomena as an instrument of God‟s political will.  His reading, instead, more subtly 
locates proximate empirical causes of the disaster in moral failings: the Court‟s 
immediate temptations to hangers-on and indirect swelling of the population—beyond the 
city‟s capacity for healthy management, as the text makes clear—by a kind of bubble 
economy.  While linking spiritually dubious motives with dire consequences, Defoe does 
not stray from evidence-based analysis.   
 On the whole, the Journal takes a dim view of arbitrary and self-interested 
interpretations of providence and, as here, insists on spiritual reading as an inductive 
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evidential process, involving self-criticism and communal work—a process at least 
theoretically opposed to irresolvable competing claims based on inner belief.  H.F‟s 
attempts to refer the dire situation to religious authority are troubled to the extent that he 
falls short of this ideal. 
 Comfortable within a narrow providential framework, H.F. advises the reader to 
“keep his Eye on the particular Providences which occur … I think, he may safely take 
them for Intimations for Heaven of what is his unquestion‟d Duty” (11).   The plague and 
subsequent events are signs from God, who by further signs makes clear his will. Yet in 
practice, H.F. cannot determine what does or does not constitute a sign.  Interpreting 
setbacks in leaving London as God‟s desire for him to stay in the diseased city—a result 
that accords neatly with his pressing business interests—, H.F. declines to flee town.  But 
his brother, “a very Religious Man,” reproaches him for his self-serving and passive 
notion of providence.  H.F. looks only to dramatic events bearing on him directly rather 
than actively reconcile his knowledge with signs available to the larger godly community.  
His convenient self-centered fatalism, condemned by his brother as “predestinating 
Notions” (12), arbitrarily limits his responsibility to think and act.  
 Subsequently, in a superstitious mockery of genuine religious sensibility, H.F. 
seeks guidance by selecting a passage at random from his Bible.  His bibliomancy 
mirrors the response of the uneducated public, for whom the narrator has contempt.  “The 
People,” he notes, “from what Principle I cannot imagine, were more adicted  to 
Prophesies, and Astrological Conjurations, Dreams, and Old Wives Tales, than ever they 
were before or since” (22).  
 248 
 These credulous responses, in H.F.‟s description, like religious enthusiasm, 
schismatically limit the interpretive community to a few readers—or one— and produce 
incompatible, subjective readings:  
And no Wonder, if they, who were poreing continually at the Clouds, saw Shapes 
and Figures, Representations and Appearances, which had nothing in them, but 
Air and Vapour. Here they told us, they saw a Flaming-Sword held in a Hand, 
coming out of a Cloud, with a Point hanging directly over the City. There they 
saw Herses, and Coffins in the Air, carrying to be buried. And there again, Heaps 
of dead Bodies lying unburied, and the like; just as the Imagination of the poor 
terrify'd People furnish'd them with Matter to work upon. (27) 
But H.F. also tries to offset enthusiasm and its popular-superstitious equivalent with a 
studied naturalism drawn partly from natural philosophy.  With respect to the appearance 
of a comet, taken by many to herald the plague, H.F. remarks, “I was apt to look upon 
them, as the forerunners and warnings of God‟s Judgments. … But I cou‟d not at the 
same Time carry these Things to the heighth that others did, knowing too that natural 
Causes are assign‟d by the Astronomers for such Things; and that their Motions, and 
even their Revolutions are calculated, or pretended to be calculated; so they cannot be so 
perfectly call‟d the Fore-runners, or Fore-tellers, much less the procurers of such Events, 
as Pestilence, War, Fire, and the like” (22).  He cannot, in other words, arbitrarily decide 
where to exercise explanatory logic and where to insist on miraculous happenings; the 
former must be included in the domain of his religious thought. 
 H.F. demonstrates as well that true providential reading, as exemplified in 
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Bacon‟s ideals, scrutinizes the observer‟s prejudices.  He relates, for example, an 
unpleasant encounter with three men who are “not afraid to blaspheme God, and talk 
Atheistically; making a Jest at my calling the Plague the Hand of God, mocking, and 
even laughing at the Word Judgment, as if the Providence of God had no Concern in the 
inflicting such a desolating Stroke”(79).  H.F censures them and records that they were 
soon “struck from Heaven with the Plague, and died in a most deplorable Manner” (80).  
He observes that, at the time, “I went Home indeed, griev'd and afflicted in my Mind, at 
the Abominable Wickedness of those Men not doubting, however, that they would be 
made dreadful Examples of God's Justice; for I look'd up-this dismal Time to be a 
particular Season of Divine Vengeance” (82).  He soon moderates his views, however, 
realizing that his certainty of God‟s judgment might spring from personal animus:         
I was doubtful in my Thoughts, whether the Resentment I retain'd was not all 
upon my own private Account, for they had given me a great deal of ill Language 
too, I mean Personally; but after some Pause, and having a Weight of Grief upon 
my Mind, I retir'd my self, as soon as I came home, for I slept not that Night, and 
giving God most humble Thanks for my Preservation in the eminent Danger I had 
been in, I set my Mind seriously, and with the utmost Earnestness, to pray for 
those desperate Wretches, that God would pardon them, open their Eyes, and 
effectually humble them.  By this I not only did my Duty, namely, to pray for 
those who dispitefully used me, but I fully try'd my own Heart, to my full 
Satisfaction; that it was not fill'd with any Spirit of Resentment as they had 
ofended me in particular; and I humbly recommend the Method to all those that 
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would know, or be certain, how to distinguish between their real Zeal for the 
Honour of God, and the Effects of their private Passions and Resentment. (82-3) 
The passage shows the congruence of spiritual and proto-scientific discourses as 
idealized by Defoe: Reading the book of nature demands a full consideration of evidence, 
free from institutional or personal prejudice.  This is less an attempt to forge a neutral 
master discourse than a process undergone by the interpreter, who must humbly examine 
his perspective and motives.  Here, Baconian principles of disinterested observation that 
undergird political arithmetic function as spiritual and psychological exercise—one that 
divides piety from its false appearance in resentment and self-aggrandizement.  The real 
product of H.F.‟s struggle to affirm a good reading, free of psychological bias—
necessitating prayer and charity—is an altered H.F. 
 
London as Symbolic Community 
 In light of Defoe‟s persistent emphasis on interpretation as a spiritual act 
concerned with overcoming self-serving, schismatic practices, whether institutional or 
psychological, we should note one final association bearing on Defoe‟s use of the London 
Bills of Mortality—namely, their status as a register of London itself as a symbolic 
Protestant community.  The Bills had long featured as political metaphors for London as 
a whole, “within the Bills of Mortality” being a common phrase signifying the civic and 
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geographic locale comprised of those parishes contributing to the records (significantly, 
Bell‟s  collection is dedicated to the Lord Mayor).48   
Like the subsequent Great Fire, the plague of 1665 served as a test of the city‟s 
independence and resilience.  A push for self-determination also fostered a vigorous 
dissenting resistance to Charles II during the years James Foe, Defoe‟s father, served the 
city as an elected parish official and a leader of the Butcher‟s Company.
49
  London‟s 
causes were a microcosm of Defoe‟s own, and the city‟s religious and political 
independence echoes in the debates over the Quarantine Act.  Defoe‟s real allegiance 
here, beyond his shifting political loyalties, seems to be toward the local, self-
determining Protestant community his city had long been. 
As state church records, the Bills served, in effect, to document legally or 
symbolically recognized members of the London community.  That is, as a record of 
christenings and (ideally) burials in parish churches, the Bills offered an official 
population record tied to the rituals and membership of the established church.  As a 
result, one chief criticism of the Bills‟ accuracy, from the perspective of those interested 
in a full demographic-geographic survey, was that dissenters were not included in the 
totals.50  But from another point of view, the omission of dissenters accurately reflects 
their status as legal or political nonpersons. 
 This sense of the Bills representing a civil death, implicit in exclusion from the 
dominant Protestant community, may be seen in A General Bill of Mortality of the Clergy 
                                                 
48 Adams, Parish Clerks, 52. 
49 Backscheider, Daniel Defoe: His Life, 22-8. 
50 Adams, Parish Clerks. 
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of London (1646), a tract that roughly replicates the appearance of the weekly Bills and 
lists by parish in the ministers deprived of livings between 1641 and 1647 as casualties of 
the “contagious breath” of the Presbyterians. It memorializes them, in essence, as having 
suffered a living death—physically alive yet deprived of their legal or public identity. 
The tract was reprinted, rather defensively, in 1662 to justify the comparable purge of 
Puritan (or merely scrupulous) ministers—including the Foe‟s own pastor, Samuel 
Annesley, accomplished by the Act of Uniformity—who were likewise seen as living 
dead. 
To a moderate Puritan like Richard Baxter, who still hoped to see a 
comprehensive Protestant church, the clergy‟s ejection needlessly split the community 
around ill-chosen adiaphora.  From that point of view, the threat of actual death 
represented by plague highlighted how poorly such symbolic divisions mapped onto the 
real community of people who were in any case linked by their fate within the 
geographical city:   
But one great Benefit the Plague brought to the City, that is, it occasioned the 
Silenc'd Ministers more openly and laboriously to Preach the Gospel, to the 
exceeding comfort and profit of the People. … And when the Plague grew hot, 
most of the Conformable Ministers fled, and left their Flocks, in the time of their 
Extremity: whereupon divers Non-comformists pitying the dying and distressed 
People, that had none to call the impenitent to Repentance, no  to help Men to 
prepare for another World; nor to comfort them in their Terrors, when about Ten 
Thousand dyed in a Week, resolved that no obedience to the Laws of any mortal 
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Men whosoever, could justifie them for neglecting of Men's Souls and Bodies in 
such extremities.51 
Besides shaming conformable clergy who fled with “the richer sort,” Baxter calls for an 
inclusive Protestant church.  Plague merely makes evident the perpetual need to repent 
with faith—which ought to be the real test for membership in the church, and of the 
pressing need for clerical guidance.  The passage goes on to observe that the 1662 
expulsion of nonconforming ministers left London underserved by ministers, a point 
Baxter makes with reference to the population extending beyond the walls as indicated in 
the Bills. 
 The Journal echoes Baxter‟s call for all, including the minority godly community, 
to be made “visible Christians” by pointing to the unity of all Christians in extremis.  The 
backdrop of plague features as a leveling presence, destroying former hierarchies since 
all are equal before death (193-4) and indeed, the Journal claims that the split between 
dissenters and Anglicans is erased during plague: both are united in worship. 
It was indeed, a Time of very unhappy Breaches among us in matters of Religion: 
Innumerable Sects, and Divisions, and separate Opinions prevail'd among the 
People; the Church of England was restor'd indeed with the Restoration of the 
Monarchy, about four Year before; but the Ministers and Preachers of the 
Presbyterians, and Independants, and of all the other Sorts of Professions, had 
begun to gather separate Societies, and erect Altar against Altar, and all those had 
their Meetings for Worship apart, as they have but not so many then, the 
                                                 
51 Richard Baxter, Reliquiae Baxterianae (London:1696), III.6. 
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Dissenters being not thorowly form'd into a Body as they are since, and those 
Congregations which were thus gather'd together, were yet but few; and even 
those that were, the Government did not allow, but endeavour'd to suppress them, 
and shut up their Meetings. But the Visitation reconcil'd them again, at least for a 
Time, and many of the best and most valuable Ministers and Preachers of the 
Dissenters, were suffer'd to go into the Churches, where the Incumbents were fled 
away, as many were, not being able to stand it; and the People flockt without 
Distinction to hear them preach, not much inquiring who or what Opinion they 
were of. (31-2) 
Defoe and Baxter both draw on the commonplace that extreme conditions reveal the 
spiritual truth that man is always under suspended sentence, and must repent.  They 
extend their point to the advantage of the dissenting cause, observing that their practice 
and call for a more inclusive church most closely approximate the view that others take 
only under duress.  
 The Journal takes up the articulation of that spiritual and ecclesiastical position in 
the civic and municipal body.  Baxter‟s call for all who meet the basic test of faith to be 
made visible Christians points, in the context of the plague, to the need for a coincidence 
of the real city and the visible church—for all citizens to be counted.  Defoe‟s ecological 
concerns about public health and civic institutions that manage disasters, as extreme tests 
of good management, are grounded very much in his dissenting perspective.  His 
particular emphasis on the city as the unit of governance in its correct scale reflects a 
culturally Presbyterian or congregational sensibility—attuned neither to an arbitrarily 
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designated territorial church, nor to the isolated or amorphously networked godly 
communities of enthusiasm or Independency.   
 Plague, no respecter of class or sectarian boundaries, but determined by physical 
vectors of contagion makes an ideal case study for Defoe‟s (or Baxter‟s) vision of a 
Protestant community roughly coincident with a geographic and civic locale.  The 
spiritual community depends for its existence upon its ability to work together to 
collectively and honestly read signs from God; at the same time, the interpretive work of 
civic duty serves to purge the community of schismatic self-interest or psychic 
dishonesty.   Defoe‟s text makes clear the practical dangers of leaving anyone off the map 
of the community: Dissenting status as legally semi-existent is belied by the practical 
need to count everyone.  The  danger associated with inaccurate Bills—misreading the 
plague and allowing disease to spread to everyone—makes for an implicit critique of 
governing from within the national church as well as pointing to the practical advantages 
of a more complete church—a link between symbolic and actual death, between the civic 
body and the church body. 
 
Conclusion:  A City of Souls 
 In Defoe's Journal, we witness, overall, H.F.‟s inability to represent, using 
dominant social narratives or epistemologies, his experience according to his religious 
impulses, his respect for judicious observation, and his wish to capture the historical truth 
of the public tragedy.  The Bills invite an array of reading strategies, none of which fully 
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reflect a pious pragmatic engagement with interpretation itself—as a spiritual exercise 
designed to foster health self- and civic governance.   
Defoe emphasizes the official status of the would-be hegemonic discourse of 
“fact.”  But that perspective remains unavailable to the public, whose religious faith and 
alienation from the channels of official power and knowledge (figured here particularly in 
the abandonment of the city by that elite group) make it unsuitable for their purposes.  On 
the other hand, for the bourgeois Defoe, the alternative medium of public speech too 
readily collapses into mob behavior and uncertainty.  Similarly, the possibility for a 
religious resolution is thwarted by the sense of religious schism, the fact that no 
institutional authority exists to give shape to these interpretations.  A summary of the 
schema involved may be approximately: 
 
 
Speech Genre Characterized By… Status 
Popular Commercial  Rumor Irrational/ Demagogic/Superstitious 
Official/Scientific  Isolated “Fact” Rational/Autocratic/Secular 
Popular Religious  Providential Sign Irrational/Schismatic/Reverent 




Defoe examines several available discourses, each appropriate to a specific social space, 
but each with limitations with respect to the political and religious circumstances of 1665, 
or 1722.  From every space of representation, Defoe is able to draw some desirable 
element, but each is, in and of itself, inadequate.  In this sense, the plague embodies, or is 
a symbolic representation of, the threatening limit-cases for the constituency associated 
with each speech genre:  In plague (social crisis) loom the possibilities for revolt by the 
masses (figured in the text, but not discussed here), dereliction of duty or authoritarian 
practice by the elite classes, and the metastasis of religious schism into a heterogeneity of 
superstitious practices. 
 Defoe‟s textual strategy, including his direct representation of the printed matter 
itself, assimilates the material, illuminates these competing modes of communication and, 
perhaps, sublates them into a more complete representation.  From a political point of 
view, the Journal resists a vertical stratification of society and its expressive authority in 
which any one discourse gains precedence over others.  Defoe preserves in his narrative 
what he sees as the best elements of speech (rationality, reverence, and commonality) in a 
horizontal structure: the texts are presented on the same plane, and torn from control of 
any particular interest, as comparable discourses of truth.  By presenting the array of 
texts, Defoe forms a readerly community expected to pass judgment on authority as he 
renders the texts legible to a broad spectrum of society.  In this sense, the historical 
narrative simulates a live voice, reviving the dead letter of authoritative texts by casting 
them back into the community in the form of a critical discussion.  
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 With Defoe‟s meta-epistemology in view, it will be useful to return to the notion 
of the text as an aspect of spiritual practice—as opposed to a modern imaginative or 
historical project.  My point here is not to classify or re-classify Due Preparations or the 
Journal in terms of their genre or reception, but rather to unearth the fundamental mode 
that unites the variant forms Defoe utilized:  this is a mode or speaking position that 
might be characterized as a spiritual meditation on emergent governmental and popular 
institutions and narratives, which are subjected to scrutiny within a dissenting framework.  
Characteristically, Defoe rejects nothing that is “new”—not print culture, not public 
management, not the new science—, but he does subject emergent institutions to a re-
visioning that makes their spiritual potential a test of their value.  Under the logic of the 
cultivation of Spirit, as expressed by Charles Morton, the one-to-one correspondence 
between the self as a potentially realizable member of a spiritual community and the State 
as both nurturer and beneficiary of that member‟s potential is crucial.    
 So, while the Due Preparations has been seen as a repository of practical advice, 
coupled with a separate series of dialogues on the highly subjective problem of salvation, 
we can nonetheless discern a symmetry in the projects.  Defoe‟s legislative proposals in 
that work, for example, are concerned in large part with preventing the deployment of 
soldiers against civilians, as occurred in France.52  Authority for the “Invasion of Liberty 
and the Ruin of Property” cannot be legitimate while, on the other hand, civilians 
certainly have a “natural Right to flee for preservation of their lives.”53  Similarly, Defoe 
                                                 
52 Defoe, Due Preparations, 9. 
53 Ibid., 16-17.  
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devotes a sizeable portion, if not a majority, of his argument regarding evacuation and 
quarantine to the necessity of making provision for the poor, the incarcerated, and the 
infirm.54  From the other side, the “Mother” character in Defoe‟s dialogue concerning 
salvation does not hesitate to identify the plague as a “National humiliation,” one that 
should force the country as a whole to cease its commerce and reflect upon God. 
 The points of exchange between individual Spirit and public institutions are even 
more on view in the Journal, where, as I have noted, H.F.‟s temptation toward 
superstitious forms of religious practice is marked out for particular criticism.  
Characterized, finally, as a “Turkish predestinarianism”—that is, an unchristian and 
unseemly fatalism—his real sin is not merely that of irreligion or superstition, but the 
particularly offensive failing of refusing to interpret the full range of God‟s signs from 
the point of view of the community.  To narrow the field to a simple and direct token of 
God‟s will represents a complete abdication of the more difficult responsibility for 
engaging and interpreting the whole world as a step toward altering the self. The 
implication of Defoe‟s insistence on this point is that his pragmatic engagements are, 
equally, spiritual ones.   
 By the same token, there is a decided respect for scientific methods and statistics 
as one useful facet of God‟s world even as—as the quotation regarding suicides in the 
London Bills suggests—there is a distinction drawn between the scientific knowledge that 
there were suicides, and the spiritual meaning of the raw data.  The spiritual is not 
marked off from the empirical; rather, the spiritual is marked by the mode of engagement 
                                                 
54 Defoe, A Journal of the Plague Year, 20-7. 
 260 
with the empirical.  To Defoe‟s dissenting sensibility, there is very little tension between 
faith and the pure contents of modernity frequently taken as the secular—a perspective 
that will survive in Enlightened versions of natural philosophy.   The problems lie instead 







Adams, Reginald H. The Parish Clerks of London: A History of the Worshipful Company 
of Parish Clerks of London. Chichester: Phillimore and Co., 1971. 
"An Admonition to Parliament." In Puritan Manifestoes: A Study of the Origin of the Puritan 
Revolt, ed. W.H. Frere and C.E. Douglas. New York: Burt Franklin, 1972. 
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. New York: Verso, 2006. 
Armstrong, Nancy. How Novels Think: The Limits of Individualism from 1719-1900. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 2001. 
Backscheider, Paula. A Being More Intense: A Study of the Prose Works of Bunyan, Swift 
and Defoe. New York: AMS Press, 1984. 
———. Daniel Defoe: Ambition and Innovation. Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 1986. 
——— .Daniel Defoe: His Life. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989. 
Barrow, Isaac. The Works of Isaac Barrow, D.D. Vol. 2. New York: John Riker, 1845. 
Bastian, F. "Defoe's Journal of the Plague Year." The Review of English Studies 16, no. 
62 (1965): 151-73. 
 262 
Battestin, Martin C. The Moral Basis of Fielding's Art: A Study of Joseph Andrews. 
Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1959. 
Baxter, Richard. The Reformed Pastor. Richmond, VA: John Knox Press, 1956. 
———. Reliquiae Baxterianae. London: 1696. 
Bell, John. London's Remembrancer: London: E. Cotes, 1665. 
Bender, John. "Enlightenment Fiction and the Scientific Hypothesis." Representations 61 
(1998): 6-28. 
———. Imagining the Penitentiary: Fiction and the Architecture of Mind in Eighteenth-
Century England. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987. 
Benedict, Barbara. "Encounters with the Object: Advertisements, Time, and Literary 
Discourse in the Eighteenth-Century Thing-Poem." Eighteenth-Century Studies 
20, no. 2 (2007): 193-207. 
———. "The Spirit of Things." In The Secret Life of Things: Anlimals, Objects, and It-
Narratives in Eighteenth Century England, edited by Mark Blackwell, 19-39. 
Lewisberg: Bucknell University Press, 2007. 
Bermingham, Ann, and John Brewer. The Consumption of Culture, 1600-1800 : Image, 
Object, Text, Consumption and Culture in the 17th and 18th Centuries. London ; 
New York: Routledge, 1995. 
Binski, Paul. Medieval Death: Ritual and Representation. London: British Museum 
Press, 1996. 
Bloom, Allan. "An Outline of Gulliver's Travels." In Gulliver's Travels, edited by Robert 
A. Greenberg, 297-311. New York: Norton, 1970. 
 263 
Bossy, John. Christianity in the West 1400-1700. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1985. 
Boughen, Edward. A Sermon Concerning Decencie and Order in the Church. 
London:1638. 
Boyle, Frank. Swift as Nemesis: Modernity and Its Satirist. Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 2000. 
Bradshaw, William. English Puritanisme. London:1605. 
———. A Treatise of Divine Worship. Middelburg:1604. 
Brewer, John, and Roy Porter. Consumption and the World of Goods. London ; New 
York: Routledge, 1993. 
Brown, Bill. "Things." Critical Inquiry 28, no. 1 (2001): 1-22. 
Brown, Callum G. The Death of Christian Britain: Understanding Secularisation, 1800-
2000. New York: Routledge, 2001. 
———. "The Mechanism of Religious Growth in Urban Societies: British Cities since 
the Eighteenth Century." In European Religion in the Age of the Great Cities, 
1830-1930, ed. Hugh McLeod. New York: Routledge, 1995. 
Brown, Norman O. Life against Death: The Psychoanalytical Meaning of History 
Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1970. 
Bruce, Steve, ed. Religion and Modernization: Sociologists and Historians Debate the 
Secularization Thesis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. 
Buck, Peter. "Seventeenth-Century Political Arithmetic: Civil Strife and Vital Statistics." 
Isis 68, no. 1 (1977): 67-84. 
 264 
Burke, Peter, ed. New Perspectives on Historical Writing. Cambridge: Polity, 1991. 
Burton, Henry. Jesu-Worship Confuted. London:1660. 
Burtt, Shelley. Virtue Transformed: Political Argument in England, 1688-1740. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
Casaubon, Meric. Of the Necessity of Reformation in, and before Luther's Time. 
London:1664. 
———. A Treatise Concerning Enthusiasme, as It Is an Effect of Nature, but Is Mistaken 
by Many for Either Divine Inspiration, or Diabolical Possession. London:1655. 
Castle, Terry J. "Why the Houyhnhnms Don't Write: Swift, Satire and the Fear of the 
Text." In Jonathan Swift, edited by Nigel Wood, 239-54. New York: Longman, 
1999. 
Churchland, Paul. "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes." In The 
Nature of Mind, edited by David M. Rosenthal, 601-12. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991. 
Clark, J.C.D. English Society 1660-1832: Religion, Ideology and Politics During the 
Ancien Regime. 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
Collinson, Patrick. Archbishop Grindal, 1519-1583 : The Struggle for a Reformed 
Church. London: J. Cape, 1979. 
———. Archbishop Grindal, 1519-1583: The Struggle for a Reformed Church. London: 
J. Cape, 1979. 
———. The Birthpangs of Protestant England: Religious and Cultural Change in the 
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988. 
 265 
———. The Elizabethan Puritan Movement. London: Cape, 1967. 
———. "The English Reformation, 1945-1995." In Companion to Historiography, edited 
by Michael Bentley, 336-60. New York: Routledge, 1997. 
———. The Puritan Character: Polemics and Polarities in Early Seventeenth-Century 
English Culture. Los Angeles: William Andrews Clark Memorial Library, 
University of California, 1989. 
———. The Reformation. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2003. 
———. "Sir Nicholas Bacon and the Elizabethan Via Media." The Historical Journal 23, 
no. 2 (1980): 255-73. 
Como, David R. Blown by the Spirit : Puritanism and the Emergence of an Antinomian 
Underground in Pre-Civil-War England. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2004. 
Cook, Richard. "Mandeville's Modest Defense of Public Stews." In Mandeville Studies: 
New Explorations in the Art and Thought of Dr. Bernard Mandeville (1670-
1733), ed. Irwin Primer, 22-33. The Hague: Kluwer Academinc Publishers, 1975. 
Copjec, Joan. Read My Desire: Lacan Against the Historicists. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1994. 
Cox, Jeffrey. The English Churches in a Secular Society: Lambeth, 1870-1930. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1982. 
Craig, John. Reformation Politics and Polemics: The Growth of Protestantism in East 
Anglian Market Towns 1500-1610. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2001. 
 266 
Craig, Patrick Collinson and John, ed. The Reformation in English Towns, 1500-1640. 
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998. 
Crane, R.S. "Suggestions toward  a Genealogy of the 'Man of Feeling'." ELH 1, no. 3 
(1934): 205-30. 
Cressy, David. Bonfires and Bells: National Memory and the Protestant Calendar in 
Elizabethan and Stuart England. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989. 
———Birth, Marriage, and Death: Ritual, Religion, and the Life-Cycle in Tudor and 
Stuart England. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. 
———. England on Edge: Crisis and Revolution, 1640-1642. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006. 
———. Travesties and Transgressions in Tudor and Stuart England: Tales of Discord 
and Dissension. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
Crowley, Robert. A Briefe Discourse Concerning the Outwarde Apparell and Ministring 
Garmentes of the Popishe Church. Emden:1566. 
———. A Briefe Discourse Concerning the Outwarde Apparell and Ministring Garmentes of the 
Popishe Church. s.n.:1578. 
Curry, Judson. "Arguing About the Project: Approaches to Swift's an Argument against 
Abolishing Christianity and a Project for the Advancement of Religion." 
Eighteenth-Century Life 20, no. 1 (1996): 67-79. 
Damrosch, Leopold. God's Plot and Man's Stories: Studies in the Fictiona Imagination 
from Milton to Fielding. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985. 
 267 
Daston, Lorraine, ed. Things That Talk: Object Lessons from Art and Science. Zone 
Books ed. New York: MIT Press, 2004. 
Davies, Horton. Worship and Theology in England. Vol. I. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1970. 
Defoe, Daniel. Due Preparations for the Plague, as Well for Soul as Body. London1722. 
———. A Journal of the Plague Year. London: E. Nutt; J. Roberts; A. Dodd; and J. 
Graves, 1722. 
———. The Life and Strange Surprising Adventures of Robinson Crusoe. London: W. 
Taylor, 1719. 
Dennis, Nigel. Jonathan Swift: A Short Character. New York: Macmillan, 1964. 
Dickens, A.G. The English Reformation. 2nd ed. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1989. 
Drake, George A. "The Dialectics of inside and Outside: Dominated and Appropriated 
Space in Defoe's Historical Fictions." Eighteenth-Century Fiction 14, no. 2 
(2002): 125-40. 
Duffy, Eamon. The Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in England, 1400-1580. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992. 
———. The Voices of Morebath: Reformation and Rebellion in an English Village. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2001. 
Dyson, A.E. "Swift: The Metamorphosis of Irony." Essays and Studies 11 (1958): 53-67. 
Eachard, John. Grounds and Occasions of the Contempt of the Clergy and Religion Enquired 
into in a Letter Written to R.L. London:1672. 
 268 
Editors, SparkNotes. "Sparknote on Gulliver‘s Travels." SparkNotes LLC, 
http://www.sparknotes.com/lit/gulliver/section3.rhtml. 
Eilon, Daniel. Faction's Fictions: Ideological Closure in Swift's Satire. Newark: 
University of Delaware Press, 1991. 
Empson, William. Some Versions of Pastoral. New York: New Directions, 1974. 
Erikson, Erik. Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History. New York: 
Norton, 1962. 
Fabricant, Carole. Swift's Landscape. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. 
Fielding, Henry. The History of the Adventures of Joseph Andrews. Edited by Adam 
Potkay. New York: Pearson Longman, 2008. 
Fisher, Edward. The Marrow of Modern Divinity Touching Both the Covenant of Works, 
and the Covenant of Grace. London1646. 
———. A Touch-Stone for a Communicant. London1647. 
Flavell, John. Navigation Spiritualized. fourth ed. London1698. 
———. The Whole Works of John Flavell. Vol. I. London1701. 
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Translated by Alan 
Sheridan. New York: Vintage, 1979. 
———. The Hermenuetics of the Subject: Lectures at the College De France, 1981-
1982. Translated by Graham Burchell. New York: Picador, 2005. 
———. "Technologies of the Self." In Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel 
Foucault, ed. Huck Guttman Luther H. Martin, and Patrick H. Hutton, 16-49, 
1988. 
 269 
Francus, Marilyn. The Converting Imagination: Linguistic Theory and Swift’s Satiric 
Prose. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992. 
French, Katherine, Gary Gibbs and Beat Kumin, ed. The Parish in English Life. New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1997. 
Gaukroger, Stephen. Francis Bacon and the Transformation of Early-Modern 
Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
Gay, Peter, ed. The Freud Reader. New York: W.W. Norton, 1989. 
Geary, Patrick. Living with the Dead in the Middle Ages. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1994. 
Gibson, Edmund. The Causes of the Discontents, in Relation to the Plague, and the 
Provisions against It, Fairly Stated and Consider’d. London1721. 
Gibson, William. The Church of England 1688-1832: Unity and Accord. New York: 
Routledge, 2001. 
Gildon, Charles. The Life and Strange Surprizing Adventures of Mr. D---- De F--, of 
London. London1719. 
Gilmore, Thomas B. "The Comedy of Swift's Scatalogical Poems." PMLA 91, no. 1 
(1976): 33-43. 
———. "Freud and Swift: A Psychological Reading of Strephon and Chloe." PLL 14 
(1978): 147-51. 
Gowland, Angus. "The Problem of Early Modern Melancholy." Past and Present 191, 
no. May (2006): 77-120. 
 270 
Graunt, John. Natural and Political Observations, Mentioned in a Following Index, and 
Made Upon the Bills of Mortality. London:1662. 
Guattari, Gilles Deleuze and Felix. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. New 
York: Viking Press, 1977. 
Hacking, Ian. The Emergence of Probability. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1975. 
Hadot, Pierre. Plotinus, or the Simplicity of Vision. Translated by Michael Chase. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993. 
Haigh, Christopher, ed. The English Reformation Revised. New York: Cambridge UP, 
1987. 
———. English Reformations: Religion, Politics, and Society under the Tudors. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1993. 
———. Reformation and Resistance in Tudor Lancashire. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1975. 
Harth, Phillip. Swift and Anglican Rationalism: The Religious Background of a Tale of a 
Tub. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961. 
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward 
Robinson. New York: Harper and Row, 1962. 
———. Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude. Translated by 
William McNeil and Nicholas Walker. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 
1995. 
Hempton, David. The Religion of the People. London: Routledge, 1996. 
 271 
Heyd, Michael. "The Reaction to Enthusiasm in the Seventeenth Century: Towards and 
Integrative Approach." The Journal of Early Modern History 53, no. 2 (1981): 
258-80. 
Hunt, Lynn, ed. The New Cultural History. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1989. 
Hunter, Ian. "The Morals of Metaphysics: Kant's Groundwork as Intellectual Paideia." 
Critical Inquiry 28 (2002): 908-29. 
Hunter, J. Paul. Before Novels: The Cultural Contexts of Eighteenth-Century English 
Fiction. 1st ed. New York: Norton, 1990. 
———. "Gulliver's Travels and the Novel." In The Genres of Gulliver's Travels, edited 
by Frederik N. Smith, 56-75, 1990. 
———. The Reluctant Pilgrim: Defoe's Emblematic Method and Quest for Form in 
Robinson Crusoe. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. 
Jacob, W.M. Lay People and Religion in the Early Eighteenth Century. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
Jones, Matthew L. The Good Life in the Scientific Revolution: Descartes, Pascal, Leibniz, 
and the Cultivation of Virtue. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006. 
 
Kelly, Ann Cline. Jonathan Swift and Popular Culture: Myth, Media, and the Man. New 
York: Palgrave, 2002. 
Kelly, James William. "Flavell, John (Bap. 1630, D. 1691)." In Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography: Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008  
 272 
Knappen, M.M. Tudor Puritanism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965. 
Kreager, Philip. "New Light on Graunt." Population Studies 42, no. 1 (1988): 129-40. 
Ladner, Gerhart. The Idea of Reform: Its Impact on Christian Thought and Action in the 
Age of the Fathers. New York: Harper and Row, 1967. 
Lake, Peter. "Calvinism and the English Church, 1570-1635." Past and Present 114 (1987): 
32-76. 
———. "The Laudian Style: Order, Uniformity and the Pursuit of the Beauty of Holiness 
in the 1630s." In The Early Stuart Church: 1603-1642, edited by Kenneth 
Fincham, 161-86. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1993. 
———. Moderate Puritans and the Elizabethan Church. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982. 
Landa, Louis A. "Swift, the Mysteries, and Deism." Studies in English 24 (1944): 239-56. 
Laud, William. A Speech Concerning Innovations in the Church The English Experience. 
New York: DaCapo Press, 1971. 
Lee, William. Daniel Defoe: His Life and Recently Discovered Writings. Vol. 2. London: 
John Camden Hotten, 1869. 
Litzenberger, Caroline. The English Reformation and the Laity: Gloucestershire, 1540-
1580. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
Liu, Tai. Puritan London: A Study of Religion in the City Parishes. Newark: University 
of Delaware Press, 1986. 
Livingston, David. Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium: Hume's Pathology of 
Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1998. 
 273 
Loverman, Kate. Reading Fictions, 1660-1740: Deception in English Literary and 
Political Culture. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008. 
MacCulloch, Diarmaid. The Later Reformation in England 1547-1603. New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1990. 
———. The Reformation. New York: Viking, 2004. 
MacCulloch, Diarmid. "The Myth of the English Reformation." The Journal of British 
Studies 30, no. 1 (1991): 1-19. 
MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1984. 
Maltby, Judith. Prayer Book and People in Elizabethan and Early Stuart England. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
———. "Suffering and Serving: The Civil Wars, the Commonwealth and the Formation of 
‗Anglicanism,‘ 1642-60." In Religion in Revolutionary England, edited by 
Christopher Durston and Judith Maltby, 158-80. New York: Manchester 
University Press, 2006. 
Mandeville, Bernard. An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour, and the Usefulness of 
Christianity in War. London: 1732. 
Marsh, Christopher. "'Common Prayer' in England 1560-1640: The View from the Pew." 
Past and Present 171 (2001): 66-94. 
———. "Sacred Space in England, 1560-1640: The View from the Pew." Journal of 
Ecclesiastical History 53, no. 2 (2002): 286-311. 
 274 
Marshall, Peter. "Evangelical Conversion in the Reign of Henry Viii." In The Beginnings 
of English Protestantism, ed. Peter Marshall and Alec Ryrie, 14-37. New York: 
Cambridge, 2002. 
———. Reformation England 1480-1642. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
Mayer, Robert. "The Reception of a Journal of the Plague Year and the Nexus of Fiction 
and History in the Novel." ELH 57, no. 3 (1990): 529-55. 
Mayne, Jasper. A Sermon against False Prophets. s.n.: 1647. 
McDowell, Paula. "Defoe and the Contagion of the Oral: Modeling Media Shift in a 
Journal of the Plague Year." PMLA 121, no. 1 (2006): 87-106. 
McKeon, Michael. The Origins of the English Novel 1600-1740. Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1987. 
Milton, Anthony. "Canon Fire: Peter Heylyn at Westminster." In Westminster Abbey 
Reformed: 1540-1640, edited by C.S. Knighton and Richard Mortimer, 207-31. 
Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2003. 
Montag, Warren. The Unthinkable Swift: The Spontaneous Philosophy of a Church of 
England Man. New York: Verso, 1994. 
Morrill, J. S. Revolt in the Provinces: The People of England and the Tragedies of War, 
1630-1648. 2nd ed. New York: Longman, 1999. 
Morton, Charles. The Spirit of Man. Boston: 1692. 
Mueller, Judith C. "Writing under Constraint: Swift's "Apology" For a Tale of a Tub." 
ELH 60, no. 1 (1993): 101-15. 
Mullett, Charles F. "The English Plague Scare of 1720-23." Osiris 2 (1936): 484-516. 
 275 
Murdock, Graeme. Beyond Calvin: The Intellectual, Political and Cultural World of 
Europe's Reformed Churches. New York: Palgrave, 2004. 
Murray, John Middleton. Jonathan Swift: A Critical Biography. New York: Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux, 1967. 
Newman, Jay. Fanatics and Hypocrites. Buffalo, New York: Prometheus, 1986. 
Newman, John Henry. The Via Media of the Anglican Church : Illustrated in Lectures, 
Letters and Tracts Written between 1830 and 1841. New York: Longmans, 1897-
1899. 
Nicholson, Watson. The Historical Sources of Defoe's Journal of the Plague Year. 
Boston: The Stratford Company, 1919. 
Noggle, James. The Skeptical Sublime: Aesthetic Ideology in Pope and the Tory Satirists. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
Novak, Maximillian E. "Defoe and the Disordered City." PMLA 92, no. 2 (1977): 241-52. 
Nuttall, Geoffrey F. The Holy Spirit in Puritan Faith and Experience. 2d ed. Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1947. 
Obelkevich, Jim. Religion and Rural Society: South Lindsey, 1825-1875. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1976. 
Orwell, George. "Politics Vs. Literature: An Examination of Gulliver's Travels." In The 
Orwell Reader: Fiction, Essays and Reportage. New York: Harcourt, Brace and 
Company, 1956. 
———. "The Sanctified Sinner." The New Yorker, July 17 1948, 61-63. 
Parker, Matthew. A Briefe Examination. London1566. 
 276 
Patrick, Simon. A Friendly Debate Betwixt Two Neighbours, the One a Conformist, the 
Other a Non-Conformist London1668. 
Paulin, Tom. Crusoe's Secret: The Aesthetics of Dissent. London: Faber, 2005. 
Paulson, Ronald. Theme and Structure in Swift's Tale of a Tub  New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1960. 
Pearl, Valerie. London and the Outbreak of the Puritan Revolution; City Government and 
National Politics, 1625-43. London: Oxford University Press, 1961. 
Pelikan, Jaroslav, ed. Luther's Works. Vol. 26. St. Louis, Missouri: Concordia Publishing 
House, 1963. 
Perkins, William. " A Treatise Tending Unto a Declaration Whether a Man Be in the 
Estate of Damnation or in the Estate of Grace." London: 1590. 
Pfau, Thomas. Romantic Moods: Paranoia, Trauma, and Melancholy, 1790-1840. 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005. 
Pocock, J.G.A. The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the 
Atlantic Republican Tradition. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003. 
———. "Virtue and Commerce in the Eighteenth Century." Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History 3 (1972): 119-34. 
———. Virtue, Commerce and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, 
Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985. 
Pounds, N.J.G. A History of the English Parish: The Culture of Religion from Augustine 
to Victoria. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
 277 
Prior, Charles W. A. Defining the Jacobean Church: The Politics of Religious 
Controversy, 1603-1625. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
Pruett, John H. The Parish Clergy under the Later Stuarts: The Leicestershire 
Experience. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978. 
Questier, Peter Lake and Michael, ed. Conformity and Orthodoxy in the English Church, 
C.1560-1660. Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2000. 
Raven, James. "The Book Trades." In Books and Their Readers in Eighteenth-Century 
England: New Essays, edited by Isabel Rivers. New York: Leicester University 
Press, 2001. 
Rawson, Claude. "The Character of Swift's Satire: Reflections on Swift, Johnson, and 
Human Restlessness." In The Character of Swift's Satire: A Revised Focus, edited 
by Claude Rawson. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1983. 
Reardon, Bernard M.G. Religious Thought in the Reformation. New York: Longman, 
1981. 
Richetti, John. Popular Fiction before Richardson: Narrative Patterns 1700-1739. 
Oxford: Clarendon, 1969. 
———. "Secular Crusoe: The Reluctant Pilgrim Re-Visited." In Eighteenth-Century 
Genre and Culture: Serious Reflections on Occasional Forms edited by Dennis 
Todd and Cynthia Wall, 58-79. Cranbury NJ: University of Delaware Press, 2001. 
Rivers, Isabel. Reason, Grace, and Sentiment: A Study of the Language of Religion and 
Ethics in England, 1660-1780. Vol. I: Whichcote to Wesley. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
 278 
Robartes, Foulke. God's Holy House and Service. London: 1639. 
Rodino, Richard. "Blasphemy or Blessing? Swift's Scatological Poems." PLL 14 (1978): 
152-70. 
Ross, John. Swift and Defoe: A Study in Relationship. Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1941. 
Rubin, Miri. Corpus Christi: The Eucharist in Late Medieval Culture. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
Ryrie, Peter Marshall and Alec. "Introduction." In The Beginnings of English 
Protestantism, edited by Peter Marshall and Alec Ryrie, 1-13. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
Sahlins, Marshall. Culture in Practice: Selected Essays. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The 
MIT Press, 2000. 
Salvaggio, Ruth. "Swift and Pychoanalysis, Language and Woman." Women's Studies 13 
(1988): 417-34. 
Scarisbrick, J.J. The Reformation and the English People. New York: Blackwell, 1984. 
Schonhorn, Manuel. "Defoe's Journal of the Plague Year: Topography and Intention." 
Review of English Studies 19, no. 76 (1968): 387-402. 
Scott, Temple, ed. The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift, D.D. Vol. IV. London: George 
Bell, 1897. 
Seager, Nicholas. "Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics: Epistemology and Fiction in 
Defoe's a Journal of the Plague Year." The Modern Language Review 103 (2008): 
639-53. 
 279 
Sembera, Richard. Rephrasing Heidegger: A Companion to Being and Time. Ottawa: 
University of Ottawa Press, 2007. 
Sena, John. "Melancholic Madness and the Puritans." The Harvard Theological Review 
66, no. 3 (1973): 293-309. 
Shanahan, John. "In the Mean Time: Jonathan Swift, Francis Bacon, and Georgic 
Struggle." In Swift as Priest and Satirist, edited by Todd C. Parker. Newark: 
University of Delaware Press, 2009. 
Sill, Geoffrey M. Defoe and the Idea of Fiction 1713-1719. Newark: University of 
Delaware Press, 1983. 
Smart, Peter. A Short Treatise of Altars, Altar-Furniture, Altar-Cringing, and Musick of 
All the Quire, Singing-Men and Choristers When the Holy Communion Was 
Administered in the Cathedrall Church of Durham, by Prebendaries and Petty-
Canons, in Glorious Copes Embroidered with Images London: 1643. 
Smith, Joshua Toulmin. The Parish: Its Powers and Obligations at Law. Second ed. 
London: H. Sweet, 1857. 
Smith, Mark. Religion in Industrial Society: Oldham and Saddleworth, 1740-1865, 
Oxford Historical Monographs. Oxford: Clarendon, 1994. 
Snape, M. F. The Church of England in Industrialising Society: The Lancashire Parish of 
Whalley in the Eighteenth Century. Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 2003. 
Starr, G. Gabrielle. "Objects, Imaginings, and Facts: Going Beyond Genre in Behn and 
Defoe." Eighteenth-Century Fiction 16, no. 4 (2004): 499-518. 
Starr, G.A. Defoe and Casuistry. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971. 
 280 
Swift, Jonathan. The Correspondence of Jonathan Swift, D.D. Ed. David Wooley. 4 vols. 
Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1999. 
———. The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift. Ed. Herbert Davis et al. 14 vols. Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1939-1968. 
Sykes, Norman. Edmund Gibson, Bishop of London, 1669-1748: A Study in Politics and 
Religion in the Eighteenth Century. London: Oxford University Press, 1926. 
Tawney, R.H. Religion and the Rise of Capitalism. New Brunswick: Transaction, 1998. 
Taylor, Charles. A Secular Age. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2007. 
———. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge: Harbard 
University Press, 1989. 
Thomas, Keith. Religion and the Decline of Magic. New York: Scribner's, 1971. 
Tonkin, A.J. Dickins and J. The Reformation in Historical Thought. Oxford: Blackwell, 
1985. 
Treat, John Harvey. Notes on the Rubric of the Communion Office. New York: 1882. 
Tyacke, Kenneth Fincham and Nichlas. Altars Restored: The Changing Face of English 
Religious Worship, 1547-C.1700. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
Tyacke, Nicholas. "Anglican Attitudes: Some Recent Writings on English Religious 
History, from the Reformation to the Civil War." Journal of British Studies 35 
(1996): 139-67. 
———. Anti-Calvinists: The Rise of English Arminianism, C. 1590-1640. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1987. 
 281 
———, ed. England's Long Reformation:1500-1800. New York: Routledge, 1998. 
Usher, Brett. "The Deanery of Blocking and the Vestiarian Controversy." Journal of 
Ecclesiastical History 52, no. 3 (2001): 434-55. 
Veeser, H. Aram, ed. The New Historicism. New York: Routledge, 1989. 
Verkamp, Bernard J. The Indifferent Mean: Adiaphorism in the English Reformation to 
1554. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1977. 
W.H. The Puritan Convert, Not to Prelatick Protestantism and yet to Prelatick 
Protestantism. London: 1676. 
Wakely, Graham Rees and Maria, ed. The Instauratio Magna, Part Ii: Novum Organum 
and Associated Texts. Vol. 11, The Oxford Francis Bacon. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2004. 
Wall, Cynthia. The Prose of Things: Transformations of Description in the Eighteenth 
Century. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006. 
Warne, Arthur. Church and Society in Eighteenth-Century Devon. New York: Augustus 
Kelley, 1969. 
Watt, Ian. The Rise of the Novel. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957. 
Weber, Max. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Edited by H.H. Gerth and C. 
Wright Mills. New York: Routledge, 1991. 
———. "On the Ideal Type." In Structures, Symbols, and Systems: Readings on 
Organizational Behavior, edited by Marshall Meyer, 40-49. Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1971. 
 282 
———. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Translated by Talcott Parsons. 
New York: Scribner, 1958. 
Webster, C.M. "The Satiric Background of the Attack on the Puritans in Swift's a Tale of 
a Tub." PMLA 50, no. 1 (1935): 210-23. 
———. "Swift's Tale of a Tub Compared with Earlier Satires of the Puritans." PMLA 47, 
no. 1 (1932): 171-78. 
———. "Swift and Some Earlier Satirists of Puritan Enthusiasm." PMLA 48, no. 4 
(1933): 1141-53. 
Weinstein, Benjamin John. "Local Self-Government Is True Socialism: Joshua Toulmin 
Smith, the State and Character Formation." English Historical Review 123, no. 
504: 1193-228. 
Whiting, C. E. Studies in English Puritanism from the Restoration to the Revolution, 
1660-1688. New York: A. M. Kelley, 1968. 
Whiting, Robert. The Blind Devotion of the People: Popular Religion and the English 
Reformation. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
———. Local Responses to the English Reformation. New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1998. 
Williams, John. The Holy Table Name and Thing. London: 1637. 
Wooley, Angus Ross and David, ed. Jonathan Swift: Major Works. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003. 
Wundt, Wilhelm. Elements of Folk Psychology: Outlines of a Psychological History of 
the Development of Mankind. London: Allen & Unwin, 1916. 
 283 
Wyrick, Deborah Baker. Jonathan Swift and the Vested Word. Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1988. 
Yates, Nigel. Buildings Faith and Worship: The Liturgical Arrangement of Anglican 
Churches, 1600-1900. Oxford: Clarendon, 1991. 
Zimmerman, Everett. "H.F.'S Meditations: A Journal of the Plague Year." PMLA 87, no. 
2 (1972): 417-23. 
———. "Swift's Scatalogical Poetry: A Praise of Folly." MLQ 48, no. 2 (1987): 124-44. 
Žižek, Slavoj. For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor. New 
York: Verso, 1991. 
———. In Defense of Lost Causes. New York: Verso, 2008. 
———. Interrogating the Real: Selected Writings. New York: Continuum, 2005. 
———. The Plague of Fantasies. New York: Verso, 1997. 
———. The Sublime Object of Ideology. New York: Verso, 1999. 
 
 
